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Social Dumping or Innovative Regulation?
Processes and Outcomes o f European Decision-Making in the Sector o f Health 
and Safety at Work Harmonization1
Abstract
When the completion of the Single European Internal Market was announced in 1985, many 
observers from the technologically advanced countries feared a lowering of existing national 
levels of protection by social dumping. These expectations were based on political integration 
theories, which analysed European policy-making primarily as intergovernmental bargaining that 
could only lead to agreements on the level of the least common denominator. European health 
and safety at work regulation, however, turned out to provide a surprisingly high level o f safety 
and health and, furthermore, even to develop innovative approaches to occupational health and 
safety regulation. When the complete European regulation process according to the New 
Approach in Technical Harmonization and Standardization is analyzed in detail, it turns out that 
European health and safety at work regulation in both phases - in legislation and in 
standardization - has to be viewed as the outcome of the interactions within complex 
configurations of actors. These configurations include more actors than just national 
governments (as analyzed by intergovernmental bargaining theories), namely national partisans 
and European actors, particularly the EC Commission as a key actor. The institutional self- 
interest of the latter is an important factor in the explanation of the observed tendency of 
innovative social regulation. However, to add legitimation to European decision-making, it is 
necessary for organized interests to become increasingly responsive to the chances of 
participation within the complex networks of European decision-making.
1 This paper is an extended version of a lecture at the European University Institute in Florence. I am 
indebted to Professor Christian Joerges and Professor Giandomenico Majone, who invited me to the EUI 
and encouraged me to write this paper, to Erwin Scherfer, Andreas BQcker and Johannes Bauerdick, 
who provided me with materials and conducted some of the interviews, and to Rolf Heinze and Helmut 




























































































1. Expectations of Social Dumping and Actual European Regulation
1.1 Expectations of Political Integration Theory Regarding Inter-governmental 
Bargaining
In many member countries, the completion of the Single European Internal Market is regarded > 
with mixed emotions. Although the economic benefits - though numerically moderate, as 
estimated by the Cecchini-study - are widely accepted, the neglect of Europe's social dimension 
is frequently criticized. The European Community, which is rooted in the Economic W 
Communities and which seems to remain, according to Streeck and Schmitter (1991, p. 138), "a 
customs union committed to liberalism and free trade", is even called the "entrepreneurs' 
Europe* (Struwe 1991; see for similar judgements the contributions in Steinkuhler [ed.] 1989 
and Kenis 1991).
When the EC started on its way to the completion of the internal market in 1985, particularly in 
the economically and technologically most advanced member countries the fear arose that the 
achieved social and ecological standards would be jeopardized. It was widely expected that 
national protective regulations, which functioned as trade barriers, would be removed by the 
White Paper deregulatory measures, leaving a regulatory vacuum which would lead to 
community-wide competition for the reduction of cost-intensive safety and health standards.
This social dumping was regarded as a consequence of Europe's inability to achieve effective 
political integration. According to the currently dominating (neo-) realist integration theory, 
European political action is mainly considered as the outcome of inter-governmental bargaining, 
under the premise that each national government has an institutional self-interest in minimizing 
changes required by European integration and in defending national structures and regulations. 
Every European regulatory act which is different from national regulation (with the exception of 
the rare cases in which a national government plans a reform exactly in this direction) causes 
economic, social and political adaptation costs.
* Economic adaptation costs arise, if European regulation changes the cost-relations and 
thus affects the relative import and export chances.
* Social adaptation costs arise, if European regulation negatively affects the working 
conditions.
* Political adaptation costs arise, if interest groups exert pressure or voters withdraw their .  
support, when they make their national government responsible for negative European 
regulation.
If we, for simplification purposes, differ between the EC Member States with high levels of 
health and safety at work regulation and those with low levels, we get the following 
configuration of interests (for similar reasoning on a different field of regulation see 
Rehbinder/Stewart 1985, p. 9-12):
* As stringent health and safety at work measures increase manufacturing costs of all 
products, these measures cause economic disadvantages for the high level countries in 
competition with the low level countries on many product markets. Therefore, the high 




























































































competitive chances on the European internal market. Furthermore, looking at the 
markets of manufacturing machinery and equipment, which are directly affected by 
product regulation of health and safety at work, the producers from the high level 
countries face difficulties selling their products on the markets in the low-level countries, 
because they are more expensive, since they include devices which are not needed in 
these countries, whereas, since the European Court of Justice's Cassis de Dijon decision 
and a restrictive interpretation of Art. 100a (4) of the EEC Treaty, they have limited 
opportunities to prevent the producers from low-level countries from offering their 
cheaper machinery and equipment on their markets.
* On the contrary, the low-level countries are not interested in a harmonization of process 
regulation at all, not even on a low level, because then their relative cost-advantages 
would diminish. On the markets for machinery and equipment, a harmonization of 
product regulation on a high level could even be disastrous, because their industries may 
not be technologically able to produce machinery and equipment with sophisticated safety 
devices. The low-level countries are interested in a harmonization of product regulation 
on a low level of protection which would open up the advanced Member States' markets 
for their cheaper products.
In sum, all Member States are interested in keeping their level of health and safety at work 
regulation. The high-level countries, however, have a strong interest in a harmonization on a 
high level, while the low-level countries profit from non-harmonized regulation as long as the 
Cassis de D ijon-policy opens the markets. In this configuration of interests, the position o f the 
high-level countries seems worse, because they want harmonization and may trade their high 
safety level for harmonization at any level, because the markets which are affected by process 
regulation are larger than the markets for machinery and equipment. As a result, a process of 
slow harmonization is predicted, ending in a harmonization on the level of the least common 
denominator, because the low-level countries are able to veto (prior to the Single European Act) 
or to form blocking minorities against high-level regulatory acts.
In a generalized analysis, Scharpf (1985) even characterized the EC as "incapable of action", 
because its decision-making system suffers from a "self-blockade", which results from the fact 
that decisions on the (higher) European level depend on the consent of the governments on the 
Gower) national level and that this consent must be unanimous or, since the Single Act o f 1986, 
almost unanimous. Since the national governments and their bureaucracies have an institutional 
self-interest in keeping and enlarging their resources and authority rather than renouncing 
sovereignty rights, they use their veto-power to block any decision with negative consequences 
for them ("Politikvetflechtm gsfalle’ or "joint-decision trap"; see also Scharpf 1985a). 
Hoffmann (1982, p. 30) sees a "power of inertia" coming from the national bureaucracies' 
institutional self-interests in avoiding change. With "package deals", "log rolling" or 
"compensatory payments* only ad-hoc-solutions with limited ranges can be achieved, because 
there are situations in which adequate compensations for each State cannot be achieved, 
especially if decisions must be made under negative-sum game conditions. Hence, the European 
Community is caught in an "institutional trap" between national sovereignty and integration, 
with no way out, neither forwards (because of the national governments' interests in keeping 
their sovereignty) nor backwards (because of the economic interests in keeping the status quo of 
the integration). Since the Member States have institutional self-interests in preserving their 
veto-power, the institutional system of the European Community is unable to overcome the 





























































































From such analyses the proposal was derived to limit harmonization in order to reduce the level 
of interest conflicts between the Member States. Schmitter, for example, explains the 
Community's ability to overcome the blockades from the mid-1960s to the 1970s with a shift 
away from harmonization, regulation and unanimity to mutual recognition, deregulation and 
qualified majority voting (1992, p. 8). He also points to the Maastricht Accord's reference to 
"the latest buzz-word in Euro-speak: subsidiarity* as an indicator that in the European Union 
still "most decisions will presumably be taken (and not just implemented) by other than central r 
government authorities" (ibid., p. 39; see also Scharpf 1990, p. 36).
Similarly, Weiler (1982) argued against a regulatory harmonization which would threaten the ^  
Member States' sovereignty, because he saw a functional requirement for the persistence of the 
European Community in managing an equilibrium between national interests and supranational 
legal supremacy by what he called "combined federalism", i.e. the "interaction of low decisional 
and high normative supranationalism" (p. 220, S23):
”.. a certain balance by a cyclical interaction of the judicial-normative process with the political- 
decisional one. Here then is one dimension of the Community formula for attaining an equilibrium 
between whole and part, centripetal and centrifugal, Community and Member States. It is an equilibrium 
which explains a seemingly irreconcilable equation: a large, surprisingly large, and effective measure of 
transnational integration coupled at the same time with the preservation of strong - unthreatened - 
national Member States." (Weiler 1982, p. 200f.)
Whereas the Member States were anxious to keep their political sovereignty, the drive towards 
integration came primarily from the development and application of Community law by the 
European Court o f Justice, which acted as a "substitute legislator" (Bettati 1989). Weiler, 
however, was not too optimistic about Europe's future, although he did not exclude the option 
of eventually overcoming the principle of unanimity. But as a result o f the extension to 12 
Member States, he expected that "the common denomination for Community action will be 
lowered even further" (Weiler, 1982, p. S38).
In the view of the realist integration theory, the Community’s (partial) repeal of the principle of 
unanimity (introduced in 1966) by the Single Act in 1986 did not help much. Scharpf considers 
the European decision-making system still as an "extremely cumbersome bargaining system, in 
which now a couple o f decisions can be made with qualified majorities (what, however, in fact 
happens rarely), but which can be paralysed by the contradiction of a few Member States" >- 
(Scharpf 1992, p. 25, my translation). Since a consensus of the national governments is still 
difficult to achieve because of the heterogenity within the European Community, Scharpf 
expects no basic change from the shift to qualified majority voting:
"Under the qualified majority rule, Brussels' harmonization decisions are still blocked by grave interest 
conflicts (e.g. between the advanced and the underdeveloped industrial countries) and by at least equally 
grave direction conflicts (e.g. between the British and the German environmental policies). Hence, the 
high level of health protection, of safety at work, of environment protection and of consumer protection, 
which is required by the Single Act (Art. 100a (3)), can not be enforced jointly, but it comes either to 
harmonization decisions on the lowest common level or to a mutual recognition of the respective national 
regulations." (Scharpf 1990, p. 36, my translation)
The advancing economic integration combined with a "blocked political integration" leads to an 




























































































national regulatory systems. The market competition, according to Scharpf (p. 37), "can only 
lead to a systematic suppression of the more expensive standard by the less costly standard*. 
Deregulation would 'degenerate to a competition of mutual dumping* (ibid., p. 38). In this 
competition between regulatory strategies, the national regulatory 'packages* will be untied so 
that each single regulation will be compared with the least expensive regulation in any other EC 
country.
The self-interest of national governments in avoiding any changes which may be connected with 
^costs of adjustment or a loss of powers or resources is reinforced by the politics o f non­
governmental actors (Streeck/Schmitter 1991, p. 142): The requirement of unanimity (or 
qualified majority voting) in decision-making puts pressure groups which are interested in 
preventing a harmonized European social policy - mainly the employers' associations - in a 
strong position, because they need just one (or three) national govemment(s) for a veto (or 
blocking minority) in the Council - "with the consequence of integration and deregulation 
becoming one and the sam e' (ibid.). Furthermore, "a class like business, whose interest was and 
is essentially not in shaping but rather in preventing a centralized European social policy, could 
always hope to find allies in national governments concerned about their sovereignty.* (ibid.) 
Streeck and Schmitter indeed write that "in the 1992 compromise, the project o f European 
integration became finally and formally bound up with a deregulation project" as a concession 
that the governments had to make in return for business giving up previous claims for protection 
of the domestic markets (ibid., p. 149).
Many scholars agree that, even if the high-level countries would succeed in preserving their 
achieved levels of protection, there would be no chance for improving these levels. Thus, if not 
a roll-back, at least a long-term standstill of innovation and improvement in the area o f social 
regulation was expected.
1.2 The Real Developments in European Regulation of Health and Safety at Work
The danger of social and ecological dumping was seen clearly when the Treaty was amended by 
the Single Act (Lindl 1991, p. 46). Therefore, in the interests of the Member States with high 
-safety standards, to Art. 100a the proviso of subsection 3 was added. The proviso that the 
Commission proposals "will take as a base a high level of protection" (italics mine), however, is 
weak and legally not binding. First, the word "high* is vague. "High" may mean higher than 
"the minimum common denominator but definitely does not mean "the highest" (otherwise 
subsection 4 would be senseless), thus, from the perspective of high level countries, not 
excluding social and ecological dumping. Secondly, the proviso is not binding, because it relates 
only to the Commission proposals and not to the final Council decisions. Hence, with Art. 100a 
(4) a land of "emergency exit" for the high-level countries was installed, allowing national 
regulation ("opting out"), if a State claims that important requirements of the safety of the 
working environment or of environment protection demand tighter national regulation and i f  - 
and this condition is essential - this national regulation does not serve as a discrimination or a 





























































































Against this background, what really happened in European health and safety at work regulation 
after 1985 was surprising. The European Community recognized the danger of competition 
between the Member States which could lead to a weakening of safety and health protection (see 
directive 89/391/EEC, preamble), and therefore started a comprehensive regulatory programme 
with the "essential aim" of preserving or improving the level of safety attained by the Member 
States (directive 89/392/EEC, preamble).
The EC's regulatory programme in the area of occupational health started in 1989 with the* 
Safety and Health at Work Directive (89/391/EEC), in which the European concept of health 
and safety at work is laid down and which serves as a framework directive, announcing (Art. p  
16) a bunch of more specific directives on the safety of machinery, personal protection 
equipment, carrying and lifting o f burdens, pressure equipment, working at visual display 
terminals etc., which have been passed since 1989 or which are currently in the legislative 
process.
Instead of social dumping, with the framework directive and the more specific directives, which 
have already been passed, the Council has decided to introduce a very broad and innovative 
concept o f safety and health at work, which not only clearly goes beyond the least common 
denominator, but also beyond the traditional approach to occupational safety, which is still in 
effect in most Member States' regulation. Compared to existing legislation, even in the highly 
industrialized Member States, the European approach to the regulation of occupational safety 
and health is characterized by the following features:
* While traditional regulatory concepts refer only to machinery, equipment and 
workplaces, the European regulation is extended to the regulation of the whole working 
environment (including the organization of work, the working time, the social relations 
etc.).
* While traditional approaches are restricted to the prevention of industrial accidents and 
recognized occupational diseases, which are considered as exceptional occurences, the 
European regulation requires the adaptation of the working conditions to the human 
nature.
* While traditional regulation aims at avoiding physical injuries, the European concept of 
occupational health protection is extended to cover the protection of both physical and 
mental health and even the reduction of physical and psychological stress.
With these innovations, the European Community definitely adopted the highest health and 
safety at work level which is to be found among the 12 Member States. Besides the EFT A 
Member Sweden, in the EC only Denmark and the Netherlands have introduced sim ilar 
approaches - Denmark in 1975 and the Netherlands in several steps between 1983 and 1990 (for 
further details, see Vogel 1991 and Aulmann/Rdmer 1989).
It is of particular significance that the EC regulation is on a level higher than that of the large 
industrialized Member States, including Germany, which was among the countries who feared 
social dumping by European harmonization most and which was the only State that voted against 
the most important single safety at work directive, the Safety of Machinery Directive 




























































































But the Germans' fears o f social dumping turned out to be no more than "prejudices", as now 
even unionists concede (Werthebach/Wienemann 1992, p. I)2. Detailed analysises by Falke 
(1989), Siller (1989), Feldhoff (1992) or Kohte (1992a, b, c), however, point out that the safety 
level of the EC directives goes clearly beyond the general safety level of German health and 
safety at work regulation and has to be appreciated as a "remarkable progress" (Lindl 1991, p. 
107-108) - in spite of all expectations of social dumping. The European directives even go at 
least partially beyond the level of the most advanced German standards UVV VBG 1 (basics) 
and 5 (injury prevention provision for energy-driven working devices) and DIN 31 000/VDE 
1000 (standard for safe design of technical products) which are, in international comparison, 
considered as high-level regulations. As, for example, Kohte states in the case of the Display 
Screen Equipment Directive (90/270/EEC), one of the specific health and safety at work 
directives announced by Art. 16 of the framework directive:
"[The Display Screen Equipment Directive] implies neither the reduction of social achievements nor a 
standstill, but, on the contrary, an important impulse for the design of this important social area. Many 
have not yet noticed this impulse, because the fear that the reduction of social protection comes from 
Brussels resp. the conception that our level of protection is particularly high anyway had obstructed the 
view of the opportunities of the Display Screen Equipment Directive anyway." (Kohte 1992c, p. 73, my 
translation)
Even the unionists Konstanty and Zwingmann, who point to the "risks" of the lOOa-directives 
(without, however, specifying these “risks"), have to concede that national regulations of many 
Member States are improved by the 118a-directives (1991, pp. 268-269). Such a  distinction 
between directives with regard to Art. 100a and those with regard to Art. 118a is not justified, 
because all health and safety at work directives follow the same integrated concept and provide a 
coherent and high level of protection (see also TGB 1991, p. 24)3. The 100a directives usually 
concern product regulation (e.g. safety of machinery, personal protection equipment) and 
provide total harmonization (which is essential for the internal market aim), while the 118a 
directives provide minimum levels which may be exceeded by national regulations, because they 
are usually related to process regulation, which does not cause trade barriers (e.g. the use of 
personal protection equipment). In some cases, however, the attachment to Art. 100a or 118a 
seems to be incidental, because some directives regulate both processes and products and could 
have been attached either to Art. 100a or 118a (e.g. the Display Screen Equipment Directive).
2 According to the analysis of Markovits and Otto (1992, p. 178), the German unions' reactions to 
European integration are 'largely a function of ideology' instead of basing their strategies on careful 
research: "They reduce the maner's complexity by fitting it into categories which they have learned to 
trust. Ideology then serves as a convenient method of minimizing uncertainty and reducing complexity. It 
is an important mechanism for attaining the semblance of control in an otherwise uncontrollable 
situation. In short, it provides expected answers where only questions exist.* However, at the end of 
1992, the German unions have become increasingly aware of the high level of European occupational 
health regulation (in particular, since it has become clear that the there is a delay of transposing the EC 
directives into national law) and have been shifting to a more offensive strategy towards European social 
regulation. See e.g. IG Metall 1992, p. 5 or Mahlberg 1992, p. 10.
3 Also Nielsen/Szyszczak (1991, p. 181) differentiate sharply between 100a and 118a directives and 
therefore regard the working environment as 'as area of potential and actual conflict between a trend 
towards raising standards of protection for workers [according Art. 118a, V.E.] and a trend towards 
deregulation [according Art. 100a, V.E.)'. However, it is absolutely not to see why Art. 100a should 
account for deregulation. To the contrary, Art. 100a requires harmonization by regulation. And given 
the provisions of subsection (3) ('high level of protection') and especially (4) (opting out), it is very 
wise that the Commission indeed proposes directives on the very highest level of protection to prevent 




























































































And because all safety and health at work directives rely on the same innovative concept, even 
the minimum requirements of the 118a-directives often provide a higher level of protection than 
present national regulations.4 *6
To be sure, looking at single provisions, there are some Member States with somewhat tighter 
regulations, such as Denmark's regulations regarding carcinogenous substances, the 
Netherlands' regarding working time at visual display terminals or Germany's regarding 
radiation. But if levels of health and safety at work can be compared at all3, the overall 
assessment is that the Community established a coherent health and safety at work concept with 
a level of protection which is certainly at the very top of the ranking and which even appears to 
exceed the protective levels of all 12 Member States.
The European regulation not only goes beyond the traditional mechanistic approaches by 
adopting the innovative Scandinavian concept, it is furthermore based on at least five innovative 
principles: the employer's obligation to care for occupational safety and health, a broad concept 
of health including the humanization of work, the concept of the working environment including 
organizational aspects, the risk assessment approach, and the concept of absolute safety 
requirements regardless of technological restrictions.
1.2.1 The Protection of All Employees in All Sectors
The European occupational health directives include all employees, including trainees and 
apprentices, in all sectors of activity, both public and private (89/391/EEC, Art. 2(1) and 
3(1»*. This broad scope is far from trivial: even in Member States with sophisticated health and 
safety at work systems grave exceptions can be found, mostly due to historical reasons (Vogel
1991).
1.2.2 The Employer's Obligation to Provide and to Improve Occupational Health
The most basic obligation of European health and safety at work legislation is the employer's 
obligation to provide for and to improve the workers' health and safety with regard to all aspects 
o f the working environment:
"The employer shall have a duty to ensure the safety and health of workers in every aspect related to the 
work." (89/391/EEC. Art. 5(1))
4 The main reason for the German unions' reservations to lOOa-directives is the institutional interest in 
conserving the bipartite Berufsgenossenschqften's regulating powers, which are replaced by 
harmonized standards according to lOOa-directives, whereas they keep this authority in national 
regulation according to !18a-directives.
3 Comparative safety levels can only be estimated, as different protective measures are often not 
questions of different safety levels but of different safety philosophies. In Germany, for example, 
electrical safety is primarily reached by safe electrical utensils, in France primarily by safety switches in 
the switch cabinets. The advantage of the safety switch philosophy is that the outlets are safer (for 
children), its disadvantage is that it does not work properly if the user is standing on completely 
insulated ground.




























































































In order to become able to do so, the employer has to acquire information on the latest state of 
the art and to act accordingly (Directive 89/391/EEC preamble and Art. 5 and 6 and similar 
provisions in the single directives).
In the EC directives, the employer is made directly and inescapably responsible for every aspect 
of occupational health, whereas, according to many Member States' legislation, the employer is 
only required to fulfill precisely defined legal and governmental (and sometimes non­
governmental but nonetheless obligatory) requirements or to act if authorized labour inspectors 
or the works council demand action (e.g. for Germany see Kohte 1992a, p. 16). According to 
traditional approaches, the employer is only obliged to react, whereas European legislation 
requires him or her to get informed, to analyse, to anticipate and to prevent. When the directives 
go into effect on 1.1.1993, the employer can be made responsible even if the national labour 
inspection service does not find fault with the working conditions.
It is remarkable that the Framework Directive is a directive according to Art. 118a and "just” 
providing minimum requirements (89/391/EEC Art. 1(3)). As Baldwin and Daintith write, the 
general obligation to ensure the safety and health of the workers
"certainly cannot be viewed as a minimum, or graduated, standard. Rather, it apperars to require the 
imposition on all employers of a duty to achieve a particular result: the health and safety of their 
workers." (Baldwin/Daintith 1992, p. 12)
This is probably the most prominent example for a phenomenon which is rife among 118a 
directives: that 118a directives provide minimum requirements which in fact establish a level of 
protection even higher than the existing levels in most - and sometimes all - Member States (see 
infra).
1.2.3 The Comprehensive Concept of Health in European Regulation Including 
Psychological Aspects
Traditionally, in most European countries safety at work regulation was restricted to avoiding 
hazards to physical health like mechanical injury, poisoning or radiation. The European 
directives adopted the innovative health concepts of the World Health Organization or the 
International Labour Office including psychological - or "soft" - aspects of health like 
psychological stress, fatigue and even discomfort. Important examples for this innovative 
concept o f health, which also demonstrate the consistency of European health and safety at work 
legislation, are the directives:
* Safety and Health at Work (89/391/EEC), Art. 6 (2) d: taking into account the human 
factor, in particular regarding relief from monotonous work and machine-determined 
work cycles.
* Machinery (89/392/EEC7), Annex I, No. 1.1.2.d: discomfort, fatigue and psychological 
stress suffered by a machine operator must be reduced as far as possible by taking
7 Amended by Directive 91/368/EEC (extension of scope to mobile equipment, lifting and moving 




























































































ergonomic principles into account; No. 1.2.8: interactive software of a machine must be 
user-friendly.
* Display Screen Equipment (90/270/EEC), Art. 3: measure against mental stress; Annex, 
No. 3: principles of software ergonomics must be applied, in particular to human data 
processing.
Practical consequences of this comprehensive concept of health are that health and safety at 
work includes ergonomics and the humanization of work. The revolutionary quality of this * 
legislation can be estimated if compared with health and safety at work regulation in Germany, 
where the humanization of work has been a political goal since the early seventies, but has never 
been considered as an item for government regulation (only for government support).
1.2.4 The Broad Scope of Regulation by Using the Working Environment Concept
The European regulatory concept goes beyond the mechanistic approach in another respect. 
Traditionally, health and safety at work regulation was restricted to technical components, to 
tools, machinery, equipment and workplaces. The European directives include the regulation of 
work organization8 and working time, the employers' obligations for risk analyses, information 
and training, considerable information and participation rights of the workers and their 
representatives, medical examinations, training of the workers and other aspects of social 
relations, which have traditionally not been items of legislative regulation but of autonomous 
arrangements between the social partners on the firm level or the associative level. Examples for 
the enlarged regulatory scope are the directives
* Safety and Health at Work (89/391/EEC), Art. 6 (1): employer's obligation to improve 
the existing working conditions; Art. 6 (2) g: consistent combination of technology, 
work organization, working conditions, social relations and the impact of the 
environment on the workplace; Art. 6 (3) c and Art. 11: participation of workers resp. 
their representatives, when new technologies are planned and introduced, and in every 
case where health and safety is concerned; Art. 12: training of the workers.
* Display Screen Equipment (90/270/EEC): Art. 3: employer’s obligation to analyze 
workstations in order to evaluate the safety and health conditions (this is a legal 
obligation for a kind of technology assessment); Art. 6: information for and training of 
workers; Art. 7: organization of work so that the daily work on a display screen is 
periodically interrupted by breaks or changes of activity, reducing the workload at the 
display screen; Art. 8: worker consultation and participation; Art. 9: the workers' right 
to ophtalmological examinations and provision of special corrective appliances with no 
additional financial cost.
The Display Screen Equipment Directive also stipulates that software must not have quantitative 
or qualitative checking facilities without the knowledge of the workers (Annex, No. 3, b).
8 Already in the Commission's Social Action Programme from 1974 (OJ No 74/C 13/1), a reform of 
work organization was aimed at, in order to provide the worker with improved opportunities for 




























































































1.2.5 The Risk Assessment Approach
The risk assessment approach is the core of the Machinery Directive (89/392/EEC). The risk 
assessment approach is innovative, because it makes the effective prevention of hazards 
obligatory. In most countries, there is obligation for preventive risk assessments for all 
machines, but only in cases of injuries or if public inspection services become active (Pickert 
1992, p. 87).
Traditional regulation is also mechanistic in the sense that it provides well-defined safety 
measures for well-defined, machine- or workplace-related risks. For example, safety distances 
are provided for moving parts, safety switches for abnormal conditions, limit values for noise, 
etc. But in industrial reality, the working environment is becoming increasingly complex, 
because more and more single functions and processes are integrated to highly automated 
systems. Because of technological innovations - the integration of functions in machining 
centers, manufacturing cells or manufacturing systems - and of organizational innovations - 
multi-machine operating, task rotation and task integration, especially within semi-autonomous 
work groups or manufacturing islands (see for organizational innovations Eichener 1991) - risks 
may be combined and multiply and work becomes less routinized and more volatile. Single 
hazards, like a moving tool, a robot or a conveyor, which can easily be controlled under normal 
circumstances, may become dangerous in a complex system, e.g. a flexible manufacturing 
system. Empirical research has proven that highly automated production systems pose more 
serious safety hazards to the human operator than traditional manufacturing systems because of 
their complexity (Karwowski 1992), so that traditional mechanistic approaches to safety fail to 
eliminate the new hazards emerging from the integration of single components.
Together with the obligation to take the latest state of the art into account, the preventive 
character o f the risk assessment approach may contribute to a new orientation towards higher 
levels o f safety (Pickert 1992, p. 88).
The European directives, particularly the Machinery Directive, responded to the changing 
working environment by adopting the "risk assessment" philosophy. In the Machinery 
Directive's annex I, No. 1.1.2, the risk assessment approach is described. Risks of accident 
throughout the foreseeable lifetime of the machinery, including the phases of assembly and 
dismantling, even where risks of accident arise from foreseeable abnormal situations, must be 
eliminated by three steps, in the order given:
* inherently safe machinery design and construction,
* protection measures regarding risks that cannot be eliminated,
* provision of information, for users, on residual risks, and indication whether any 
particular training is required and specification of any need to provide personal protection 
equipment.
The European Pre-Standard prEN 292 "Safety of Machinery and Equipment - Terminology: 
General Design Guidelines", which was triggered by the Directive, refines the Directive's 
definition of risk assessment (see also Radandt/Scheuermann 1989, p. 11-15): Here, risk 




























































































case o f a circular saw: sawblade cutting, noise, toxic dust and vibration). In the second step, the 
risks of these hazards are assessed by combining the severity and the probability of the hazards 
(e.g. high severity and high probability of cutting and noise, risks of dust depending on 
materials and cut). From this risk assessment, the action plan with steps three to five is derived. 
Step three is the risk reduction by design (e.g. controls, noise reduction, dust suction, vibration 
reduction). In step four, protective measures are developed for the risks which could not be 
eliminated by design (e.g. guards and brakes for the sawblade, extraction points for the dust, .  
mountings against vibration). Finally, in step five, the workers have to be informed about the 
remaining risks and trained to recognize and to avoid them (e.g. machine and part handling to 
avoid the sawblade, personal protection against noise and dust, information on hazardous * 
substances in dust of different materials).
Similarly, the Display Screen Equipment Directive provides a workplace analysis which has to 
take into account the additional and/or combined effects of the risks (Art. 3(2)).
1.2.6 The Approach of Defining Absolute Safety Requirements Irrespective of the State of 
the Art
Traditional health and safety at work regulation relates to the state of the art in technology. The 
safety level which is usually provided by regulation is relative, because it depends on what 
technology allows (e.g. automatic stopping of moving tools and parts may require a highly 
developed sensor technology). Whereas technology is dynamic, regulation is basically static and 
lags behind the technological development, thus frequently remaining below the technologically 
achievable level o f safety (Ossenbuhl 1982, p. 136).
According to progressive lawyers, the settlement of this problem requires a "dynamization of 
law* (Wolf 1987, p. 387). One approach to such a dynamization is to shorten the cycles of law 
supplementation. The Health and Safety Directive 89/392/EEC has established a committee and 
a procedure to adapt the Directives' technical annexes to the technological, regulatory and 
scientific developments. But supplementary law can only reduce, not eliminate the time-lags 
between law and technology. A second approach is to pass laws which refer to technical 
standards which are set by private-law standardization organisations. This legal instrument, „ 
which has been used heavily in German technical regulation since the beginning of this century, 
has also been applied to European health and safety legislation since the shift to the New 
Approach to Technical Harmonization and Standardization in 1983 (for a detailed analysis of the - 
New Approach, see section 2.1). Because private standards are not legally binding, they simply 
become obsolete when they lag behind the state of the art, whereas laws are valid as long as they 
are not formally withdrawn or modified. But the range of this approach is also limited, since 
standards are renewed in certain cycles (usually every rive years) and therefore periodically lag 
behind the technological development too. Also, they often do not reflect the latest state of the 
art, even at the time when they are released, because they are the product of a consensus of 
different interest groups. Therefore, a provision is required for the case that existing standards 
do not (any longer) reflect the latest state of the art. A third approach is to refer directly to the 




























































































standards are obviously behind the technological development9. This principle is also applied to 
the basic Directive (89/391/EEC Art. 6 (2) e, sharper: preamble).
The most progressive approach of the dynamization of law, however, is to provide absolute 
requirements regardless of the technological possibilities and restrictions, which may go beyond 
the current state of the art and anticipate future technological progress, meaning that the 
standards cannot be achieved at the time when the law is passed. A model for this concept is the 
car emission legislation of the State of California, which provides a 10-year stage plan with 
decreasing limit values (see Eichener/Voelzkow 1993).
The Machinery Directive provides absolute requirements too:
"The essential health and safety requirements laid down in this Directive are mandatory. However, 
taking into account the state of die art, it may not be possible to meet the objectives set by them. In this 
case, the machinery must as far as possible be designed and constructed with the purpose of approaching 
those objectives." (89/392/EEC, Preliminary Observations, No. 2)
1.2.7 Conclusion
If the Machinery Directive is criticized by well-meaning commentators, then not because its 
technical requirements are too weak, but because they are too tight, because providing 
technically unachievable requirements may compromise the European legislation as not realistic 
(interview, standardization manager).
Particularly the combination of the absolute requirements approach with the risk assessment 
philosophy leads to an innovation of national occupational health systems in most Member 
States. The traditional approach takes hazards for granted and provides compensatory protective 
measures, thus focusing on personal protection. The absolute requirements approach starts from 
the goal o f eliminating the hazards and minimizing them as far as technically possible. The risk 
assessment philosophy provides an elimination or minimization of hazards as early as possible - 
at best at the source (by machinery design) and not by personal protective devices. The 
European directives provide a rank order of technical safety in the first, collective protection in 
the second and personal protection in the last place.
This innovation in occupational health also already has quite a tradition in European legislation. 
It was already applied with the Hazardous Materials Directive from 1980. It resulted in an 
innovation of national health and safety at work systems, the extent of which can be estimated 
by the fact that Germany, for example, transposed it into national law with a delay of three 
years.
9 A basic function of standards, however, is to define the state of the art (with regard to economic 
efficiency). Standards may not satisfy this function, (1) if they have been passed a long time ago and not 
renewed, or (2) if standards have been passed incorrectly, e.g. because the standard-setting committee 
was dominated by a group who was interested in weak standards for economic reasons. In both cases, 




























































































Obviously, at least in the field of European health and safety at work legislation, no social 
dumping has taken place, but rather a comprehensive, consistent and innovative regulation 
process, which has yet to be explained.
Enacting EC directives, however, is only half the story. Although the directives provide 
important regulations like the scope of the regulation, manufacturers' and employers' liabilities, 
workers' rights and essential safety requirements, European regulation of health and safety at 
work follows the New Approach, hence, the technical details are de facto  regulated by the 
European standardization bodies. Since the standardization committees define the state of the 
art, decisions on the level of protection are not only made by the European Council but also in 
the Technical Committees of the European standardization organisations. Here, questions of 
participation of different interests, of decision-making processes and of democratic legitimation 
arise too.
1.3 Structural Similarities: Theoretical Modelling and Empirical Findings on 
Environmental Protection Policy
Negative expectations from Brussels are not restricted to the sector of social policy. Similarly to 
social dumping an ecological dumping was expected too by the high-industrialized countries. In 
a recent series o f articles - which were published as a special issue of Germany's leading 
political magazine and probably had a considerable influence on the public opinion in Germany - 
the European Community was accused of regulating environment protection on the level of the 
least common denominator, thus lowering the level of protection in the more advanced states 
and preventing them from improving their environmental protection policies (Fruhauf/Giesinger
1992). However, in the regulatory area of environment protection, a similar phenomenon as in 
health and safety at work regulation - European regulation on a considerable protective level 
despite dissenting public and theoretical expectations - was already observed by Rehbinder and 
Stewart as early as 1985 - before the Single Act. Rehbinder/Stewart tested an integration theory 
based on a game-theoretical approach of intergovernmental bargaining which predicted 
ecological dumping by European harmonization.
Rehbinder/Stewart (1985, p. 9) started from the basic assumptions that the only relevant actors 
are states, that all states want both environmental quality and economic growth and that there is* 
a trade-off between these goals. From these assumptions, they derived the following 
expectation:
‘in a federal system requiring unanimous consent, there will, in the case of product regulation, be 
support from both polluter and environmental states for harmonization through mutual adoption of 
uniform standards. To the extent that a Cassis de Dijon principle restricts the ability of environmental 
states for excluding polluter states' products, the support of environmental states for harmonization will 
be increased and the support of polluter states will be decreased. Since, however, there is a rule of 
unanimous agreement, the net impact of such a rule will be to significandy reduce the stringency of 
harmonized measures. In the case of process regulation it is difficult to see why there would be any 
harmonization at all above the lowest common denominator level, since it would never be in the interests 




























































































The empirical findings, however, showed a considerable amount of environment protection 
legislation by the European Community, even in this period, prior to the White Paper and the 
Single European Act, which could not be explained properly. Rehbinder/Stewart found a 
"patchy but substantial" amount of process regulation, whereas the theoretical model predicted 
nothing, and "perhaps more harmonization of product regulation than might be expected" (ibid., 
p. 315, 12).
Up to now, in the field of environment protection, surprises similar to those in health and safety 
at work regulation have occurred - although many environmentalists still consider European 
environment protection policy insufficient. Now that the emission standards for small cars have 
been tightened up (by 89/458/EEC) and several immission directives have been passed (for 
sulphur dioxide and suspended dust 80/779/EEC, for lead 82/884/EEC and for nitrogen dioxide 
85/203/EEC), at least some European environmental regulatory acts seem to provide a 
surprisingly high level of protection too (although there are still many examples for a low-level- 
harmonization). Like in health and safety at work legislation, some regulatory acts are even 
innovative compared to existing national regulations, e.g. the Environmental Impact Assessment 
Directive (85/337/EEC) and the recent Commission proposal for an Ozone Directive, which 
recommends very strict limit values and goes beyond everything that exists in national 
regulations within the EC (COM(91)220 final; OJ No 91/C 192/05) (see Eichener/Voelzkow
1993).
Even the critical report of the Task Force on the Environment and the Internal Market10 *states 
that in European policy-making there has been "a growing emphasis on environmental 
principles". Instead of ecological dumping, the objective of harmonization was - similarly to 
health and safety at work legislation - combined with the objective of "progressive improvement 
in environmental quality" (Task Force 1990, p. 188). Most directives specify quality standards 
(e.g. emmission limits) as minimum standards, which leave the opportunity for the Member 
States to opt for higher standards. Perhaps - from the view of intergovernmental bargaining 
theories - the most striking fact is that "Community environmental legislation is now well 
developed" (ibid., p. 187), although prior to the Single European Act the original Treaty did not 
specify any Community authority for environmental legislation (see also Majone 1989, p. 165, 
who sees a "continuous growth of Community regulation, even in the absence of explicit legal 
mandates’ in environment protection).
Confronted with empirical findings, Rehbinder/Stewart stated an explanatory "failure" of their 
game-theoretical model and formulated the need for more accurate explanations of the 
integration process:
"It is also submitted that the integration theories developed by political scientists do not provide further 
insight into the process of regulation in federal systems, in particular in the European Community. .. 
Accordingly, neofunctionalist theories, at least in their present form, can not adequately explain the 
history of Community integration in the environmental area." (Rehbinder/Stewart 1985, p. 317)“
10 The Task Force report met with the Council's and the Commission's disapproval (and was not 
officially published), because it prognosticated grave negative ecological impacts of the internal market
analysis of the much more complex decision-making process in EC environmental 
regulation and its problems regarding a high-level protection policy see Neumann/Pastowski 1992a, b.
programme.




























































































1.4 Intentions of this Paper
The general intention of this paper is to analyze the decision-making processes in both phases of 
European health and safety at work regulation - in legislation (preparation and passing of 
directives) and in standardization (setting technical standards by private-law standardization 
bodies) - in order to identify the chances of different interests to influence the regulatory 
outcomes and to explain the actual results which so drastically contradict the common 
expectations. The original approach is inductive, starting with an empirical analysis and then 
trying to find theoretical explanations, rather than deductive, and bottom-up, analyzing a 
circumscribed area of Community policy, namely health and safety at work, rather than top- 
down, starting from the overall process of European integration. Therefore, this paper's 
explanatory scope is limited to the area of health and safety at work regulation. The question of 
whether some conclusions may be generalized and applied to other fields o f Community policy, 
has yet to be tested. As indicated, there may be - evidently to a more limited extent - similar 
processes in the field of environment protection.
Theoretically, the attempt is made to develop some new hypotheses, in addition to the theory of 
intergovernmental bargaining, by analyzing the procedural, institutional and social aspects of the 
regulatory process, including the role of actors other than national governments.
There are primarily two theoretical approaches to explaining processes of European integration: 
the (neo-) functionalist and the (neo-) realist integration theories12.
In the 1950s and '60s, the functionalist and neo-functionalist integration theories proposed a 
quite optimistic perspective of international or European integration (Haas 1964, Haas/Schmitter 
1964, Mitrany 1966, Deutsch et al. 1968). Deutsch et al. (1968) and Deutsch (1970) 
emphasized the role o f cultural and social rather than economic factors in integration processes,
i.e. "informal integration’ in W. Wallace's (1990, p. 9) terms, like compatibility o f values, 
mutual responsiveness, links of communication, density of transactions, personal links between 
elites) and saw better communication as "the most promising general method’ for moving 
towards supranational integration (Deutsch et al. 1968, p. 201). As I'engrenage this theoretical 
concept became Monnet's political strategy for uniting Europe (Monnet 1976, ch. 16).
Within the neo-functionalist approach in the tradition of Haas, a tendency of supranational 
systems, once established, to further integration was viewed as an almost automatic process, 
because integration in one area would lead to a "spill-over* into other, functionally dependent 
areas, because the actors learn from success with international integration in one context to 
apply the same policy in other contexts, so that "to the extent that the initial functional task 
contained its own expansive logic ... it possesses an ad hoc norm-generating capacity 
redounding to the advantage of the organization and diminishing the powers of the member 
states" (Haas 1964, p 48). Schmitter’s (1969, p. 162; 1971, p. 243) interpretation of political 
spill-over maintains - the other way round - that frustrations and/or dissatisfactions with poor 
political performance in one area result in the search for alternative means for reaching the same
12 For a more differentiated overview of the functional, neo-functional, federal and intergovernmental 




























































































goals in other sectors. Through the process of spill-over or task expansion (economic), 
interdependency leads to increasing (political) integration. For example, an economic 
community with a range of tasks limited to coal and steel industry might eventually lead to a 
political union.
The star of (neo-) functionalism, however, sank, when the process of European integration 
slowed down during the period from the late '60s to the early '80s. W. Wallace even spoke of 
the "collapse of integration theory" (1982, p. 57). Empirical research proved that spill-over or 
task expansion was in fact limited (Schmitter 1992), and also the report of Monnet's former 
associate Maijolin stated that the performance of the original idea of I'engrenage was in fact 
disappointing (Commission 1975). Theoretically, neo-functionlism was attacked as a theory 
based on the "error of teleology, and the teleology of technology" (Hoffmann 1982, p. 30). It 
was criticized that functionalists underestimated the "powers of inertia", especially the national 
bureaucracies' abilities to resist the transfer of powers to supranational organizations (ibid.). 
Buhl (1978, p. 208-9) pointed out that interdependency does not necessarily lead to integration, 
but can also cause new conflicts between the actors. Wessels (1992, pp. 50-1) argues that 
functional spill-over is limited both by the national governments' strategies to keep certain 
policies autonomous and by the existence of other, functional equivalent and more powerful 
international relations (e.g. the hegemony of the USA in security policy. Obviously, European 
reality showed that there was no automatic tendency towards increasing integration.
The optimistic functionalist theory was pushed into the background by a pessimistic paradigm, 
which called itself the realist integration theory and which predicted integration on the level of 
the least common denominator only, because the national governments and their bureaucracies, 
which are considered as the only relevant actors, are institutionally interested in keeping their 
sovereignty. It was expected that international integration is limited to that amount of 
cooperation that can be achieved by intergovernmental bargaining in order to overcome some 
limitations of unilateral action (which increase with increasing international interdependency) 
and to get some benefits of cooperative action. The nation-states are even strengthened by 
international cooperation (by "pooling" their sovereignties) instead of transfering their 
sovereignty to supranational institutions (Keohane/Nye 1974, Puchala 1975, Hoffmann 1982, 
Scharpf 1985, Keohane/Hoffmann 1990, Raczka 1992).
Compared to realist "intergovemmentalism" (Taylor 1975), which tends to game-theoretical 
models of intergovernmental bargaining (e.g. Rehbinder/Stewart 1985), neo-functionalist 
integration theories include a wider set of actors and variables and acknowledge the role of 
supranational actors (which are almost completely ignored by intergovemmentalists). Although 
the automatism (or a priori optimism) of functional integration is not shared here, it is 
acknowledged that its theoretical merits include the notion that nation-states are not the only 
relevant actors but that integration processes can be pushed forward by supranational actors, 
which are created on the supranational level and which may change the logics of 
intergovernmental bargaining by serving as "institutionalized mediators" (Haas 1964, p. I l l )  
and by developing their own dynamics of action. The promotion of integration may be (under 
certain conditions) a procedural "side-effect" of the creation of international institutions 
(Deutsch et al. 1968, p. 189). More recently, the impact of the growing capacities o f "the core 




























































































governments, economies and societies which will go "well beyond the traditional model of 
relations among nation-states" (W. Wallace 1990, p. 21).13
Furthermore, our perspective is a sociological one in the sense that corporate actors - like states 
or governments - are not homogenous actors but are vertically and horizontally differentiated 
and composed of individual human beings with specific interests - especially career interests -, 
expectations and capabilities. This leads us to the analysis of more complex configurations of .  
corporate actors - of national interest groups and institutions, of different ressorts of national 
governments, of European institutions - and their institutional self-interests and constraints 
which can be derived from the cost-benefit structures, the career expectations, the task ranges, - 
the traditions and orientations and the knowledge and capabilities of the individual actors within 
these institutions.
Beyond mere intergovernmental bargaining within the European Council (resp. the Council of 
Ministers), a complex network of decision-making processes and structures has to be analyzed, 
including the EC Commission's preparatory functions, the national and European interest 
groups' attempts for lobbying, the influences of the European Parliament and the Economic and 
Social Committee and the role of the numerous advisory committees of national representatives 
from the technical levels of the bureaucracies.
The paper starts with an overview of the formal process of European regulation of health and 
safety at work according to the "New Approach to Technical Harmonization", which restricts 
European legislation to the provision of essential requirements only and delegates the technical 
specification o f these requirements to European standardization bodies (section 2). After the 
description of the formal process, in section 3 the configurations of actors within the first phase 
o f the European regulatory process, the generation of directives, are analyzed before the second 
phase, standard-setting, is dealt with in section 4. In both chapters, the determinants of the level 
of occupational health and safety and the participation chances of different private and public 
interests shall be analyzed. Finally, section 3 contains a brief conclusion.
The reasoning of this paper is based on analyses of documents and qualitative interviews with 
significant actors from national governments, national and European standardization bodies, 
national and European interest groups (trade unions, employers, manufacturers), the 
Commission (DG III, V, XXIII) and other experts. As usual, the interview partners appear - 
anonymously, as the interviews included open-minded side-talks and personal views of processes 
(rather than official statements). Although the interviews with actors from different points of 
view added to a quite coherent image of the European regulatory process with a sufficient level" 
o f validity and reliability, this paper reflects no more than first insights into the complex process 
of European decision-making which has yet to be analyzed on the basis of more systematic 
empirical research in order to develop an appropriate theory of the European integration 
process.
13 The academic debate seems to reflect to changes in reality. Since functionalism has been as clearly as 
optimistic as realism has been pessimistic, an increasing scientific interest in less enthusiastic versions of 





























































































2. The Formal Process of European Regulation of Health and Safety at 
Work: Framework Legislation with Directives and Technical Specifications 
with European Standards
The workers certainly have the strongest and most direct interest in technical products which 
meet safety and health at work requirements. The workers' interests, however, are not directly 
represented on the market, while suppliers and demanders of machinery and equipment may 
have some interests in safety, but also competing interests in functionality, low cost etc. Thus, 
the market does not provide a sufficient level of safety and health. In situations of market 
failure, the public interest in safety and health at work requires regulation of technology. 
Governments are obliged to ensure that machinery and equipment are safe and do not harm the 
workers' health.
Technology, however, is a difficult field for governments to regulate. There are considerable 
limits of government regulation, and these led to the introduction of the "New Approach" to 
technical harmonization in 198S, which delegates European regulation of technical specifications 
to private-law standardization bodies. Hence, European health and safety at work regulation is 
the result o f the complex interdependence of European legislation by directives and European 
Standardization.
2.1 The "New Approach" to Technical Harmonization: Limits o f  State Legislation  
and "Private Government" by Standardization Bodies
Governments, including the government institutions of the European Community, face 
considerable limits, if they try to regulate technical products in detail.
2.1.1 Government's Limited Resources and Instruments for a Detailed Technical 
Regulation
First, governments do not have sufficient capacities for detailed technical specifications 
regarding safety and health at work. Detailed technical regulation requires a tremendous number 
of highly qualified experts, who can neither be financed by national states nor by the EC14.
Secondly, governments do not have the technological knowledge, which is unconditionally 
required for technical regulation which reflects the state of the art, while this knowledge is 
concentrated in the industry's research and development departments.
14 In one country, Germany, no less than 40.000 technicians and scientists are working for just one 
(though the largest) of ISO standardization bodies, the DIN (German Standardization Institute). The 
expert list of only one of approx. 60 technical committees which draw up occupational health and safety 
standards on the European level contains more than 250 experts (CEN TC 114 "Safety of Machinery") - 
many more than the Commission could employ for a limited range of technical specifications. If the 
experts within the national shadow committees are counted, there are probably more people working for 





























































































Thirdly, government regulation often does not meet the industry's acceptance, which can cause 
serious implementation problems, because the industry often has subtile obstruction powers - 
industry can either take legal steps, often with quite good chances of success (van den Daele 
1989, p. 95), or evade government regulation with technical means. Consequently, if they pass 
regulatory acts, governments usually depend on the addressees' cooperation for proper 
implementation (for examples from the field of environment protection see Mayntz et al. 1978, 
Bohne 1981).
Fourthly, as already mentioned, the legislator's instrument "law" is basically static in character 
and is therefore not suited to dynamic technology. When the state of technology advances, legal 
regulations of technical specifications will become either barriers to technological (and social) 
progress or just obsolete - with unpredictable consequences (Ossenbuhl 1982, Breuer 1976, 
Nicklisch 1982, 1983). Technical standards, because not strictly binding, are more flexible 
instruments of technical regulation.
These are arguments that effective government regulation of technology is not possible. It can 
also be argued that government regulation is not desirable - from the point of view of theory of 
democracy. It is well-known from the discussion on technology assessment that parliamentarians 
have limited capabilities for dealing with the highly specialized topics of technology. Assessment 
and, even more, regulation of technology is clearly dominated by the executive. The ubiquitous 
preponderance of the executive was the reason for the various attempts to enhance the 
parliaments' abilities regarding information acquisition and processing by installing 
parliamentarian technology assessment (TA) capacities, which were partly successful in the USA 
(with the installation of the Office of Technology Assessment) but failed in many European 
countries (e.g. Germany), because it was clear that the parliamentarians would exchange 
dependency on the executive's information for dependency on the opinions of experts, whose 
academic and political premises cannot be appraised either (see Majone 1979, 1982; 
Eichener/Heinze/Voelzkow 1991). The notorious shortage of technological knowledge cannot be 
overcome simply by integrating experts into legislative processes (e.g. thru TA studies, 
hearings, advisory comittees or whatever instruments have been developed):
"It is simply not enough to leave the assessment of risks to experts. There must, in the light of 
the normative element inherent to risk assessment, be some external judgement as to the social 
acceptability o f the risk evaluation provided, and the risk management suggested by experts. 
Whilst the legal system must integrate scientific judgements on the one hand, it must also pay 
regard to cooperative arrangements. The structuring of such arrangements is one of the key 
issues o f safety regulation." (Dehousse et al. 1992, pp. 12-13)
What makes technology assessment and technical regulation so difficult is that both competences 
have to be combined: technological competence and political competence. Therefore 
’cooperative" (or "corporatist') arrangements of decision-making like technical standardization 
appear to be most appropriate, especially since the executive lacks technical expertise and 
democratic legitimation too:
The executive, besides facing the same problem as the legislative (though to a less extent), lacks 




























































































governments into the various ministries leads to a disintegration of the public interest into 
particularistic, ressort- and clientele-specific interests which influence the ministries' regulatory 
activities: it makes a difference whether a ministry of labour and social affairs or a ministry of 
economic affairs passes a bill or decree15.
A consequence is to drop the ideas that a homogenous "public interest” can be clearly defined 
and that any representative of "the state" (i.e. the responsible ministry) has a monopoly on the 
definition of the public interest, and rather to adopt a pluralist concept of the public interest, 
which is viewed as the outcome of a process of consensus-building by mutual adjustment of a 
plurality of organized interests, including governmental divisions, which have the status of equal 
players among many others (Lindblom 1965).
According to pluralist concepts of democracy, the regulation of matters, which are too 
specialized for parliamentarian regulation, shall be delegated to arenas of functional 
representation of the various societal interests (of the workers, the several industrial branches, 
the consumers, the environmental groups etc.). When a plurality of interests participates in such 
arenas of functional representation (e.g. standardization bodies), the democratic quality of 
associative self-regulation can be higher than that of ressort-specific government regulation, 
which may be captured by clientele interests.
A critical precondition for the democratic legitimation of associative regulation within a "public 
pluralism" (Kelso 1978) or an "associative democracy" (Cohen/Rogers 1990) is that all affected 
interests have effective chances to participate in the regulatory process, which generally requires 
public framework regulation of the self-regulatory processes, organisational support of the 
societal interests incapable of organizing themselves and active representation of public interests 
by government actors, who participate in the associative arenas as equal players. We will discuss 
these problems, as they occurr in European health and safety at work regulation, later in this 
paper.
It was probably more the above mentioned "technical" problems than considerations of 
democratic quality, which caused government regulation of technical safety and health to fail in 
many states. Such a failure of government regulation also happened on the level of the European 
Community before 1985.
2.1.2 The Failure of Technical Detail Regulation Attempts on the EC Level Before 1985 
and the Shift to the "New Approach"
With the General Programme for the Removal of Technical Trade Barriers from 28.5.1969, the 
European Council began to draw up directives to provide detailed technical specifications for 
single products and groups of products. This "traditional" approach to technical harmonization 
failed completely. Since detailed technical regulation requires a lot of technical expertise, 
extreme amounts of time were required to finish the directives, which often covered just a small 
scope of technical products. The regulatory activities were practically from the beginning behind





























































































schedule. The feet that it took 10 years (from 1975 to 1984) to pass a single directive on gas 
containers made of unalloyed steel is not an atypical example for the poor performance of this 
approach. The average time for processing the 15 directives, which were passed as a package in 
September 1984 (OJ No 84/L 300/1-187), was no less than 9 1/2 years (Sauer 1987, Joerges et 
al. 1988, pp. 260, 274). Besides long preparation times, regulating detailed technical 
specifications opened up unintended opportunities for industrial influence, because the industry's 
expertise was needed, overloaded the Council's political decision making with technical details 
and caused a permanent necessity for adapting the directives to the technological and scientific 
development (Joerges et al. 1988, p. 269).
It was obvious that, when the single internal market was aimed at, a much more efficient way of 
technical regulation had to be found. Pelkmans (1987, p. 252f.) lists no fewer than nine reasons 
why the old approach failed, including "time-consuming and cumbersome procedures", 
"wasteful duplication, useless inconsistencies and time lost’ due to lacking linkage between 
regulation and standardization, the "slowness of European harmonization", "implementation 
problems in Member States" and "a lack of political interest by the Ministers".
Already in 1973, a new method of technical regulation was used. The Low Voltage Directive 
dispensed with detailed technical specifications and refered to the dynamic "state o f the art’ 
instead. The Directive's annex contains 11 general safety goals which have to be specified by 
harmonized technical standards which should be provided by the European Committee for 
Electrotechnical Standardization CENELEC, a private organization in Brussels, whose members 
are the national standardization bodies.
The second important step towards the "New Approach" was the Information Directive for 
Standards and Technical Specifications from 1983 (83/189/EEC). This linked private 
standardization and public regulation by several measures. In particular, it obliged the Member 
States and the national standardization bodies to inform the Commission about standardization 
processes (Art. 8 and 4), and required a standstill of national standardization, when European 
standardization or legislation starts (Art. 7 and 9), and the establishment of a Standing 
Committee for dealing with questions arising with regard to the relationship between legislation 
and standardization (Art. 5 and 6).
The next steps were the Council Resolution from 16.7.1984, which obliged the member states to 
develop the European Standardization bodies, and the General Guidelines for Cooperation 
between the Commission and the European Standardization Bodies CEN and CENELEC, signed - 
on 13.11.1984, which obliged CEN/CENELEC to issue technical standards in accordance with 
essential requirements provided by directives.
With the Council Resolution from 7.5.1985 and the White Paper on the Completion of the 
Internal Market (Art. 65 and 68), the "New Approach to Technical Harmonization and 
Standardization" was formally approved (and recently, by the Council Resolution from 
18.6.1992 - OJ No 92/C 173/01 -, confirmed). The "New Approach" means that the Council 
restricts its legislation to the provision of "essential requirements" only, while these general 
requirements are specified by European Standards to be issued by the European standardization 




























































































States' national standardization organizations16. With this approach, technical regulation is de 
fa cto17 delegated to private organizations. For assuming a share of the Government's (Council 
and Commission) workload, CEN/CENELEC receive considerable financial support from the 
Commission.
Similar constructions have been practised successfully in many Member States for a long time. 
Particularly in Germany, since the beginning of this century technical safety has been regulated 
by standards and other specifications set up by private associations, which specified general legal 
requirements. The German "Geratesicherheitsgesetz" (Safety of Machinery and Utensils Act), 
which refered to "Approved Technical Rules", was the (albeit modified) model for the New 
Approach and even for the Low Voltage Directive (Braun 1989, p. 9).
The delegation of regulation to private organizations causes the problem of democratic 
legitimation. If regulation authority is delegated to self-regulative associations of private law, 
then a "regulation of self-regulation" (Joerges 1991, p. 36) is required to safeguard the 
representation of the public interests18. Formally, this problem was settled by three measures.
First, CEN/CENELEC have, by signing the above mentioned general guidelines, agreed that all 
interested parties (industry, users, consumers, unions, state agencies) shall have the chance to 
participate in European standard-setting. Furthermore, Machinery Directive (Art. 5(3)) obliges 
the Member States' governments to guarantee that the social partners have the opportunity to 
participate in national standardization, which is the normal access to harmonized European 
standardization. Directive 89/686/EEC on personal protective equipment contains a similar 
provision (Art. 5(5)).
Secondly, if the conformity of Standards with directive requirements is doubted, this matter can 
be brought before the Standing Committee introduced by the Information Directive and which is 
an advisory committee to the Commission, which has the power to reject standards or to demand 
modifications. This safeguard clause is an "emergency break" so that the final decision lies in 
the Commission's hands.
Thirdly, the standards are not legally binding. Producers can offer products which do not 
conform to standards if they otherwise satisfy the essential requirements. The burden of proof, 
however, is then reversed. If a product conforms to European Standards, it is assumed that the 
product satisfies the essential requirements, otherwise the producer must have his product tested 
and certified. It is expected that in cases of conflict the courts will rely on harmonized European 
standards to evaluate the state of the art or the level of protection (Lommel 1992, p. 108). 
Though de jure  not binding, standards are de facto  highly relevant as regulatory instruments.
16 In 1992 the European Telecommunications Standards Institute ETSI became the third official 
European standardization body.
17 Standards must retain their non-binding status, of course, but as it is supposed that products fulfill the 
Directive requirements, if they conform to European standards, standards in fact have a great importance 
as recognized specifications of European law.




























































































2.1.3 The "New Approach”: Provision of Essential Requirements by Directives and 
Detailed Technical Specifications by European Standards
Since 1985, the New Approach has been practised in many fields of technical regulation, 
including safety and health at work regulation.
The preamble of the Machinery Safety Directive (89/392/EEC), as an example of a directive 
according to Article 100a of the Treaty (which foresees complete harmonization), refers to the 
New Approach explicitly. Thus, the Directive is limited to the definition of essential safety and 
health requirements which shall be specified by standards as provided in Article 5 (2).
In the preamble to the Machinery Directive, the Council observes that the Member States' 
provisions are "frequently supplemented by de facto mandatory technical specifications and/or 
voluntary standards". This principle should not be omitted by technical harmonization according 
to the New Approach, which is described as follows:
"Whereas .. this Directive defines only the essential health and safety requirements ..., whereas in order 
to help manufacturers to prove conformity to these essential requirements and in order to allow 
inspection for conformity to these essential requirements, it is desirable to have standards harmonized at 
European level for the prevention of risks arising out of the construction of machinery.." (89/392/EEC, 
preamble)
Here are just some illustrative examples for essential requirements from the Machinery 
Directive:
* "The materials used to construct machinery or products used and created during its use 
must not endanger exposed persons' safety or health." Standards are required to specify 
these materials according to the latest state of scientific knowledge and technology (e.g. 
when dust of certain woods is identfied as cancer-causing, standards must be drawn up in 
order to protect woodworking machine operators from being exposed to such dusts).
* "Control devices must be clearly visible and identifiable and appropriately marked where 
necessary." Standards are required to specify what controls must look like and which 
colours, words or pictograms must be used so that they are clearly identifiable (e.g. red 
for emergency stop, pictograms for certain hazards).
* "Interactive software between the operator and the command or control system of a 
machine must be user-friendly." This single sentence requires a comprehensive series of 
standards of software-ergonomic criteria and testing methods.
These few examples demonstrate that many essential requirements leave much room for 
interpretation by standards. Standards are much more than just technical specifications, 
frequently the level of protection is de facto  defined by standards.
This delegation of important regulatory tasks to the self-regulation of the industry and the other 
interested parties was the Commission's clear intention (for a official statement, see Braun 1989, 
p. 13). The Commission even assigns European Standards a "quasi-legal" character 




























































































If important decisions on the level of health and safety at work are made de facto  in 
standardization committees, then technical standardization becomes a political process. The 
regulations of the German standardization institute DIN indeed define technical standardization 
as a political process. Technical standardization is more than a mere conventional definition of 
the state of the art. The "state of the art" is nothing that can be stated objectively; there is 
usually much cognitive uncertainty about the state of the art, because the matter is on a 
subjective level, assessed differently, both by differents schools of academic thinking and from 
the viewpoints of different interests (see Majone 1979, 1982). Hence, standardization 
committees are not just expert committees, but standards are set by the "interested parties" - the 
manufacturers, users, consumers, workers, certification bodies, ministries, government 
agencies, health and safety at work agencies, occupational health insurances and other groups, 
including scientists who may be economically or emotionally affiliated to one of the interested 
parties. If interests are involved, there are interest conflicts, of course, e.g. between economic 
efficiency and safety, between workers and employers, but also between industrial users and 
manufacturers. The outcome of standardization processes depends on which groups participate, 
and what their chances of influence are.
To make sure that the relevant interest groups have a chance to participate in the process of 
standard-setting, the European health and safety at work directives demand that employers and 
employees effectively contribute to the standardization process. Furthermore, the "Member 
States shall ensure that appropriate measures are taken to enable the social partners to have an 
influence at national level on the process of preparing and monitoring the harmonized standards" 
(89/392/EEC, Art. 5 (3)). The Directive also stipulates that if a Member State or the 
Commission considers that European standards do not entirely satisfy the essential requirements, 
this matter shall be brought before the Standing Committee set up under the Information 
Directive (83/189/EEC), which is an advisory committee to the Commission, which has the 
power to revoke this standard.
But not only 100a directives refer to standards. The Display Screen Equipment Directive 
(90/270/EEC) is an example of a directive according to Article 118a of the Treaty, which 
provides minimum requirements only, whereas the Member States have the right to set up 
higher (but not lower) national safety levels (partial harmonization). Consequently, this directive 
does not refer to European standards, because no harmonization is required on the European 
level. But the technical requirements of the Display Screen Equipment Directive are on a very 
general level too, as the following examples show:
* "The characters on the screen shall be well-defined and clearly formed, of adequate size 
and with adequate spacing between the characters and lines." The words I put in italics 
have to be exactly specified, either by numerical/graphical specifications (as done by the 
German standard DIN 66 234 part 1 and 2) or by a perceptibility-testing procedure.
* "All radiation with the exception of the visible part of the electromagnetic spectrum shall 
be reduced to negligible levels from the point of view of the protection of workers' safety 
and health." What "negligible levels" are has to be specified by limit values. *
* "The principles of software ergonomics must be applied..." This formulation was added 
to relate to software ergonomic standards which already existed when the Directive was 




























































































These requirements need specifications on the national level. The Member States can pass laws 
to specify the Directive’s technical requirements, of course. But this is unlikely, for the already 
mentioned reasons, i.e. the lacking capacities for detailed technical regulations. It is more likely 
that the Member States transpose the Directive to national law by passing laws which refer to 
national standards too. Many requirements defined by the Display Screen Equipment Directive 
have already been standardized by the German standard series DIN 66 234 and other standards. 
Furthermore, the standardization activities, which advanced the European legislative activities 
(DIN 66 234 part 8 and ISO 9241 part 10), influenced the preparation of the Directive19.
Furthermore, Technical Committee TC 159 of the International Standardization Organisation 
ISO is currently preparing an international standard for safety and ergonomics of visual display 
equipment (ISO 9241) on the basis of DIN 66 234, which shall be adopted as a European 
Standard.
Thus, also this Directive, although not explicitly refering to the New Approach, will probably 
be specified by standards in most Member States, and it seems as if these standards are going to 
be harmonized European Standards, which are even identical with International Standards 
(Riese/Ruckert 1992). There are good chances that there will be a tfe/acro-harmonization too, 
although the Directive as based on Art. 118a does not require total harmonization.
23 , Overview of the Formal Process of Technical Harmonization, Actors and 
Institutional Structures
The total process of technical harmonization, starting with the preparation of directives and 
ending with the eventual checking of standards, is shown in fig . 1. The arrows which come from 
the left side o f the scheme indicate the optional channels of influence, which may be used by the 
interested parties - producers, users, workers, consumers, health insurances, government 
agencies, science. Before the effective chances for participation are assessed for the different 
interests, the formal process will be described briefly.
2.2.1 Generation of Directives
The directives regarding safety and health at work (like all European directives) are proposed by 
the Commission. The Commission usually prepares its proposals in a participative process, 
which includes (1) direct consultations with interested parties (who are actively lobbying at the 
Commission and have often contact offices in Brussels) or other important actors, experts and 
consultants (who are invited by the Commission) and (2) discussions in Commission committees. 
Since there are more than 1,000 advisory, administrative and regulatory committees at the 
Commission, the word comitologie was added to the vocabulary of Euro-speak. Many of these
19 See the comment of the Economic and Social Committee on the Proposal for the Display Screen 
Equipment Directive (OJ No 88/C 318/32 from 12.12.1988), No. 4.8, and the Decision of the European 
Parliament (OJ No 90/C 113/75 from 4.4.1990), Alteration No. 34. The Economic and Social 
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committees, even if they have other formal tasks (the "comitologie committees" originally have 
implementing tasks), are involved in the process of directive preparation (IEP 1989, p. 126).
The 12 Member States send national delegations to these committees, which consist of 
government representatives and often other experts. For example, the German five-person 
delegation to the advisory committee for the Pressure Equipment Directive, a single health and 
safety at work directive which is currently being prepared, includes a federal government 
representative, a representative of the states (Lânder) governments, a representative of the 
industry, a representative of certification bodies (TÜV) and a representative of the German 
standardization institute DIN. Often representatives of the national or European standardization 
bodies belong to these committees to link standardization and legislation activities in both 
directions. Ideally, standardization follows the directives, then the link is important so that 
standardization committees are able to set standards in accordance with the Commissions' 
intentions. In reality, the regulation process often starts with standardization; then the 
Commission proposals are often influenced by the existing standards to which they refer or by 
current standardization activities. The example of the software-ergonomic requirements of the 
Display Screen Equipment Directive has been mentioned. The preparation of the Machinery 
Directive was heavily influenced by CEN too (Falke 1991, pp. 90-91). Sometimes the 
Commission mandates research or standardization activities, before a directive proposal is 
prepared, to get a better basis for the legislative process.
After this participative process of proposal preparation, which may take several years, the 
Commission proposal is discussed by the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and 
Social Committee and, in the case of 118a directives and sometimes in the case of 100a 
directives too, by the Advisory Committee on Safety, Hygiene and Health at Work, a tripartite 
advisory committee, established by Council Decision 74/325/EEC. Then the proposal, which 
might be altered by the Commission at any stage of the decision-making process, is dealt with in 
the cooperative procedure between Council and Parliament. Finally, the Council passes, 
modifies or rejects the Commission proposal.
To sum up, the complex procedure of decision-making opens up many points of access for 
interested parties to articulate their opinions and demands, either directly, by consultations, or 
indirectly, over governments, standardization bodies, committees or the European Parliament.
2.2.2 European Standardization
When the Council has enacted a directive which refers to European Standards, or even when the 
Commission plans regulating activities which will eventually refer to standards, then the 
Commission can give one of the European Standardization Bodies CEN, CENELEC or ETSI a 
mandate to set up European Standards accordingly. Mandates are usually connected with 
financial support by the Commission.
CEN and CENELEC (ETSI, which is less important for health and safety at work 
standardization, works somewhat differently) are basically composed of three levels, with a 






















































































































































































standard-making level and Working Groups (WG) as TC sub-groups on the working level. The 
TB and the TC are composed of delegations from the official national standardization bodies, 
e.g. the German DIN, the British BSI, the French AFNOR etc. (see fig . 2).
The actual formulation of standards is done in the Working Groups or, to a small but increasing 
degree, in draft secretariats within manufacturers' associations (e.g. European Workshop for 
Open Systems EWOS) or at industrial consortia, which may be supported by European research 
grants (e.g. European CIM Architecture AMICE).
The national standardization institutes install shadow committees to the CEN/CENELEC 
committees which consist of representatives of the interested parties and which send national 
delegations to the CEN/CENELEC TCs. Thus the various interests are in a first step gathered 
on the national level, filtered and condensed to single national opinions and finally transposed to 
CEN/CENELEC by the national delegations. When a consensus or a qualified majority decision 
has been achieved by the CEN/CENELEC TC and the TB, CEN/CENELEC releases a draft for 
standards which is published by the national standardization bodies. Then the public in each 
Member State has the opportunity to submit comments and proposals for amendment within four 
months after publication. The comments are discussed in the national shadow groups and in the 
CEN/CENELEC Technical Committees, until the TC makes a decision and hands the standard 
to the CEN/CENELEC Technical Bureau, where the national delegations pass (or reject) the 
standard by qualified majorities with weighted votes. Then, the national standardization bodies 
are obliged to publish the European Standard as a national standard (for more detailed overviews 
of the process see Nicolas/Repussard 1988, Anselmann 1991).
Another, much more simple way of creating a European Standard is to adopt an International 
Standard by CEN/CENELEC by using a preliminary questionaire (PQ), which is sent to all 
national delegations. Usually, there is a division of labour between the international and the 
European standardization bodies to avoid double work.
Fig. 3  sums up the different kinds of standardization in the European context:
* Completely harmonized standardization with Commission mandates according to Art. 
100a directives. Here the above mentioned sequence is used: provision of essential 
requirements by a directive, standardization mandate, European Standard, National 
Standard and, eventually, revision by the Commission under advice of the Standing 
Committee.
* European standardization without mandate. Triggered by national standards or 
standardization initiatives, European Standards can be made without a Commission 
mandate and, hence, adopted as national standards.
* Adoption of international standards. European (and hence national) Standards can be set 
by adopting international standards (issued by ISO, IEC or other) with the preliminary 
questionaire (PQ) procedure.
* Partially harmonized national standardization according to 118a directives. 118a 
directives provide minimum requirements, which can be tightened up by national laws, 
eventually refering to divergent national standards. *




















































































































































































































Hence, besides specifying the directives' essential requirements, standardization may have 
important regulatory functions in areas not (yet) covered by European legislation. Furthermore, 
there are complex, bi-directional interdependencies between European legislation and 
standardization.
Hence, the level o f protection is the result of the interaction of legislative regulation by the 
European Community and of associative (self-) regulation by the standardization organisations. 
Both parts o f the whole regulative process are equally important for the outcome. The directives 
define the level o f protection primarily, as they provide the scope of regulation, the basic aims 
and the essential requirements which are to be specified by standards. Since the directives' 
essential requirements are often vague and often refer to the current state of the art, whereas 
standards are more than mere interpretations, they define the safety level to a great extent.
The social and political dynamics of both parts of the regulatory process are analyzed in the two 
following sections. The next chapter deals with the social and political processes of the 
legislative part of health and safety at work regulation, the generation of directives, before 
actors and processes of the standardization process become the subject of chapter 4.
3. Actors and Processes o f European Health and Safety at Work 
Regulation - Part 1: Generation o f EC Directives
3.1 Three "Sudden and Unexpected" Changes in European Regulatory Policy
The preparation of the European health and safety at work directives, starting with the 
framework Directive 89/391/EEC, which triggered a not yet finished bunch of single directives, 
turned out to provide a surprisingly high level of protection - which was not predicted by 
political integration theories, which model European decision-making processes basically as 
intergovernmental bargaining between egoist nation-states.
During the seventies, when the integration process advanced very slowly and the technical 
harmonization schedule broke down because of endless bargaining and veto-powered national 
blockades in the Council, these theories were quite realistic (therefore, the optimistic 
neofunctionalist approach of the fifties and sixties was pushed somewhat into the background).
In the early eighties, there was still not much reason to alter the perspective. Regarding the 
increasing heterogenity of interests, which was caused by the EC extension to 12 Member 
States, in 1982 Joseph Weiler saw four options for the future development of the European 
Community (Weiler 1982, p. 538):
1. A continuation of the status quo, i.e. a low level of regulatory integration because of 
national egoisms, and merely acute crisis management by ad hoc measures.
2. A mutual blockade of decisions, leading to a regulatory standstill and finally to the 




























































































3. A management of increasing heterogenity by creating a "two (or three?) speed Europe".
4. More supranational decision-making by overcoming the national veto-powers in 
unanimous decision-making.
He was, however, not too optimistic about the last and only positive option, and he was not 
alone in his pessimism (e.g. Taylor 1983). As late as 1985, it was predicted that the Member 
States would never give up the principle of unanimity in decision-making, because no State 
would have an interest in giving away its veto-power voluntarily (Scharpf 1985).
But 1985 was exactly the year of the breakthrough in European integration policy. The unlikely 
option became reality indeed. Prepared by the Commission's White Paper on the Completion of 
the Internal Market, the Single European Act, signed in February 1986, dispensed with the 
principle o f unanimity and made the Community capable of efficient regulatory action.
The mere shift to majority voting, however, could not alone be responsible for the Community's 
innovative regulatory drive since 1985 (cf. Scharpf 1990, 1992). The shift to qualified majority 
voting could only give rise to the expectation that, within the ranking of the 12 Member States, 
the level of protection would have been slightly lifted from the very lowest national level to the 
least common denominator of the nine or ten States needed to form a qualified majority. The 
fact that the Community adopted the highest level of protection to be found in the Member 
States has yet to be explained.
Since 1985, three significant changes have taken place in Community politics, which had not 
been predicted by the pessimistic intergovernmental bargaining approaches:
1. The replacement of unanimous consent by qualified majority voting. Given each Nation- 
State's vital interest in sovereignty, why has each Member State given up its veto-power?
2. The extension of European harmonization into many regulatory areas beyond the 
economic sphere in its strict sense, including European product and process regulation of 
health and safety at work. Why have the Member States increasingly transfered 
regulatory authority to the European Community?
3. The high protective level of European health and safety at work legislation. Why have 
the Member States accepted the economic, social and political costs o f standard 
upgrading, why have the low-level States given up their advantage in the Europe-wide 
competition for industrial locations?
The shift to qualified majority voting is a judicial fact and the high level of health and safety at 
work legislation has already been revealed in this paper. But the thesis of increasing regulation 
is still controversial with regard to the talk of "deregulation", "mutual recognition instead of 
harmonization’ and "subsidiarity" (e.g. Streeck/Schmitter 1991). In the light o f current 
research, however, these phenomena appear to be only temporary tendencies which have been 
replaced by a new and very strong tendency of European re-regulation.
Since it turned out that mutual recognition did not work efficiently (because it leads to the 
blockades of intergovernmental bargaining), there is a clear tendency towards technical 
harmonization (Majone 1989, pp. 171-172). Majone (1989, p. 170) characterizes the temporary 




























































































deregulation, and to rally all available forces around the banner of 1992" (similarly Schneider 
1992, pp. 19-20). European integration implies in fact a deregulation at the national level, 
which is, however, followed by a massive reregulation at the Community level (ibid.). Already 
in the Single Act, the mutual recognition approach (a "subtle form of deregulation", 
Streeck/Schmitter 1991, p. 149) was counterbalanced by the New Approach to technical 
harmonization - the "opposite" of mutual recognition (Schmitt von Sydow 1988, p. 92) - and by 
the new goal o f "economic and social cohesion’ (subsection IV, Art. 130a-d). The policy of -  
cohesion, which the Commission presently seems to be stressing (interview, Commission 
official), implies that the less advanced countries shall be lifted up to the economic and social 
level o f the highly developed countries - which includes, of course, an upgrading of the level of '  
occupational health and safety to the level of the northern countries.
Schmitter himself (1992, pp. 36a-c) analyses the level of authority - from "all policy decisions 
at national level’ over three intermediary steps to "all policy decisions at EC level’ - for 28 
issue arenas and for a time-span from 1950 over 1970 (as assessed by Lindberg/Scheingold 
1970, pp. 67-71) and 1992 to 2001 (estimated outcomes of the Single European Act and the 
Maastricht Accord). The result is that "there is not an issue arena that was the exclusive domain 
of national policy in 1950 and that has not somehow and to some degree been incorporated 
within the authoritative purview of the EC/EU" (ibid., p. 37). The highest levels of regulatory 
integration are in the economic issue arenas, but in work conditions, labour-management 
relations, education and research there will also be considerable harmonization (which even 
appears to be underestimated by Schmitter). This analysis confirms the fact that the greatest leap 
towards integration was, in long-term perspective, the Single Act, with an additional expected 
impulse o f the Maastricht Accord.
In the academic discussion, there are, however, different opinions on the Single Act's 
significance. Realists tend to undervalue the changes brought about by the Single Act, because 
the basic logics of intergovernmental bargaining were not altered (Hrbek/Laufer 1986, p. 180, 
Scharpf 1990, p. 36). Other authors judge the Single Act's effects with "reasonable optimism" 
(Dehousse 1988, p. 333) or even call it "path-breaking" (Pelkmans 1988, p. 367). Schmitter 
also estimates that the Single Act's provisions had an overwhelming effect on European 
integration, the full implications of which "the national governments which signed the SEA 
seemed not to have been fully cognizant" (1992, p. 30) - a phenomenon which seems to be not 
untypical for European policy-making (see infra).
My impression is that there has indeed been a new drive towards European integration since the 
mid-80s. The Single Act, however, was not a sudden "big bang", but just one, albeit important, 
step in a long-term programme towards European integration that was prepared by the 
Commission carefully over a period of several years. According to Schmitt von Sydow (1988, 
pp. 84-85), it began on 17.6.1981, when "the Commission raised the alarm" with a 
communication on the state of the internal market (COM(81)313). In December 1982 the 
Council - on the Commission's proposal - emphasized the necessity to realize the European 
internal market, and installed the "Internal Market Council" with the assignment to work on this 
objective. The shift to the New Approach to Technical Harmonization was a process of several 
years too - from the Commission's first ideas to resume the strategy of the Low Voltage 
Directive from 1973 over the Information Directive from 1983 and the Council Resolution on 




























































































great agenda for a new era of European integration was the Commission's White Paper on the 
Completion of the Internal Market (also based on a "forerunner": Commissioner Naijes' paper 
"Consolidating the Internal Market"; COM(84)305 of 13.6.1984), which also preceded the 
Single Act, whose function was to provide the legal framework for the previously prepared 
integration programme.
"For both realist and neofunctionalist integration theories, the "sudden and unexpected success" 
of the Single Act was, according to Keohane and Hoffmann (1990, p. 283), a "puzzle": "Since 
none of us anticipated such a dram: ic and coherent revival of Community policy-making, any 
attempts to explain it should be viewed with scepticism. What was unpredicted by analysts 
working with established theories cannot, in general, be adequately explained, post hoc, through 
the use o f such theories." (Keohane/Hoffmann 1990, p. 284; see also Wessels 1992, pp. 36-37).
3.2 First Hypotheses to Explain High-level Regulation
Rehbinder and Stewart already concluded in their in 1985 published study, on the basis of 
indications for the last two of these three tendencies, that more adequate theories of European 
policy-making are needed. Rehbinder/Stewart (1985, pp. 12-13) themselves offered first 
hypotheses to explain these unpredicted developments:
1. A regulation on a higher level within "package-deals", which offer compensatory benefits 
for the low-level countries.
2. A regulation on a high level because of the greater bargaining power of the high-level 
countries.
3. A regulation on a high level because of the influence of multinational firms.
4. A community-wide sentiment for environment protection.
5. In contrast to national governments, the ministers within the Council of Ministers who 
are responsible for the environment face no opposition from the other ressorts (esp. for 
economics).
6. The polluter states favour the EC as an institution and therefore European regulation.
Rehbinder and Stewart, however, were themselves not entirely satisfied by these explanations, 
in the following sections, we will discuss these explanations and add some more hypotheses.
3.2.1 Reciprocal Concessions with Package Deals
The first explanation - package deals and log rolling- remains completely within the logic of 
intergovernmental bargaining. According to this hypothesis, an upgrading to a regulatory level 
higher than the minimum common denominator can be achieved by reciprocal concessions over 
time. As package deals are never completely satisfying, they produce permanent requirements 
for reform and subsequent decisions, thus increasing self-dynamic integration and overcoming 




























































































Package-deals or log-rolling are indeed frequently used decision-making techniques: the highly- 
industrialized countries may achieve a high level of environment protection or occupational 
health, while the less developed countries may get subsidies for mackerel fishing or protection 
of colonial bananas. Combining single topics to packages certainly accelerates the decision­
making process within the Council, because the single items are no longer discussed in detail 
once the package is tied. Furthermore, the threshold for vetoing rises, since no government 
wants to kill the whole package because of comparatively insignificant details, which would, 
have provoked resistance if discussed separately. Given the enormous heterogenity of interests 
among the Member States, however, it is very difficult and takes much bargaining to tie 
packages with perfectly balanced gains and losses for all 12 governments. Hence, by log-rolling,* 
the Community can advance on the path towards integration, but very slowly, as could be seen 
during the years before 198S, when this technique was already being practised.
3.2.2 Higher Bargaining Power of the High-Level Countries
The second hypothesis of a higher bargaining power of the technologically advanced high-level 
states is also insufficient. If Keohane and Hoffmann (1990) are right that Germany is the most 
powerful Member State - and certainly the dyade Germany-France is most powerful -, then it is 
surprising that neither the German nor the French concept of occupational health was adopted 
but the Scandinavian. In the case of health and safety at work regulation, the Community 
legislation is closest to the national approaches of Denmark and the Netherlands - certainly not 
the most powerful Member States - and thus inspired by the legislation in Sweden, which is not 
a Member State at all (but astonishingly influential, e.g. in European standardization). Insofar as 
the innovative Scandinavian health concept and the risk assessment approach - which came from 
reformist members of the British Labour Inspection Service - have been combined, the health 
and safety at work directives even go beyond the protective levels of all Member States, so that 
no single Member State can be identified as a partisan which successfully realized its interests.
The next two hypotheses extend the intergovernmental bargaining approach, insofar as external 
actors, industry and population are included:
3.2.3 Influence of Multinational Firms
The influence of mighty multinational firms, which are pushing the governments toward 
harmonization to create an internal market, may play a role in some fields of environmental 
protection policy. In occupational health regulation, however, apart from a limited number of 
fields of technology (e.g. information technology), no such firms can be identified. The most 
important market which is affected by European product regulation of safety at work is the 
market for machinery, which is an extremely heterogenous market with a huge number of small 
and medium-sized manufacturers, which have few capacities to participate in European lobbying 
for producing a common good. With regard to process regulation, which affects the users of 
machinery and protection equipment, the common good problem (Olson 1968) is even more 




























































































good "regulation", why should any single one of them invest scarce resources in costly attempts 
to exert influence on the regulatory process?
3.2.4 A Community-wide Sentiment for High-level Regulation
A community-wide sentiment for environmental regulation may have contributed to the 
improvement of environmental protection policy, but a similar community-wide sentiment for a 
„ high-level health and safety at work regulation is nowhere in sight. Even the trade unions 
disagree, since the trade unions of the low-standard countries are primarily interested in 
defending the few competitive advantages of their home countries in order to secure jobs.
Rehbinder and Stewart's fifth hypothesis is a theoretically interesting variation o f the 
intergovernmental bargaining approach, because the supposition of the homogenity of the 
national governments is dropped:
3.2.5 No Opposition from Competing Ressorts within the Council of Ministers
Within the national governments and parliaments, there are interest conflicts between ecological 
and social interests on the one hand and economic interests on the other hand. National 
regulation is the result of the relation of power between these conflicting interests and, from the 
ecological and social point of view, at best a compromise. Within the European Council of 
Ministers, however, the ministers who are responsible for the environment and the ministers 
who are responsible for labour face no opposition from the other ressorts and can better realize 
their interests in improving their national level of protection:
"Environmental ministers and officials play a substantial role in representing member states in 
Community decision-making, and are likely to emphasize environmental goals even if they 
conflict with strictly economic calculations. Unless the matter becomes one o f 'high politics', 
their influence may be substantial." (Rehbinder/Stewart 1985, p. 13)
'  The same argumentation can be applied to the Council of labour ministers (whose ministries are 
often closely related to the trade unions). Whereas the heads of the Member States' governments 
want to keep their sovereignty in order to pursue a homogenous "State's interest", the ministers 
may even be interested in European harmonization, because they can use it as a vehicle to 
realize their political goals better than in the national political context. In other words: if they 
don't succeed in their home country, they go to Brussels and try it there.
Labour ministers of low-standard countries frequently find themselves in a dilemma: they are 
politically blamed for high numbers of occupational injuries, but can do nothing to improve 
safety at work, because in competition with the economic ressorts they do not get the resources 




























































































As all labour ministers share the same ressort-specific interest, the least common denominator of 
intentions within the Council of Ministers turns out to be much higher than the least common 
denominator of actual national regulations.
This hypothesis, though fruitful, needs to be refined, since there are some remaining problems:
First, as Rehbinder/Stewart stated, this mechanism of standard-raising only works as long as the 
matter does not become "high-politics", but it is likely that the heads of governments and the 
labour ministers' opponents within the national governments will eventually notice that the 
labour ministers are playing tricks on them. Related to this objection is the fact that this 
argument cannot explain why the governments introduced majority voting, which makes it easier 
for the ressort ministers to play a game of their own within the Council of Ministers. Finally, 
there are conservative governments with a dedicated deregulatory goal within the EC, and these 
governments have labour ministers with the same goal.
The Machinery Directive certainly was "high politics’ . Since President Jacques Delors 
considered the proposal for this Directive as very important - the Machinery Directive was given 
a pilot- and driving-function for health and safety at work regulation -, the proposal was 
specially discussed within the Commission on two meetings on 17.11. and 25.11.1987 and not 
handled in the usual procedure in writing (Zachmann 1988, p. 538).
In Germany, too, where the Machinery industry with almost 1 million employees is the largest 
industrial branch, the genesis of the Machinery Directive was carefully watched not only by the 
labour ministry but also by the ministry for economic affairs, the occupational injury insurances, 
industrial associations, testing and certification bodies and other actors (VdTUV 1988, DIN 
1989). Germany was the only State which voted against the Directive proposal. The reasons, 
however, for the negative vote sound strange. The proposal was not rejected because the level of 
protection was considered too high or too low, but rather because there were no sufficient 
provisions for the one to two years of the transitional time between the time the Directive goes 
into effect and the time when the European standards are released (Wlotzke 1989, pp. 7-8; 
Partikel 1989, pp. 159-160). This "exaggerated" (Lindl 1991, p. 126) argumentation arouses the 
suspicion that the German government took its own rejection none too serious1?20 (and did not 
invite other governments to join it), but was politically forced to vote against the Directive, 
because both industry and trade unions had a strong negative attitude towards European health 
and safety at work legislation, from which they (falsely) expected nothing but social dumping 
(see Jansen 1988, Waldeck 1989 or even Waldeck 1991)20 1.
20 For example, an official of the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs heavily contradicted Jansen 
(1988) by pointing out that since the 1960ies there had been many cases of European regulation forcing 
the German government to upgrade the level of protection. Without the European Community, many 
improvements would not have been possible (Winkel 1988, p. 50). The Machinery Directive was 
assessed as an improvement even by the Federal Labour Ministry because of its broad scope (Streffer 
1988, p. 9).
21 It is remarkable that the German government did not fear the removal of trade barriers and did not 
vote negatively as a result a protectionist motivation: on the contrary, Germany voted against the 
Directive's transitional provision that national standards are valid as long as European standards have 
not yet been released (Wlotzke 1989, p. 8). This makes sense, since Europe's by far largest machinery- 
producing country gains much more from the removal of trade barriers than it loses (if the level of 




























































































Especially the German unions had to oppose to the EC directives, because this necessarily 
implied that the mighty Berufsgenossenschaften, the bipartite occupational injury insurances, 
would lose comprehensive regulatory powers (Jansen 1988, p. 35). The regard to these 
politically powerful institutional interests was probably the German government's main 
motivation for voting against the Directive (see for a detailed analysis Bauerdick 1992). 
Obviously, the Directive's opponents - besides the Berufsgenossenschaften the Technische 
Überwachungsvereine (TÜV, testing and certification bodies, who lose a monopolist position by 
the European certification procedures, see Gareis 1988) - were primarily driven by institutional 
self-interests. The institutions who fear the loss of authority and resources seemed to pretend 
they were afraid of a reduction in the level of protection which was, however, merely expected 
but not proved.
It seems to promising to analyze the decision-making processes on the EC level more closely 
and to differentiate not only between national government heads and ressort ministers but further 
between ministers, the administration, government agencies and even non-governmental actors. 
This leads us to Rehbinder/Stewart's sixth hypothesis.
3.2.6 A Positive Attitude of Low-level States towards Commission Proposals
This hypothesis says that the low-level states may agree with high-level European regulation, 
because they favour the EC as an institution and, accordingly, the Commission's proposals. This 
argument has two important implications:
First, the argument implies that the Commission is an actor in European legislation which has 
some influence on the decision-making process.
Secondly, it implies that the Commission is interested in a harmonization on a high level of 
protection.
These two implications overcome the restrictions of the intergovernmental bargaining 
approaches, because they introduce a new actor besides the Member States: the Commission. 
The Commission's role requires further analysis.
3.3 The Commission's Role in European Legislation
The Commission of the European Communities is the "forgotten actor" in the process of 
European integration. While the European Court of Justice has received much attention as a 
promotor o f integration (especially by Weiler 1982 and the following discussions), the 
intergovernmental bargaining theories have neglected the Commission's role (Schneider/Werle 




























































































more than a few sentences are dedicated to the Commission's role22. This is astonishing, since 
the Commission was established as the Community's "driving force" (Hallstein) and has got the 
prerogative of directive proposal - which is certainly more than a quantité neglegible (see infra).
The Commission's role is pointed out by Schmitter's analysis of the long-term developments 
(1950-1992) in 29 issue arenas. In regard to the relative influence of various agents on European 
integration, Schmitter came to an interesting result, when he actually intended to test the neo­
functionalist spill-over hypothesis. From his evaluation of different agents' positive or negative 
influence on European integration in 29 policy arenas, the following ranlcing of agents can be 
derived (source: Schmitter 1992, pp. 2 la-b):
1. Commission promotion in 26 of 29 issue arenas
2. functional dependency in 20 arenas
3. national government resistance in 19 arenas
4. Council promotion in 15 arenas
5. functional expansion in 13 arenas
6. trend in international environment in 11 arenas
7. promotion by European interest groups in 10 arenas
8. enlargement of EC membership in 10 arenas
9. national interest group resistance in 9 arenas
10. European Parliament promotion in 9 arenas
11. responses to international shocks in 7 arenas
12. European Court of Justice promotion in 6 arenas
13. change in national ideology in 5 arenas
14. shift in mass public opinion in 4 arenas
15. popular resistance in 4 arenas
16. supra-national resistance in 1 arena
16. European Parliament resistance in 1 arena
This evaluation reveals several phenomena of utmost importance:
* The Commission turns out to be clearly the dominant agent of European integration.
* Functional dependency is the second most important agent, the integration process 
possesses, to a degree, its own dynamics, while the effect of functional expansion (spill­
over, l'engrenage) appears to be somewhat overestimated, though still quite important.
* Exogenous trends and events also play a secondary role.
* The Parliament and the Court are promotors, but of moderate influence.
* The public opinion has almost no influence.
* The influence of interest groups is moderate, with a balance between promotion by 
European groups and resistance on the part of national groups.
* The influence both of the Council and of the national governments is strong, but clearly 
less than the Commission's influence. Perhaps the most startling phenomenon is that the 
Council promotes while the national governments (according to realist integration theory) 
resist integration. Numerically, both effects are almost balanced. It seems as if there is a
22 E.g. Hoffmann (1982, p. 32): "The EEC's institutions are weak, because they lack autonomy (from 
the member states) and because their capacity to act is small." Scharpf (1985, p. 323) also sees the 




























































































certain mechanism that turns national governments' resistance within the Council into 
promotion.
On the basis of these data, it can already doubtlessly be concluded that the Commission is a key 
actor of European integration. This of course does not mean that the national governments play 
a secondary role, but it does mean that the relationship between the Commission and the 
national governments appears to be the key for the explanation of European decision-making 
(although there are actors - e.g. the Trade Unions Technical Bureau in Brussels [TGB 1991, p. 
87] - who regard the Commission's DGs as the "most important actors" in the Community's 
legislative process).
Keohane and Hoffmann, however, still insist: "Any attempt to understand the institutional 
changes of the Single European Act must begin with a recognition that governments took the 
final crucial steps leading to its negotiation and ratification." (1990, p. 284) We will follow this 
advice.
3.3.1 Overcoming the Mutual Blockade with the Delegation of the Process Control to the 
Commission
The political blockade situation, from which the three innovative tendencies - the shift to 
qualified majority voting, the extension of the Community’s regulatory authority and regulation 
on a high level of protection - emerged, was diagnosed quite correctly by the intergovernmental 
bargaining theories.
Although it was rational for each government to use its veto-power to avoid economic, social 
and political adaptation costs of harmonization, the results of this mutual blockade were 
suboptimal for each State, since the profits of a single internal market could not be internalized. 
Before the Single Act, the intergovernmental situation was characterized by a fundamental 
discrepancy between the Member States' individual interests in avoiding any adaptation to 
harmonization and the common interest in the economic effects of European integration. 
Assuming that every State government tried to optimize its action, it is safe to assume that each 
Member State wanted to profit as much as possible from the Community and, at the same time, 
to minimize the economic, social and political costs of adapting to the Community (cf. 
Olson/Zeckhauser 1967). There was a collective interest in a single internal market and in the 
degree of harmonization required to achieve this objective, but there were individual interests in 
keeping national regulation and in imposing each State's own national interest on the 
Community.
Within the logics of intergovernmental bargaining, there was no escape from this strategic 
dilemma, since log-rolling turned out to be a difficult business, which only allowed a slow 





























































































One solution - to submit to the leadership of a strong partner (which often occurs when security 
communities are formed, see Deutsch et al. 1968) - had no chance in Europe, where none of the 
(at least o f the large) Member States would accept a dominant role of any other.23
The only solution to this dilemma was for all Member States to give up some of their decision­
making powers without transferring them to any other State, so that the balance of powers 
between the Member States remained unchanged. This could be achieved by (partially) 
submitting to the regime o f a set of supranational institutions which could serve as moderators of 
the integration process.
By submission to regimes - “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision­
making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international 
relations” (Krasner 1982, p. 186) - the dilemma, i.e. that individually rational action leads to 
collectively unwanted consequences, can be overcome, since, under regimes, the cost and 
benefit structures of the individual actors can be modified and individual action can be regulated 
according to commonly arranged rules (Schneider/Werle 1989, p. 413). A second, more 
effective step towards overcoming the mutual blockade strategies is to create a corporate actor to 
which the (legal) authority and the (financial) resources to act in the Member States' common 
interest are transferred. The opportunities both for individual action and for exit must be 
restricted in order to stabilize the corporate actor's ability to act in the common interest 
(Commons 1961, Coleman 1974, see also Haas 1964, p. 111).
Among the European institutions serving as ’corporate actors’ and pushing the integration 
process forwards are (1) the Court of Justice, which was such an integrative institution to a 
certain extent already before 1983 (’For many years, the European Court of Justice has been the 
most active and creative Community organ’ Dehousse/Weiler 1990, p. 247, and earlier Weiler 
1982), (2) to a limited but growing extent the European Parliament, (3) in a limited way, the 
’ second chamber’ , the Social and Economic Committee (only with advisory functions), and, 
primarily, (4) the Commission, whose role was clearly enhanced by the Single European Act 
(Bieber et al. 1988, pp. 24 and 30, Pelkmans 1988, p. 373, H. Wallace 1990, pp. 217-221. 
"The Commission clearly won 'the battle of the Single Act'" - Dehousse et al. 1992, p. 8).
The submission of the Member States to the political leadership of supranational institutions, 
mainly the Commission, was bound to important conditions:
First, each Member State had to feel sure that its net share of the total positive effect of the 
European integration would exceed the costs of adjustment. Since this conviction was a crucial 
prerequisite for giving up the veto-power, it is understandable that the Cecchini-report (which 
predicts, soberly analyzed, only quantitatively moderate economic effects of the internal
23 Keohane and Hoffmann (1990, p. 293) ask, with good reason, whether the European States would 
accept being dominated by Germany - according to these scholars the strongest Member State. Also the 
Franco-German relationship is characterized as a ’sporadic duo* (H. Wallace 1990, p. 223), since 
besides a common interest in European integration there are many differences in detail questions - 
including occupational health, where the French and German philosophies are totally incompatible, 
already raising a conflict (the European Court of Justice decision in the case of wood working machines, 




























































































market24) was (and is) quoted almost ritually. As the Cecchini-report has a motivating function, 
it presents "political data" (van Suntum 1992, p. 18), which are regarded as rather optimistic by 
several economists (e.g. Data Resources Inc. 1988, Prognos 1988, Herrmann/Ochel/Wegner 
1990, Heine/Kisker/Schikora 1991). The image of the "global triad" and the conclusion that 
only a united Europe can withstand the economic challenges from East Asia and North America 
has the same function. Both the "global triad "-picture and the Cecchini-report formed Delors' 
"clever marketing strategy" to convince the Member States to support the Commission's main 
goal: a revitalization of political integration in the backpack of market integration (Schneider 
1992, pp. 19-20).
The relationship between the procedural reforms of the White Paper/Single Act and the 
objective of the completion of the Internal Market can hardly be overemphasized. To "alter the 
institutional balance" - in favour of the Commission - and to "improve decision-making" on the 
one hand and to create a Community without frontiers on the other hand were the two closely 
interconnected central aims of the Internal Market strategy (Pelkmans 1988, pp. 361-362). 
When the Commission had to pick a motto for the White Paper from quite a choice of options, it 
strategically selected the Internal Market aim (and not e.g. institutional reform and progress), 
because no opposition to this undoubtedly positive goal was expected from the national 
governments (Schmitt von Sydow 1988, pp. 85-86).
Secondly, all Member States' governments must trust the stability and predictability of European 
decision-making. In particular, they must expect, in the long run, positive results for their own 
country to be realized, and, in the long run, an approximate reciprocity of gains and losses 
between all Member States. A high level of stability and predictability of decision-making is 
required, since it has become evident that it is extremely difficult to manage single decision 
packages with reciprocal gains and losses for all 12 Member States at one time. Governments 
are willing to accept poor bargains for their own country only when they can be quite sure that 
they will get compensatory benefits in the future.
"Over a period cooperative modes can be established and habits of transacting business entrenched. Pay­
offs and reciprocal understandings are spread over a long period and apparently credibly so. As a 
working goal, 1992 rests on precisely this assumption - as regards both the pain of adjustment and the 
promise of growth. .. Mrs. Thatcher accepted the Delors package not because she was enamoured of its 
immediate returns, but because over the long haul she believed that the overall outcome lay well within 
its settlement area." (H. Wallace 1990, p. 225)
Thirdly, the supranational process moderators, primarily the Commission, have to be strictly 
neutral. As soon as some Member States started to suspect that the Commission's policy 
systematically favoured another State or a group of other States, they would return to securing 
their interests by intergovernmental bargaining and forming permanent coalitions for blocking 
minorities. The logics of intergovernmental bargaining must not be transferred to the 
supranational institutions, otherwise the mutual blockade dilemma would just move to another 
level. Within the Commission, there exists indeed a long tradition (since the Hallstein era) of
24 The report estimates an overall economic growth effect between 6.5 and 7.5 % (Cecchini 1988, p. 
132). When one considers the fact that the market integration effects are spread over a time of at best 
five years (realistic would be ten to twelve years), the dimension of the economic growth effects of 0.5 
thru 1.5 per cent per year is much smaller than the normal cyclical movement, and certainly much 




























































































’European thinking* and of the acquis commurumaire. Thinking in categories of national 
interests is taboo among Commission officials (von Senger und Etterlin 1992, p. 21). On the 
contrary, the national governments are the main opponents of all European institutions - the 
Commission, the Court and even the Parliament -, because their reluctance is the main barrier to 
the enlargement o f these institutions' powers. Most of the Commission officials, the Members of 
European Parliament, and the Court judges share a common interest in integration, because their 
career opportunities are within the European institutions and not in the national governments. 
This rational self-interest o f the individuals who work for the European institutions is reinforced 
by a "corporate culture" or an esprit de corps among the "Europeans", who work in Brussels, 
Luxembourg and Strassbourg.
Fourthly, the supranational process moderators must have a vital self-interest in the integration 
process in order to be pushy enough. This is the reason why institution-building can be very 
useful in overcoming mutual blockade configurations, because institutions have an institutional 
self-interest (and their officials a personal self-interest) in growing and maximizing their 
resources, authority and powers.
"The Commission officials appear to follow just one working principle: How can I secure more authority 
for myself and hence for the Commission?” (von Senger und Etterlin 1992, p. 19, my translation)
The self-interest in institutional growth and the fact that the Commission officials personally 
profit from further integration (each step to further integration offers new career chances) appear 
to be the main reasons for the observed expansion of the European institution's tasks and, hence, 
of the range of the Community's regulatory activities.
Fifthly, the partial self-disempowering of the Member States governments by signing the Single 
Act is not irrational in another respect. Power is not a primary objective of politicians, but 
rather success. Power is very often a means to achieve success. But power - here: the veto- 
power - is of no use if it is blocked by counter-powers. Power is always relative. Especially in 
situations in which power does not lead to success, relinquishing power can even be useful for 
politicians, because they are discharged from responsibility.
When the Council was bound to unanimous decision acceptance, the Member States 
governments could easily be made responsible for every detail of European policy (by the 
Parliaments, the interest groups and the voters), with the argument that they could have used 
their veto-power to avoid the decision. Since majority decisions have become the rule within the 
Council, a government who was outvoted cannot be made responsible for the decision at all. 
Furthermore, even when a government agrees, it can argue that it was forced to agree to a 
compromise, because otherwise it would have been outvoted anyway. Hence, national 
politicians like to talk on Community affairs according to the verse (Hansch 1990, p. 245):
"Wenn die liebe Sonne lacht, hat's das eigne Land gemacht, 
gibt's aber Regen, Eis und Schnee, war's bestimmt die EWG."
(When the sun is shining, the own country made it,




























































































The more de ./aero-authority is transferred to the Commission, the better the Commission can 
serve as a scapegoat for national politicians. The ugly word "Eurocrats" is a good example for 
the notorious habit of blaming the Commission for every kind of political failure which might 
occur in any Member State.
Sixthly, the integration process conducted under the Commission's leadership could be 
accelerated by creating time-pressure. The tight schedule for integration, which was set up with 
the White Paper and justified with the Cecchini-report, had the function of speeding up the 
decision-making process. Facing the huge and profitable task of creating the single internal 
market, all the Member States' objections against single provisions of regulatory acts became 
neglectable and no longer justified the blocking of the decision-making process. The Council set 
itself under time-pressure and empowered the Commission to set it under an even tighter time- 
schedule by giving it the right of proposal and by affirming the Commission's legislative 
programmes. Also, because the industries have begun to prepare for the internal market and 
hence created irrevocable facts, the governments have no choice but to achieve the self-set goal 
of integration (Scharpf 1992, p. 24).
Given these conditions, dispensing with the principle of unanimity does not seem as irrational 
for the national governments as it once did. The strategy is approved by its success: "Although 
the quantity and quality of outputs have been uneven, the substantive rewards, in terms of the 
interests of the participants, have been sufficient for them to be willing periodically to reinforce 
the process." (H. Wallace 1990, p. 218) With the Single European Act (and related means), the 
Member States governments transformed their configuration of inevitable mutual blockade into a 
configuration which tends to further integration. Within this configuration, the supranational 
institutions, particularly the Commission, with their self-interest in integration, play crucial roles 
as driving forces of the integration process.
Such a configuration may even be, to a certain extent, self-reinforcing, as will be shown by 
applying a model which was used by Elias (1969) to develop his theory of the genesis o f the 
modem nation-state. Comparing European integration with the development o f the nation-state 
is not as odd as it may seem at first glance, since many theorists have called the international 
system "neo-medieval" (Schmitter 1992, fn. 1 with reference to Bull 1977, p. 264).
The medieval society in Europe was characterized by a configuration of small principalities in 
permanent conflict with each other. Every time one of the competitors was on the verge of 
creating a larger empire by successful warfare, this empire would soon break apart, because the 
king would have to establish aristocrats and churchmen to administer the regions, but would not 
be able to prevent them from making themselves independent from the central sovereign and 
eventually becoming independent principalities or dioceses (Elias 1969, see also Toynbee 1976). 
The first stable nation-states in Europe, which overcame the era of an oscillation of centripetal 
and centrifugal tendencies, were the absolutist monarchies. They emerged when three conditions 
were fulfilled: First, when the monarchs succeeded in securing internal peace by creating a 
territorial monopoly of physical power. Secondly, when the monarchs were able to create a 
stable system of acquiring permanent financial resources, i.e. a tax system (etat is still the 
French word for state). The means to finance a standing army and police in turn stabilized 
permanent peace, just as peace was a prerequisite for stable state finances. Thirdly, the empires 




























































































forces by managing a certain configuration of actors which was called the "King's mechanism" 
by Elias:
"The time for a strong central power within a highly differentiated society comes, when the ambivalence 
of the interests among the most important functional groups becomes so great und the balances are so 
evenly distributed among them that it comes neither to a decisive compromise nor to a decisive fight and 
victory among them." (Elias 1969, vol. 2, p. 236, my translation)
The absolutist king's centralized power depended on his ability to keep the regional sovereigns 
(aristocrats and bishops) in a state of permanent mutual competition so that they had to use their 
powers to defend themselves against each other and could not threaten his own position - the 
Ceasarean strategy of divide et impera. The king prevented any one of his competitors from 
becoming too strong by distributing his resources selectively, so that each time one of the 
regional sovereigns showed signs of becoming dangerous for the king, the others received more 
resources and thus the power to fight him down and thus stabilize the king's position. Since the 
regional sovereigns were unable to overcome their conflicts and to form a consensus, they had 
to submit to the decisions of the central sovereign, who maintained the coordinating and 
regulating functions for the whole territory. The main arena of the competition among the 
regional sovereigns was the king's court, where the aristocrats had to spend their money to 
survive their peers' intrigues.
Although one would hesitate to compare the Commission of the European Communities with an 
absolutist monarch23, there are structural similarities between the configuration of regional 
sovereigns at the dawn of the modern nation-state and the present configuration of national 
governments within the European Community: There are severe interest conflicts among the 
national governments, and all governments are interested in preventing any other Member State 
from becoming dominant within the EC. In any configuration with an inherent tendency to keep 
an equilibrium by changing coalition-building (all others against the strongest, until another one 
becomes the strongest), a "third" actor with very few resources can exert considerable power by 
acting as a process and conflict manager. "The key players are frequently the intermediate 
balancers, of which the Commission is generally a leading representative." (H. Wallace 1990, p. 
226) Especially the Single European Act enhanced the Commission's opportunities for playing 
off the national governments against one another, because qualified majority voting provides the 
Commission "with more opportunities to forge coalitions, differing from case to case" 
(Pelkmans 1988, p. 373). The Commission's main resources, besides spending some distributive 
money and besides its (limited) executive powers, are its function as a mediator and process 
manager and its right of directive proposal to the Council.
Once established by the Council as the EC's driving force, the Commission turns out to be a 
quite independent actor - which is not untypical for corporate actors which are created to 
overcome the dilemma of an incongruency of individual and collective interests. Besides the
23 In an interview, however, the Commission officials were called "Europe's last princes" by a national 
delegate to an advisory committee to the Commission. This assessment came from the experience that the 
Commission officials as committee chairmen are able to play off the national delegations against one 
another and, hence, are rather free to prepare directive proposals. Also the national delegates' behaviour 
towards the Commission officials was characterized as "courtier-like", since the delegates are all ears to 
interpret the officials' utterances regarding the direction in which the proposal drafting might go 




























































































members' common interest, corporate actors tend to develop an institutional interest of their 
own in securing their existence and in maximizing resources and powers. The institutional self- 
interest of supranational corporate actors countervails the institutional self-interests of the 
national bureaucracies, which have been emphasized so heavily by intergovemmentalism. There 
is a tendency for corporate actors to become independent v i s - a - v i s  their members and 
founders (see Schneider/Werle 1989, p. 415).
When regimes are created, they are usually not intended to renounce national rights of 
sovereignty and to submit to federal systems. On the contrary, with the construction of 
supranational regimes, governments intend to strengthen the nation-state by getting the benefits 
of cooperative action in exchange for a limited and revocable restriction on national action 
opportunities:
"Such regimes, in exchange for curtailing the states' capacity for unilateral action, serve to preserve the 
nation-state as the basic unit in world affairs and actually help governments perform their domestic tasks. 
Although the traditional model of sovereignty is clearly obsolete, the nation-state today survives even 
though some of its powers have to be pooled with others, and even though many apparently sovereign 
decisions are seriously constrained, or made ineffective by, the decisions of others as well as by 
economic trends uncontrolled by anyone. International regions help the state survive, by providing a 
modicum of predictability and a variety of rewards." (Hoffmann 1982, p. 35)
Of course, as Deutsch et al. (1968, p. 201) recognized at an earlier date, "most people in the 
past have tended to regard integration as a means to achieving some object of domestic politics". 
However, an unintended consequence of regime-building - at least if it includes the creation of 
supranational institutions - is that the national governments may get trapped in the regime they 
created because of the supranational actors' institutional self-interests in extending their powers 
and in driving the regimes further towards integration.
As a corporate actor, the EC Commission has become more than a "passive receiver o f orders", 
but it plays an increasingly active role in defining the Community interests. "The Commission is 
no neutral arbiter, but a player with vested interests of its own to promote and the record of 
Community legislation to defend." (H. Wallace 1990, p. 217) It is institutionally interested in 
extending its authority, powers, resources and the legitimation as a political actor 
(Schneider/Werle 1989, p. 417; Schneider 1992, p. 8).
The main power that was transferred from the Member States to the Commission, in order to 
overcome the mutual blockade situation in Community decision-making, is the prerogative of 
directive proposal. Although the final decision still lies in the hands of the Council, the Council 
cannot make any politics without or against the Commission (Engel 1991a, b). And the 
Commission is rather free to develop its own ideas of regulation and to draw up proposals for 
directives properly:
"Any practioner of negotiation well recognizes the crucial power of the drafter of texts, which remains 
the Commission's prerogative. The Commission can also bring the Council to a halt by providing no text 
at all." (H. Wallace 1990, p. 217)
This right of proposal is also crucial because it changes the logics of decision-making within the 
Council fundamentally. If, instead of the Commission, single States had the right of proposal, 




























































































for this proposal and the State would have to do a great deal of negotiating to achieve a 77 % 
majority, particularly if other States presented other proposals on the same topic at the same 
time. The Commission, however, was given the prerogative of proposal. If the Commission 
presents a proposal for a directive, the logics of decision-making are reversed: the 
Commission's proposals are supposed to be accepted by all States, because this is the only way 
to come to decisions. A single State which disagrees has to find other States to form a blocking 
minority. Integration theorists argue that the States' dissension is the barrier against integration. 
Once the Commission's right of initiative has been introduced, it is this very dissension that 
prevents the States from stopping the Commission's path to integration.
3.3.2 Safeguarding of the Member States' Interests by Committees to  the Commission?
Intergovernmental bargaining theorists have acknowledged that "members of the Commission 
are independent figures rather than instructed agents" (Keohane/Hoffmann 1990, p. 281), but 
argue that "yet national governments continue to play a dominant role in the decision-making 
process", because "there are innumerable committees of national experts and bureaucrats, 
preparing the Commission's proposals and the Council's decisions" (ibid.). Furthermore, "the 
execution o f the Council's directives by the Commission is closely supervised by committees of 
national bureaucrats, some of which can overrule the Commission's moves" (ibid.).26 According 
to this argument, the Commission seems to be just an intermediary institution. Is it that, with the 
committees, a perfect cycle of control by the Member States - from directive drafting to 
application - is closed?
There are indeed over l.OOO27 committees of Member States' delegations to the Commission, 
which are classified, according to their power in relation to the Commission's autonomy, as 
"advisory" or "consultative", as "administrative" or "management" and as "regulatory" 
committees. The powers of these "comitologie-committees" are related to the Commission's 
executive functions only. Regulatory committees and partly management committees (procedure 
U.b) have the power to pass decisions against Commission decisions to the Council, which can 
overrule the Commission's decisions. The Council Decision 87/373/EEC from 13.7.1987 on the 
comitologie is considered as the Council's attempt to limit the Commission's room for discretion 
in the execution of Council directives and thus keep the institutional equilibrium between 
Council and Commission (Meng 1988, Hamier 1991).
After a closer analysis of the role of the committees, however, the Council's decision on the 
comitologie appears to be a minor victory in a running fight. Particularly within DG III, many 
of the most powerful regulatory committees (as "little Councils of Ministers") are installed to 
adapt the Council directives to the technological and scientific development, because the Council
26 One commentator draws from the mere fact that many Commission activities are accompanied by 
committees the conclusion that the Commission has lost control over its policies and has been captured 
by organized interests (Grote 1990). Grote's assessment, however, is only based on "political" reports 
from 1983/84 (PE 85.216 final/EP Document 1-446/83 and PE 89.377 final/EP Document 1-40/84) 
which used the European Parliament in the debate on the regulation of the comitologie in order to 
support the positions of the Community institutions against the Member States (for further details on this 
debate see Meng 1988).




























































































is not able to do this highly technical work. Also, the adaptation of the health and safety at work 
directives is within the responsibility of a committee, which is set up by Art. 17 of the Health 
and Safety at Work Directive. If the Council delegates legislative tasks to committees, which are 
chaired by a Commission representative, the Commission does not lose, but rather even gains 
influence. And the committees which deal with the Commission's genuine tasks, i.e. the 
problems of the implementation and application of directives, are often just advisory 
committees, e.g., the committee set up by the Machinery Directive, Art. 6 (2). Even the 
important task of checking the directive-conformity of standards is in the discretion of the 
Commision, which just takes notice of the opinion submitted by the Standing Committee set up 
by the Information Directive.
Furthermore, the Council's comitologie-dec'mon seems to turn out to be Pyrrhic victory over the 
Commission (who had presented a proposal for the regulation of the comitologie on 3.3.1986 
(OJ No C 70/6), providing more authority for the Commission). The empirical study of the 
Institut ftir  Europ&ische Politik (IEP) on the comitologie found out that "the responding 
Commission officials generally do not think that their committee considerably reduced the 
Commission's freedom and even less so that it has been set up to assure the member states's 
control" (IEP 1989, p. 9). This subjective assessment of the Commission's officials is verified 
by hard facts. The Commission reported that it had received a positive opinion from regulatory 
committees for 98 % of all proposals submitted since July 1987 and that the contre file t variant 
(procedure Ill.b: the Council can with a simple majority decide that the Commission may not 
act, if the Council rejects the Commission's proposal but does not make a positive decision of its 
own), which was the main point in dispute and was finally introduced by the Council against the 
Commission's vote (Meng 1988, pp. 218-219), was never used (SEC(89) 1591 final).
The IEP study reveals that the Commission's influence within all three types of committees is 
still strong. In only 3 % o f the cases, the Commission reacted to committee reservations by 
withdrawing its original proposal, while it insisted in spite of the committee's negative vote in 
18 % of the cases (IEP 1989, p. 113). The dominant picture is that the Commission's proposals 
are modified, usually without substantial changes.
The overall assessment o f the committee's performance is that the comitologie does not lead to a 
blockage of Community action (as possible with the contre filet procedure), since
"the Council only acts rarely and then in most instances it comes to a decision - and this decision 
(according to the study) mostly corresponds to the Commission's original ideas (which may 
indeed mean that the Council cannot - by a qualified majority - find a different solution and 
therefore decides that the Commission can enact its decision)". (IEP 1989, p. 123)
The Commission even profits from committees, because they "add weight to the decision", 
which is basically delegated to the Commission by the Member States, who wanted to reduce the 





























































































3.3.3 Balances of Power in the Preparatory Stage of Directive Drafting
Although the committees do not serve as the Member States' "elongated arms", they do play an 
important role in the preparatory stage of Community decision-making. According to my own 
interviews with experts, the Commission has such a high workload in preparing health and 
safety at work directives on time that it relies heavily on receiving working capacities and 
technical expertise from the outside. "It seems evident .. that the Commission does not have 
enough staff to provide for an expert in every sector and for every technical problem." (1EP 
1989, p. 83) The Commission gets the required capacities and expertise
1. from informal contacts and consultations and
2. from the technical experts within the committees.
ad 1: The Commission acts within a network of informal contacts and is open to every kind of 
lobbying28. It is estimated that already no fewer than 10,000 lobbyists are expressing their 
interests to the Commission (Kohler-Koch 1992, p. 106). Representatives of the industry, of 
employers, o f trade unions, of consumers, of the Member States' governments and agencies and 
independent experts have access to the Commission officials and may express their interests at 
an early stage of proposal drafting. Since the Commission lacks technical expertise and working 
capacities, it welcomes uninvited contributions from all sides (TGB 1991, pp. 55-56, Kohler- 
Koch 1992, p. 101).
Furthermore, the Commission invites lobbying for political reasons, because the associations 
perform important mediating functions in both directions - towards the Commission by interest 
aggregation and from the Commission by information distribution. And interest organizations, 
especially those on the national level, may serve as important supporters of the Commission in 
its struggles with the Council resp. the national governments. The Commission has been 
characterized as "a political entrepreneur building its own 'winning coalitions'" (Kohler-Koch 
1992, p. 102, my translation).
Within the game of coalition-building, informal consultations seem to be the most important 
channel of influence for the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the 
Advisory Committee on Safety, Hygiene and Health at Work, which all have only limited 
formal powers, too.
"Neither Council nor Commission are obliged to follow the Parliament's recommendations and proposals 
for amendment. In fact, however, they do so in many cases." (Hlnsch 1990, p. 243, my translation)
HSnsch claims that between 1987 and 1989 the Commission accepted 60 % of the Parliament's 
proposals for amendment (of the first reading) and the Council again 70 % thereof. The 
Parliament's influence, however, decreases, the more importance the matter is given by the 
Council or the Commission (IEP 1989, p. 244). Prominent examples - e.g. the Small Car
28 For a similar assessment of the limited working capacities and the openness of Commission officials 
to informal consultations, see Dietz/Glatthaar's vademecum to European lobbying, which is not a 
scientific study in a strict sense but obviously experience-laden and quite realistic (the book even lists the 





























































































Emissions Directive of 1989 - demonstrate that the Parliament's influence can be quite strong, if 
the Parliament can form a coalition together with the Commission against the Council (see also 
TGB 1991, p. 44). Therefore, the EP tries to get in preconsultations with the Commission in an 
early phase. The first opportunity for the expression of priorities and guidelines is the annual 
drawing up of the legislative calendar by the EP together with the Commission. During the 
preparatory phase there may be informal contacts between EP Members (resp. their staff) and 
Commission officials, so that most of the work should be done when the Commission officially 
submits a proposal to the EP for comment (Interview, EP staff). "[The EP's] most important 
role is consultation." (TGB 1991, p. 43, my translation)
The IEP report (1989, p. 98) reveals that in 78 % of the cases preconsultations take place. And 
in the remaining cases, advisory committees are frequently somewhat formalized forms of 
consultations; e.g. the tripartite Advisory Committee on Safety, Hygiene and Health at Work 
secures the participation of employers and trade unions, who don't have the resources to be 
continuously present in the Commission's lobby29.
In the drafting phase of the Machinery Directive, for example, the Commission invited quite a 
few different groups to four preparatory sessions between 1985 and 1987: representatives of the 
governments, of European Machinery and Machine Tool Manufacturers Associations 
(ORGALIME and CECIMO), of supervising agencies (CEOC), o f standardization bodies 
(CEN/CENELEC), of the Advisory Committee on Safety, Hygiene and Health at Work and the 
European Trade Union Federation (CES) (Zachmann 1988, p. 538).
ad 2: Although the comitologie-commiUses have been installed for executive functions, 63 % of 
the surveyed committees are involved in the preparation o f legislation (IEP 1989, p. 126), 
especially the regulatory committees of DG III. This means, they are fora for the expression of 
the Member States' delegations' wishes and interests, while the Commission is drafting directive 
proposals for the Council.
All this sounds very participative, but it is not really participative in the pluralist sense o f this 
word - both in terms of participation chances for territorial (Member States) and functional 
representation (interest groups)30.
First, the different interests have different abilities to participate effectively in the committee 
work. From our own interviews with committee members and observations, a general rule for 
effective work in committees dealing with technical matters can be stated: The higher the 
interest and the higher the technological level of a Member State is, the greater its influence in 
technical discussions is. The debates tend to move quickly to a level of technical details (about 
what is technologically possible and at which costs) so that technical expertise is a crucial 
condition for effective participation. Thus, the delegations from the technologically advanced
29 In its communication on the programme concerning safety, hygiene and health at work (OJ No 88/C 
28/02), which was approved by Council resolution from 21.12.1987 (OJ No 88/C 28/01), the 
Commission considered the Advisory Committee on Safety, Hygiene and Health at Work as an "ideal 
forum for the consultation of the social partners’ . The Trade Union Technical Bureau, using the same 
word, assigns the Committee great importance in articulating the social partners' interests in the early 
stage of drafting too (TGB 1991, p. 40).
30 "Pluralism" is meant here in Fraenkel's sense, i.e. that the result of participative processes is the 




























































































countries have an advantage, because they usually have a greater potential for expertise than the 
low-level countries, whose occupational health ministries chronically suffer from a lack of 
expert staff (see Vogel 1991). The interest in the matter is an important corresponding variable, 
because the higher the interest is, the more resources will be invested in the committee work. 
Members report that delegates from low-level countries frequently prefer to listen to discussions 
to get early information on regulatory acts than to actively contribute.
These impressions are confirmed by the IEP study results, which revealed the following ranking 
list of Member States according to the number of cases where a particularly strong influence of 









5 Greece, Portugal and Spain
The differences between the high- and low-level countries become even greater, when the 
absolute influence is related to the size of the countries. Then (besides the special cases of the 
very small countries Luxembourg and Ireland) it turns out that especially the high-standard 
countries Denmark and the Netherlands have an influence which is clearly above average, 
whereas the low-standard countries Italy and especially Spain have a rather weak position, 
compared to the size of their population.
The study's authors comment diplomatically on these findings, remarking that the particularly 
remarkably low (absolute) score of Spain as a larger Member State "must be seen as a further 
indication of the fact that committee participants need to get experience in order to know how to 
exercise influence. ... The dominant picture is that of two or more northern member states - 
mostly together with one or more other delegation - having the strongest position." (IEP 1989, 
p. 104) "Special interests" (63 %), "personal capacity" (40 %) and "personal continuity" (29 %) 
were reported as the main reasons for the particularly strong influence of a delegation (ibid., p. 
106).
A similar comparison of the States's influence shall be made with regard to the composition of 
standardization committees (see infra, section 4.2).
The differences in the abilities of the Member States' delegations' to participate effectively in 
the committees' work appear to be one factor contributing to the surprisingly high level of 





























































































3.3.4 The Commission's Institutional Self-interests and Standing in the Preparatory 
Process
Obviously, the Commission is interested in regulation on a high level too. Of course, Art. 
100a(3) of the Treaty obliges the Commission to draft proposals on a high level o f protection. 
Since this obligation is, as already mentioned, vague and leaves room for the Commission's 
discretion, the Commission must have an intrinsic interest in regulation on quite a high level 
too.
One reason is the Commission's and the Commission Members' and the Commission Officials' 
self-interest in achieving an image as a political actor. The Commission, however, has too few 
disposable financial resources for "large scale initiatives" in distributive policy (since most of 
the budget is bound by agriculture and some existing distributive programmes) and therefore 
tends to regulatory policy:
"Given this constraint, the only way for the Commission to increase its role is to expand the scope of its 
regulatory activities. This is precisely what happened, and what will probably continue to happen in the 
future . . . .  Thus any satisfactory explanation of the remarkable growth of Community regulation must 
take into account both the desire of the Commission to increase its influence - a fairly uncontroversial 
behavioral assumption - and the possibility of escaping budgetary constraints by resorting to regulatory 
policy making." (Majone 1989, p. 167, see also Majone 1992, pp. 137-8).
With a conservative, traditional regulatory policy, the Commission as an institution and the 
concerned Commission officials can hardly achieve a political image. Thus, the pursuit o f a 
more active political role results in the attempts for innovative regulation which go beyond the 
Member States' traditional approaches, extending into new regulatory areas like consumer 
protection, environment protection and occupational health.
We emphasized that not only the Commission as an institution, but also the individual 
Commission officials are interested in an innovative, high-level regulatory policy. This can be 
derived from the particular employment situation of the Commission officials. Although 
empirical research on the Commission's internal social structure is lacking, it is possible to 
supply a theoretical foundation for the typical impression of everyone who has some contact 
with the Commission, i.e. that the Commission officials' typical motivational structure is quite 
different from that of the average national government official. While the staff of the national 
governments is often recruited from persons who tend to be - compared with their peers who 
choose an industrial career - solid, correct, security-oriented, conservative, risk-averse and often 
somewhat narrow-minded, the Commission recruits its staff from people who are highly 
motivated, risk-oriented, polyglott, cosmopolitan, open-minded and innovative - features which 
add to a common self-image of Commission officials: "At least trilingual, the Eurocrats are the 
avantgarde of the new European people." (von Senger und Etterlin 1992, p. 21) From the 
beginnings in the 1960s and up to the present, it has indeed been officials of a special type who 
chose to leave the relative security of their national administrations to go to Brussels to do there 
a well-paid but personally extremely challenging job. These people mutually stabilize their 
motivational structures with a distinct esprit de corps and with success criteria, benefit structures 
and career schemes which appear to honour behaviour which is more political-entrepreneur-like 




























































































structural conditions o f recruitment and career favour a tendency to support new ideas and to 
pursue a strategy of innovative regulation which attempts to go beyond everything which can 
presently be found in the Member States.
A second reason for the Commission's support for a high level of protection is the 
Commission's institutional self-interest in maximizing its authority and resources. The higher 
the level o f European regulation, the more authority and provisos of action the Commission will
get-
A third reason may lie in Rehbinder/Stewart's assumption that the more powerful (highly 
industrialized) States' interests are favoured by the Commission, because the diminishing 
acceptance of the EC by the population of the advanced Member States, who may fear that their 
historical achievements are jeopardized by social and ecological dumping, can be very critical 
for the EC - as was seen when a majority of Denmark's population rejected the Maastricht 
Accord.
The Commission officials' actual behaviour, in the committees involved in directive preparation, 
is described by the interviewed committee members as follows:
The Commission officials listen (in the committees as in informal preconsultations) to 
everybody, but are free to choose whose ideas and proposals they adopt. This behaviour opens 
up great chances of influence for certain individual experts who, because they present ideas 
which are in line with the Commission's interests, may thus act as "partisans''. Usually, the 
technical annexes of the health and safety at work directives are drafted by such (identifiable) 
partisans, who may come from the British labour inspection service, the German Federal 
Agency for Occupational Safety or a similar institution of another high-level country.
In the case of the Machinery Directive, for example, the technical annex with its risk assessment 
philosophy was drafted by a British labour inspector, who originally intended to reform the 
British regulatory system (which still follows the traditional, mechanistic concept of 
occupational health). When he had no success in his own country, he brought his innovative 
ideas to the European Community, where they were welcomed by Commission officials and 
eventually became European law.
Partisans have good chances within the committees, since most of the committee members suffer 
from the usual problems: limited working capacities, time pressure and the pressure to achieve a 
positive result. The IEP study speaks of a "common interest" in taking care of a matter, which 
leads to an informal, "'problem-solving' working style in which there are no 'diplomatic 
behavioural patterns' and no 'hidden power games'" (1989, p. 107). Hence, since every 
committee member, both from the Commission and the national delegations, is personally 
interested in effective problem-solving, there is no conflictual attitude of bargaining, coalition­
building, plotting and other behavioural patterns which are rife within the Council. In the 
committees, there is little intergovernmental bargaining, but frequent transnational cooperation.
Committees are not "little Councils", because their participants are in a different situation. The 
committee members are usually technical experts from the intermediate and even the lower 




























































































in intergovernmental bargaining (which is the ministers' task), but rather on doing good and 
noiseless committee work, good drafting work (e.g. avoiding legal mistakes, not forgetting 
important aspects) and coming to positive results on schedule while not neglecting their primary 
tasks at home.
"Experts, if left to themselves, do not make critical decisions. They attempt to solve problems once and 
for all, to deprive them of controversy." (Haas 1964, p. 115)
It is not the task of the national governments' representatives to bargain on directive proposals in 
the committees; it is rather their task "to highlight and then iron out those elements in a proposal 
which will render its implementation or application in the Member States difficult" (Weiler 
1988, p. 353). Their committee work is focused on legal and technical, not political problems 
(ibid.). Furthermore, the phenomenon that the actors on the technical level share more common 
interests than the political actors (ministers and heads of the governments) - particularly the 
common interest in improving the level of health and safety at work regulation (and thus getting 
more authority and resources) - is to be observed in practical committee work (copinage 
technocratique, for this explanatory approach see Weidner 1955 and Beer 1974).
According to Kohler-Koch (1990, p. 224), the administrative actors may even have a common 
interest in transnational cooperation, in order to get more room for action and to get some 
independence from their own national governments and parliaments (see also Winter 1991, p. 
166).
Similarly, Bach (1992, p. 24) states that administrative and regulatory processes are "de­
nationalized" by passing them to the level of technical experts who are interested in pragmatic 
solutions. These experts tend to "problem-solving" instead of "bargaining" (to use Scharpfs 
[1985] categories) within transnational bureaucratic networks, which in turn grant them 
"privileged access to data and positions on decision-relevant processes in Brussels and often also 
to the respective state of decision in the other Member States. These can be used excellently for 
bilateral coalition-building on the level of officials, in order to promote or to obstruct single 
projects." (ibid., pp. 25f., my translation)
Given this configuration of interests, committees usually welcome initiatives from partisans who 
offer to do a great deal of the practical work. Furthermore, committees take the character of 
working groups, and social groups tend to follow leaders. The level of protection may be raised, 
since these partisans tend to be people with innovative ideas rather than conservative delegation 
members, because innovators sometimes try it on the European level, when they fail in their 
home countries (as in the case of the Machinery Directive), whereas conservatives do not engage 
themselves on the European level, from which they expect no threats. In this respect, the 
expectation of social dumping may turn out to be a "suicidal prophecy". Schmitter's 
interpretation is that the "rather extraordinary success of the Eurocrats in sustaining a 
consistently low political profile can be evidenced by the low scores for popular resistance" 
against integration (1992, p. 25).
Another startling phenomenon is the fact that the committee members sometimes do not 
maintain an overview of all of the consequences of the regulative provisions which they support. 




























































































*1 think they did not understand what we were talking about." The partisan, who drafted the 
Directive's technical annex, even claimed: "We hijacked the Directive."
These social dynamics of committees strengthen the position of the Commission, whose 
representatives are the chairpersons and thus control the committee work.
According to the results of the IEP study (1989, pp. 83-85), the Commission prepares the 
committee work carefully. Particularly when the subject is considered important, the 
Commission defines its course very precisely, usually on the level of Heads of Division (30 %) 
and Directors (41 ft) , but sometimes also on the level of the Director General (11 ft), the 
Commissioner (3 ft) or the College of Commissioners (7 ft). As already mentioned, the 
original ideas and, if presented, proposals of the Commission are mostly modified during the 
committee work, but very rarely rejected. The modifications reduce the level of conflict, but 
usually leave the essentials untouched.
Another technique to increase the legitimation is to collect statements. As reported from the 
advisory committee, which is currently in charge of preparing the Pressure Equipment Directive 
(which is due in 1993), "everything is discussed. And to each issue there are at least two 
opinions. The Commission officials listen to everything, but don't participate in the discussions. 
Finally, the Commission presents a directive proposal, and every aspect of this proposal is 
legitimated, since there was always someone who supported it." (Interview, advisory committee 
member)
In this way, the Commission appears to get legitimation without effective participation. This is 
possible, because there is little formal voting, although all committees are supposed to take 
formal votes. In 56 ft of the advisory committees (directive preparation is a merely advisory 
task without formal powers for the committees), formal voting never takes place (IEP 1989, p. 
92).
The Commission's strategy to get a dominant position as the process manager is eased by the 
fragmentation of the national representation in Brussels, so that the overview of the total 
regulatory system "remains essentially in the Commission's hands" (Weiler 1988, p. 352). This 
is even true within single policy-fields like health and safety at work legislation. National 
experts, for example, tend to deal with 100a and 118a directives separately (e.g. 
Konstanty/Zwingmann 1991), although all health and safety at work directives follow the same 
underlying philosophy (even use the same formulations) and establish a rather coherent system 
of protection on a high and even level.
Another startling fact is, that obviously few actors are sufficiently informed about legal status, 
functions, authority and procedures of committees. At least no less than 39 ft of the responding 
committee secretaries and chairmen (!) did not know the specific type of "their" committee 
regarding the Council decision 87/373/EEC on comitologie. (For researchers in this field, it is a 
frequent experience that committee members are not able to correctly name the committee to 
which they belong.)
Although the Commission has a strong position, which allows it to pursue its ideas and interests 




























































































effect o f eventually forming a blocking minority) are rare. A permanent coalition against the 
Commission was found in only 4 % of the examined committees, while in 64 % of the cases 
coalition-building never occurred (1EP 1989, p.99).
The Commission's divide et wipera-strategy, that prevents coalitioning in the committees, gives 
it - at least in the national delegates' perception - an extraordinary standing within the 
committees, as a German government representative - with a clear feeling of anger and 
frustration - depicts:
"The EC Commission quasi determines the guidelines of the policy. The EC Commission has a 
monopolist position, it is not under parliamentary control. .. The EC Commission is like a tank, it gets 
through everywhere. It is a kind of dictatorship, without democratic control. .. If the EC Commission 
finds out that a blocking minority will not be achieved, it enforces its conceptions. .. 90 % of our 
proposals are rejected, unless we indicate that we have come to an agreement with the French 
delegation." (Interview, advisory committee member/national government representative)
It also becomes clear from the description of the chairman of the German delegation to the 
advisory committee on the preparation of the Machinery Directive, an official of the Federal 
Labour Ministry, that the Commission insisted in its draft proposal against the criticisms of 
many Member States's delegations - in one case (scope resp. definition of machinery) even 
against France, United Kingdom, Denmark and Germany combined (Kalwa 1988, pp. 56-57). 
Obviously, the Machinery Directive was one of the highly important issues where the 
Commission insists regardless of the committee's reservations - and where the governments - 
with only one exception - approved the proposal in the Council of Ministers in spite of the 
reservations of their committee delegations.
To sum up, in the preparatory stage of Community legislation there are several factors adding to 
the chance of high-level regulation:
* A common interest of the committee members in a level of protection which is higher 
than current regulation in their home countries.
* Greater influence of the national delegations from the high-level countries.
* Good chances for partisans with innovative ideas.
* The Commission's interest in high-level regulation, combined with the Commission's 
dominant and by the committees effectively undiminished role in the process of proposal 
drafting.
Proposals, however, are not binding. What happens to Commission proposals during the further 
steps of the legislative process?
3.3.5 The Fate of Commission Proposals in the Further Steps of the Legislative Process
Reviewing the history of the health and safety at work directives, the general pattern reveals 
itself, according to which the level of protection is even raised during the legislative process 




























































































Especially the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee were involved in 
raising the level o f health and safety at work legislation, as demonstrated by two examples:
Example 1: Selected steps of the genesis of the Machinery Directive 89/392/EEC
1. First Commission proposal from 22.12.1987 (COM(87)564 final; OJ No 88/C 29/01)
2. Modified Commission proposal from 24.6.1988 (COM(88)267 final; OJ No 88/C 214/23
3. Comment o f the Economic and Social Committee from 27.10.1988 (OJ No 88/C 337/11)
4. Legislative Decision of the European Parliament (First reading) from 16.11.1988 (OJ No 
88/C 326/40)
5. Council Directive from 14.6.1989 89/392/EEC (OJ No 89/L 183/9)
The comparison of the First Commission proposal and the final Directive reveals only relatively 
small modifications in favour of more participation of the social partners and somewhat tighter 
technical provisions. One important extension of the Directive's scope, however, - the inclusion 
of wood working machines - was already proposed by the Commission with its modified 
proposal.
This extension was welcomed by the ESC, which also judged the high protection level 
philosophy and the innovative health and safety at work concept positively. The ESC also 
welcomed the Commission's intentions to improve the opportunities for the participation of the 
social partners in CEN/CENELEC standardization and in the Directive's execution (the ESC 
was informed about these intentions by informal consultations).
The European Parliament welcomed the Commission's intentions too, and formulated concrete 
proposals for amendment on the subject of the social partners' participation. The EP was 
entirely satisfied with the essential requirements.
Compared to the first Commission proposal, the final Directive was modified as follows (major 
modifications only);
* The goal o f the preservation or improvement of the level of protection was added to the 
preamble.
* The provision was added, that opportunities for the social partners' participation in the 
work of harmonizing standards are to be created (Art. 5 (3)).
* The provision was added that a standing committee for the Directive's execution is to be 
installed (Art. 6(2)).
* The essential requirements were tightened up. Especially the absolute requirements 
approach (regardless of the technical opportunities) was added, the principles (annex I, 
No. 1.1.2) were tightened up considerably ("without putting persons at risk"; “the 
machinery must be designed to prevent abnormal use if such use would engender a 
risk")31, some provisions were extended (No. 1.2.6. and 1.2.7) and the provision was 
added that interactive software must be user-friendly (1.2.8).
31 Two modifications, however, weakened the original text: the reservation ("when it is used under the 
conditions foreseen by the manufacturer") in the preliminary observations and the word 'reasonably be 




























































































In all stages of the Directive's history, the Commission acted as the dominant driving force, 
which was able to realize practically all of its intentions. The Commission was supported by the 
Economic and Social Committee and by the European Parliament, which seemed to be 
dominated by the Socialist faction (in the second reading the EP's rapporteur spoke also on 
behalf of the Socialist faction; OJ No 89/C 1S8/75) and which demanded some more regulations 
in favour o f the Trade Unions without success.
Example 2: Selected steps of the genesis of the Display Screen Equipment Directive 
90/270/EEC
1. First Commission proposal to the Council from 11.3.1988 (COM(88)77 final; OJ No 
88/C 113/07)
2. Comment of the Economic and Social Committee from 12.12.1988 (OJ No 88/C 318/13)
3. Legislative Decision of the European Parliament (First reading) from 14.12.1988 (OJ No 
89/C 12/92)
4. Modified Commission proposal from 28.4.1989 (COM(89) 195 final; OJ No 89/C 
130/07)
5. Common standpoint of the Council (C3-9/90 - SYN 127; OJ No 90/C 113/75)
6. Decision of the European Parliament (Second reading) from 4.4.1990 (OJ No 90/C 
113/75)
7. Council Directive from 29.5.1990 (90/270/EEC; OJ No 90/L 156/14)
When the first Commission proposal and the final Directive are compared, it can be seen that a 
couple of provisions have been formulated more precisely, that quite a few of the provisions 
have been tightened up and that important new provisions have been added. The general 
impression is that the text has been improved according to the Commission's original intentions 
and that the essentials have been tightened up considerably.
Both the Economic and Social Committee and the European Parliament demanded that the first 
Commission proposal be strengthened. The Commission reacted to these comments by 
presenting a modified proposal, which included some important proposals for amendment of the 
ESC's and the EP 's comments. The main amendments were:
* The goal o f the improvement of the level of protection of workers' safety and health was 
added to the preamble (according to the EP's proposal).
* The elimination of a reservation ("if necessary") regarding the employer's obligation to 
eliminate hazards (Art. 3 (2) in the final Directive) (EP proposal).
* A new article (final: Art. 7) was added, which provided the employer's obligation for an 
appropriate work organization. Measures (breaks) against monotonous work and 
continuous stress (as demanded by the ESC; the EP proposed a limitation of work at 
display screen equipment to 50 % of the daily working time).
* It was added that the workers and their representatives are to participate in the regulation 
of the working time (The EP demanded more comprehensive participation). *
* In the technical annex several new provisions were added, according to EP proposals 





























































































* According the ESC's main demand and the EP's demand, protection from radiation was 
added.
* In the section regarding software ergonomics, the EP's demand was added that no hidden 
checking facility may be installed.
While the ESC proposed moderate improvements of the level of protection, the EP's comments 
implied many demands for a rigid tightening up of the Directive proposal which were not 
accepted by the Commission. Of particular interest may be the fact that the EP proposed 
amendments with detailed technical specifications, e.g. limit values for lighting, noise and 
radiation. The Commission, however, and finally the Council, continued to apply the New 
Approach.
With the Council's common standpoint the Commission's proposals were not only adopted but 
some provisions were even tightened up, e.g.:
* The employers were obliged to keep themselves informed about the latest advances in 
technology and scientific findings concerning workstation design (preamble).
* Art. 7 (work organization) was tightened up (interruption of the work on a display screen 
with regular breaks or other tasks).
* In Art. 8 the workers' right of participation was greatly extended to all questions of the 
Directive.
* To Art. 9 the obligation of regular ophtalmological examinations was added, and it was 
added that the protective measures are to be free of charge for the workers.
* Several details o f the technical annex were tightened up (e.g. footrest upon the request of 
the worker instead of if necessary).
* The provision of ergonomic software design was formulated more precisely with the 
effect o f tightening it up.
Regarding one aspect, however, the modified Commission proposal was weakened: The 
provision that no hidden checking facility may be used was altered to the provision that such 
facilities may not be used without the knowledge of the workers.
In the second reading, the European Parliament made many more proposals for amendment with 
the intention of a further tightening up, which were not added to the final Directive, e.g.:
* Health and safety at work on the highest possible level (!) (preamble).
* Participation of the social partners, especially the trade unions, in the Directive's 
implementation (preamble).
* Special protection for pregnant women (preamble and a new article).
* Improved participation rights for the workers and their representatives (Art. 6 and 8).
* Many improvements in the technical annex, including the re-establishment of the rigid 
restriction of checking facilities.




























































































* The proposal to eliminate combination effects too (Art. 3 (2)).
* Ophtalmological examinations by persons with the necessary qualifications (Art. 9).
* Stricter requirements for the document holder (annex).
* Inclusion o f the space requirements (annex).
* An extension of the software ergonomic requirements (annex).
-The genesis of the Display Screen Equipment Directive is the history of an (almost) continuous 
tightening up. Both the Economic and Social Committee, and particularly the European 
Parliament, demanded stricter regulations, many of which were adopted by the Commission, 
and even the Council seemed to tighten up some provisions.
The Parliament's and the Economic and Social Committee's behaviour is not surprising. The EP 
and the ESC are European institutions which have a similar interest in overcoming 
intergovernmental bargaining (and blockades) and in attaining a distinct and innovative image. 
Furthermore, within the Economic and Social Committee and within the EP Committee - where 
the socialist faction plays a dominant role - phenomena occur similar to those in the advisory 
committees to the Commission.
The Commission itself quite often amends its proposals during the process. The measures are 
generally tightened up, especially when the Commission's basic intentions and the delivered 
comments go in the same direction. Then, the Commission adopts and even strengthens the 
proposals for amendment as far as they fit into its concept32. Many of the EP proposals, which 
are politically controversial, however, have no chance of further consideration. The possibility 
of enforcing unanimous consent within the Council to outvote an EP decision is not of much 
use, because the EP is trapped in the logical dilemma that unanimity would reduce the chance 
for high-level legislation33. Hence, the EP will be most influential, if it forms coalitions together 
with the Commission (Winter 1991, p. 163).
The right o f proposal has been characterized as the main reason why the institutional equilibrium 
is biased towards the Commission. The history of the health and safety at work directives 
'indicates that the Commission proposals have good chances of passing the Council without 
substantial amendments.
There are several factors why the Commission proposals do not fail in the Council although they 
provide a level of protection which surpasses by far the least common denominator of the 
Member States required for a qualified majority. The main reason is that the logics o f decision­
making within the Council is reversed by the Commission's prerogative of proposal (see supra). 
Package-deals, the notorious time-pressure and the fact that there is no alternative to the
32 Similar processes occurred in environmental regulation, e.g. when the Commission adopted and even 
reinforced the Parliament's tightening up of the Small Car Directive (see Arp 1991, pp. 26ff. and Strubel 
1992, p. 286).
33 An example was the EP's proposal for more stringent limits in the Benzole Directive. The proposal 
for amendment failed, because it was not adopted by the Commission and the Council (as was to be 




























































































Commission proposal contribute to a high barrier against rejection. The political price of 
vetoing, which is considered as 'national obstructionism*, is high; 'the  veto is a tactic to be 
used only in extremis" (H. Wallace 1990, p. 222). The division of labour between the European 
Council and the Councils of Ministers increases the barriers against vetoing against single 
proposals in the Council of Ministers, because the packages are tied in the European Council 
across policies. 'I t  is possible then that within this process of decision-making by horse trading,
proposals will be accepted by Member States despite objections from their internal
bureaucracies* (Weiler 1988, pp. 353-354).
Finally, if the Commission proposal is above the level of protection of all Member States', 
relative deprivation is a lighter burden than absolute deprivation. As one representative of a 
German labour ministry, who belongs to an advisory committee, states:
'Naturally we are not satisfied with every aspect of the Commission proposals. But facing the high
political costs within package-deals, the barrier against voting negatively is high. We would not
recommend voting against the proposal in the Council of Ministers, when we can tell our minister that 
we can live with the Directive and that all others have to adapt too.’ (Interview)
This statement reveals a paradoxical effect of the 'division of labour' between Council and 
Commission: the Commission was given the prerogative of proposal by the Member States, and 
it uses the latter to draw up innovative regulatory proposals providing a high level of safety and 
health at work, because, besides its institutional self-interest in innovative social regulation, this 
is its task as the Community's driving force and guardian of the acquis communautaire. The 
Commission does not intend - and claims it has not the necessary legal authority - to bargain on 
its proposals in the committees or elsewhere, neither with the Member States' representatives 
nor with interest group representatives, because this would be the Council's task (according to 
Commission official Zachmann 1988, p. 538). There is no safeguarding of national interests in 
the advisory committees.
As we have seen with the examples of the Machinery and the Display Screen Equipment 
Directives, the Council, however, usually does no more than slightly modify and ratify the 
Commission's proposals, because it is assumed that all interests, including all Member States' 
interests, have received due consideration during the complex preparatory process, including the 
committee work. Hence, at least in the area of health and safety at work legislation, the 
Commission's right of proposal appears to become de facto the power to determine the 
Community's regulatory policy: *.. the Commission proposal .. remains, despite Council 
amendment, the core legislative text of Community legislation' (Weiler 1988, p. 339).
An additional factor is to be seen in the fact that the low-level countries' reluctance to accept 
high-level legislation is also reduced by the opportunity to compensate the high requirements 
somewhat by weak implementation. The de jure transposition of the directives into national law 
already takes many years, since the directives provide generous time-limits for transposition and 
many States still delay transposition until, on the Commission's request, the European Court ol 
Justice compels the States to transpose appropriately (for statistical data on the increasing 
number of violations of the Treaty see Joerges et al. 1988, pp. 276-280).
With the usual time-lag in mind, the minister who agrees to a directive in the Council has noi 




























































































protection. Even in Germany, where the ministry of econmic affairs was involved in the 
discussion of the health and safety at work directives from the beginning (VdTUV 1988, DIN 
1989), the gatekeepers of the employers' interests within the government did not become fully 
aware of the directives’ implications (new liabilities for the employers, more rights for the 
workers, broad scope of the regulation of the working environment) until autumn 1992, when 
.the transposition into national law was due. The political conflict was not raised in 1988, when 
the directives were prepared, but in 1992, when the consequences became visible (see 1G Metall 
1992).
Furthermore, low-level countries tend to be less accurate with de /acro-implementation of health 
and safety at work regulation, as a delegate from a high-level country said: "We are used to 
obeying everything in writing. Other countries aren't that correct.” (Interview, government 
official) Some of these countries do not have an inspection service capable of ensuring an 
appropriate de /ac/o-implementation (see Vogel 1991, Baldwin/Daintith [eds.] 1992); in some 
countries (United Kingdom, Netherlands, Italy, Spain, Germany, France) it even looks as if 
rather rigid legal provisions are deliberately "softened" by weak enforcement structures and 
practices (Baldwin 1992, pp. 229-230).
Weiler made an interesting observation (1988, pp. 355-356): Member States which appear as 
"tough and detail-minded negotiators" in the Council (like Denmark, "verging almost on the 
obstructionist"), tend to implement the decisions rather correctly, while countries which are 
ready to compromise (like Italy, with a "reputation as one of the most c o m m u n a u ta ire  
Member States”) tend to have very poor records of compliance (see also the Commission 
communication on implementation of the legal acts required to build the single market COM(89) 
422 final o f 7.12.1989).
At least in the past, the Commission seemed to ignore the de /acro-implementation problems, 
because it has several reasons to do so:
* The opportunity of a weak de /ac/o-implementation reduces the level of conflicts within 
the Council and eases decision-making.
* Since there are still too few harmonized standards, there is not much to inspect thus far.
* The Commission is busy with legislation and has no capacities to monitor de focto- 
implementation in the Member States.
"All in all the Commission for the most part gives very little impression of wanting to check up on how 
exactly Community Directives are being applied and to what effect. Commission officials perhaps lose 
interest in a Directive once agreed, and prefer to move on to framing other new Directives." 
(Siedentopf/Ziller 1988, Vol. II, p. 665)
But this situation might change. If the Commission has fulfilled most of its legislative duties to 
create the internal market, the institutional self-interest in maximizing resources and powers will 
make it seek additional tasks, which might be in the field of de /aero-implementation of 
European law. There are first indications that the Commission is tending toward 
implementation: besides its increasing involvement in standardization, the Commission has 
already proposed the establishment of a European agency for health and safety at work (OJ 1991 




























































































268, TGB 1991, p. 91) and which "would potentially enhance the Commission's health and 
safety capabilities significantly" (Baldwin 1992, p. 247). If the Commission becomes more 
active in implementation, the level of protection will become really high in the Member States.
Harmonized European legislation provides a surprisingly high level of health and safety at work 
regulation. The complex, opaque and Commission-dominated decision-making process leads to 
results which would never be expected from simple inter-governmental bargaining within the 
Council. The democratic legitimation of European decision-making is doubtful, but the results 
are surprisingly good - and much better than expected by mere inter-governmental bargaining. It 
seems that exactly the democratic deficits - the opacity, the different de facto  participation 
chances and the Commission's leadership - are responsible for the good results. No wonder, that 
the Commission officials object the idea of more publicity in the preparatory stage of European 
legislation (IEP 1989, p. 145).
And the Commission's role does not end with the passing of directives by the Council. When a 
New Approach directive is passed, merely the legislative framework for regulation has been 
provided. Most of the de facto regulation is delegated to the European standardization bodies, 
raising the question of how different interests participate in this part of the regulatory process 
and how the peculiar relationship between legal and private regulation is managed.
4 . Actors and Processes o f  European Health and Safety at Work 
Regulation - Part 2: European Harmonization o f  Technical Standards
In section 2.2.2, the formal process of technical harmonization was briefly described. In fact, 
the process may vary and be connected with several problems concerning the participation ol 
different interests and hence the democratic legitimation of the resulting standards. A closet 
analysis o f the problems and prospects of European standardizations starts with the working anc 
decision-making methods of standardization committees, before turning to the chances ol 
participation of different interest groups, and the recent discussion on remedies.
4.1 How Standardization Bodies Work and Make Decisions: The Role Ol 
Consensus and Majority
"Standardization is a tug-of-war, a sports fight, which is not always fair 
Politics are made there in a big way." (Interview, standardization committe 
member/govemment representative)
"Many battles are fought." (Interview, standardization committe 
member/govemment representative)
The basic principle of decision-making in technical standardization on national, international ani 
European level is consensus. This is very obviously for anti-trust reasons, because otherwise 
majority o f manufacturers could outvote competitors and pass standards which wouli 




























































































committees. Therefore, the internal and sometimes external34 regulations for the standardization 
process prescribe that standards have to reflect common interests and must not lead to special 
economic advantages for single participants (see e.g. the internal regulations of the German 
DIN: DIN 820 part 1, standardization, principles, No. 2). Consequently, standardization is 
carefully watched by anti-trust agencies. Anti-trust legislation, however, relates to economic 
disadvantages only, while non-economic interests generally have fewer possibilities to use the 
-courts to assure appropriate consideration of their interests if they are outvoted.
Consensus, however, does not mean that each member of a committee has veto-power - 
'otherwise the standard-setting process could easily be blocked by single participants. 
Inofficially, consensus is usually defined as "absence of substantiate opposition" (Interview, 
standardization manager). This means in practice that single opponents who insist in their 
rejection and who do not agree to a compromise are just ignored.
To achieve consensus, usually much discussion on the level of technical details is required 
within the working groups. This is the main reason for the long - and often criticized - duration 
of the standardization process (rarely less than 3 years and sometimes up to 10 years or more). 
Time is the price for the acceptability of standards. Each argument has to be discussed in detail, 
either until an agreement is found or absolutely incompatible positions have been cleared (and 
the standardization issue is dropped). Usually, the decision-making process is broken down into 
small steps: each formulation is discussed in detail, and after all arguments on each item have 
been exchanged, at the very end of the process, all committee members are asked whether 
everybody can accept the result or - the other way round - whether there is someone who still 
opposes it fundamentally. Inquiring especially about opposition against the result o f an aching 
discussion process can be a technique to achieve consensus.
Although technical argumentation plays a key role in consensual decision-making processes, the 
numeric composition of the committees is still of some importance. First, the working methods 
vary greatly and there are some committees where decisions are frequently made by majority 
voting (and accepted by the minorities). But this is the exception. There are certainly more 
committees where there is no formal voting, but where majorities are nonetheless important. 
There are several reasons why the numerical composition of consensual committees is still 
important:
* Within majority factions there is a greater variety of technical expertise, and the majority 
factions thus have an advantage in technical discussions.
* The majority has better chances for differentiated argumentation strategies, because each 
member can have his or her own strategy and can attack one or two minority 
representatives from various sides.
* The majority can work more efficiently, because the majority faction can divide the 
workload among its members.
34 In Germany, for example, the system in which technical standards specify general requirements 
provided by law is regulated by a treaty between the Federal Government and the German 
Standardization Institute DIN. Before this treaty was signed in 1975, the DIN had to renew its internal 
regulations (DIN 820) according to the principles of consensus and multi-interest representation. Among 
the essentials of this treaty are, that the DIN must not change these internal regulations, and that the DIN 




























































































* There are greater shares of speaking time for the majority faction.
* The participants within the majority faction have better support by others, and therefore, 
the debates are less exhausting for each individual within the majority faction.
* The members of the majority come less frequently into veto positions than minority 
members. But the one who always blocks will gradually be taken less seriously by the 
others and regarded as an outsider who is not interested in achieving a result (Battis/Gusy 
1988).
The last aspect may be the most important. Standardization committees which have existed for 
many years are more than mere working groups, they become social groups too, and hence, 
standardization is not a mere rational process, it is also a social process (see Eichener/Voelzkow 
1991). Social groups have a specific life cycle, often described as "forming, storming, norming, 
and performing" (Witte/Ardelt 1989, p. 255). Before groups can start working, some 
fundamental conflicts have to be settled ("storming") and some basic agreements and group- 
specific norms have to be found ("norming"). Once settled, these points are no longer discussed, 
and the group is ready to work efficiently ("performing").
The harder it has been to achieve a consensus, the more tenaciously this fragile consensus is 
defended against every criticism or proposal for amendment. If there is a minority of members 
who do not share these basic agreements and norms, they may be treated as social outsiders and 
discriminated against by more or less subtile practices. Important information is withheld from 
them; they are excluded from the "inner circles", where the fundamental decisions are made, 
mostly in an informal way; they are excluded from social activities and from professional 
networks.
"Personal contacts between the members have much effect. The committee members come closer over 
the years. In the course of time a committee becomes a closed circle. The people meet in a private 
atmosphere, e.g. with their wives a  a lake resort. It then comes to a certain aversion against non­
members and new members. The members together with the clique then agitate against every new one. 
This implies certain risks, but on the other side it contributes to the progress of work." (Interview, 
standardization manager)
“If you are member of a standardization committee, you are blind. You fight for your standard." 
(Interview, standardization committee member/industry representative)
To be not only in a minority position, but also treated as an outsider, can be quite unpleasant - 
hence, many individuals would rather either dispense with fundamental opposition and limit 
their contributions to minor corrections or leave the committee, because they see no use fn 
participating in a committee where they and their arguments are not accepted 
(Eichener/Voelzkow 1991).
In order to be accepted, it is quite important to share the values, norms and symbols of the 
dominant social group which is involved in the standardization process. It is especially important 
to be a member of the same professional subgroup. In a committee regulating safety ol 
machinery, for example, which is dominated by technicians, it is difficult for a psychologist oi 
sociologist to be accepted, because he or she speaks a different language, has different ideas anc 
concepts, different values and goals and quite often even different social behavior and a differen 




























































































The social dynamics of standardization committees are quite important for the chances of 
different interest groups to achieve influence, especially if a dominating majority is sent by one 
distinct group (usually the industry) while the representatives of the other interests (e.g. the 
employees’ interests) form just a small minority.
-These remarks are related to standardization committees in general. At the first glance, 
European standardization committees seem to work in a different way. CEN/CENELEC 
regulations provide that decisions are made by the national representatives' weighted votes 
l(analogue to voting within the Council) within the Technical Bureaus. But in fact, the decisions 
are made on the lower levels, in the Technical Committees and in the Working Groups, where 
there is no weighted voting. On the working level, often not all states are represented, while 
other states send two or three representatives, and there are additional committee members with 
a liaison status. In Technical Committees and Working Groups, decision-making is usually 
consensus-based, and the way of working is the same as in other standardization bodies. There 
are only majority decisions in the case of severe conflicts in the Technical Bureau.
4.2 National and Functional Representation in European Standardization
When we analyzed the preparatory stage of European health and safety at work legislation, we 
quoted results of an empirical study on comitologie, which reflect quite a different influence of 
Member States within Commission committees, with the tendency that the Member States with a 
high level of protection are much more influential than the low-level States. A similar picture 
can be drawn when national representation in the standardization committees is analyzed. As an 
example, the national composition of CEN TC 114, the technical committee which draws up 
safety standards for machinery (including standardization mandates according to the Machinery 
Directive), shall be listed. The following table contains two columns of figures: the absolute 
number of experts who are listed in the CEN TC 114 expert list from February 1992 and the 
number of experts, weighted by the number of working groups in which they are active35:
CEN TC 114 "Safety of Machinery": territorial representation
Country Abs. No. of Experts Weighted No. of Experts
total 253 100 % 419 100 %
Germany 59 23 % 82 20 %
France 39 15 % 57 14 %
United Kingdom 32 13 % 39 9 %
Austria 12 5 % 34 8 %
Belgium 20 8 % 31 7 %
Finland 14 6 % 28 7 %
Italy 12 5 % 27 6 %




























































































Sweden 16 7 % 26 6 %
Denmark 12 5 % 22 5 %
Norway 12 5 % 22 5 %
Switzerland 10 4 % 16 4 %
Netherlands 5 2 * 9 2 %
Spain 4 1 % 7 2 %
Luxembourg 3 1 % - -
Portugal 2 0 % 2 0 %
Iceland 1 0 * 1 0 *
Greece - - - -
EC Commission 13 3 %
TUTB 3 1 %
It is not surprising that the German representatives dominate the Membership of CEN TC 114 
(Germany also holds the TC's chair and secretariat), because Germany is Europe's largest 
manufacturer of machinery and has a long tradition of standardization. The high rankings of 
France and United Kingdom are also expectable. Some other facts are, however, remarkable. 
(1) Over 30 % of the working group members are representatives from EFTA States (which 
have a smaller share with regard to population and economy). (2) The rather small countries 
Austria, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland and also Belgium appear to be relatively well 
represented, while the southern countries are fairly poorly represented, including the large 
countries Italy - as Europe’s second largest manufacturer of machinery!36 - and Spain. Portugal 
practically does not and Greece literally does not participate in European standardization of 
safety of Machinery. Scherfer (1992, p. 6) draws the following conclusions:
* The countries with a high level of protection are quantitatively and qualitatively dominant 
(Germany, France, United Kingdom, Austria etc.).
* The countries with an innovative, "super high" level of protection are fairly strong, 
compared to their size (Sweden, Denmark, Norway).
* The countries with a low level of protection are insignificant.
This inequality of influence is an effect of the general rule that the more technologically 
advanced a country is, and the higher the level of health and safety at work is, the higher both 
the interest in and the capacities for participation in standardization are.
The functional composition of CEN TC 114 can not be described very exactly, since a numbei 
of experts cannot be definitely assigned to a special group. The relations between the functiona 
groups can be estimated as follows:





























































































CEN TC 114 "Safety of Machinery": functional representation
health and safety at work institutions
(labour ministries, labor inspection 
services, occupational injury insurances, 
research institutes)
90-100 36-40 %
'industry (incl. associations) 90-100 36-40 %
standardization bodies 25 10 %
consumer organizations 1 0 %
trade unions 5 2 %
other (scientists, testing institutes, 
ministries of economic affairs etc.) 20-40 8-16 %
Compared to other standardization committees, the good representation of occupational health 
institutions (in particular the German Berufsgenossenschaften among them) and the relatively 
low share of industrial representatives is startling. One has to keep in mind that CEN TC 114 
does not deal with special products but with safety of machinery in general, e.g. with principles, 
terminology, risk assessment and general protection measures for various kinds of machinery. 
Therefore, the interests of single manufacturers are not directly affected. A manufacturer, e.g. 
of grinding machines, will usually not send delegates to CEN TC 114 but to TC 65, which 
draws up specific standards for grinding machines; but a specialist for two-hand controls o f a 
health and safety agency will go to the respective working group of TC 114 (WG 7). 
Furthermore, the machinery industry is extremely heterogenously structured, with few large 
producers but thousands of small and medium-sized enterprises, which have few capacities to 
invest in standardization, i.e. in contributions to the production of a public good. No wonder 
that among the industrial delegates to CEN TC 114, many are sent from large companies like 
Siemens, AEG, FIAT, Renault, Peugeot, Volkswagenwerk, Saab Scania, Volvo, Michelin, 
Norsk Hydro, ICI, Hoechst, Bayer, CIBA-GEIGY, Nokia or EDF.
Besides CEN TC 114 a lot more standardization committees draw up European Standards for 
'safety and health at work. The CEN committees which are busy with standardization in the field 
of safety of machinery are listed as follows:
CEN TC 10 Passenger, goods and service lifts (chair: manufacturer, F / secretariat: F)
CEN TC 54 Unfired pressure vessels (chair: N.N. / secretariat: UK)
CEN TC 65 Portable grinding machines - mechanical safety (chair: manufacturer, D / secretariat: D) 
CEN TC 69 Industrial valves (chair: industry, F / secretariat: F)
CEN TC 98 Lifting platforms (chair: technical supervising association, D / secretariat: D)
CEN TC 113 Heat pumps and air conditioning units (chair: industry, D / secretariat: D)
CEN TC 114 Safety of machinery (chair: standardization institute, D / secretariat: D)
CEN TC 121 Welding (chair: Institute, DK / secretariat: DK)
CEN TC 122 Ergonomics (chair: Science, D / secretariat: D)
CEN TC 123 Lasers and laser equipment (chair: manufacturer, D / secretariat: D)
CEN TC 137 Assessment of workplace exposure (chair: occupational health insurance, D / secretariat: 
D)
CEN TC 142 Woodworking machines - safety (chair: manufacturer, UK / secretariat: UK)




























































































CEN TC 144 Tractors and machinery for agriculture and forestry (chair: industry / secretariat: F)
CEN TC 14S Rubber and plastics machines - safety (chair: manufacturer, D / secretariat: D)
CEN TC 146 Packaging machines - safety (chair: institute, I / secretariat: 1)
CEN TC 147 Cranes - safety (chair: health and safety executive, UK / secretariat: UK)
CEN TC 148 Continuous handling equipment and systems - safety (chair: industry, F / secretariat: F) 
CEN TC 149 Rail-dependent storage and retrieval equipment - safety (chair: manufacturer, D / 
secretariat: D)
CEN TC 150 Industrial trucks - safety (chair: industry, UK / secretariat: UK)
CEN TC 151 Construction equipment and building material machines - safety (chair: occupational health, 
insurance, D / secretariat: D)
CEN TC 152 Fairground and amusement park machinery and structures - safety (chair: health and safety 
executive, UK / secretariat: UK)
CEN TC 153 Food processing machinery - Safety and hygiene specifications (chair: standardization" 
institute, D / secretariat: D)
CEN TC 156 Ventilation for buildings (chair: standardization institute, UK / secretariat: UK)
CEN TC 168 Chains, ropes, webbing, slings and accessories - safety (chair: manufacturer, UK / 
secretariat: UK)
CEN TC 169 Lighting applications (chair: manufacturer, D / secretariat: D)
CEN TC 182 Refrigerating systems, safety and environmental requirements (chair: health and safety 
insurance, D / secretariat: D)
CEN TC 186 Industrial thermoprocessing, safety (chair: manufacturer, D / secretariat: D)
CEN TC 188 Conveyor belts (chair: Science, UK / secretariat: UK)
CEN TC 195 Air filters for general air cleaning (chair: manufacturer, B / secretariat: B)
CEN TC 196 Machines for underground mines - safety (chair: Science, UK / secretariat: UK)
CEN TC 197 Pumps (chair: manufacturer, F / secretariat: F)
CEN TC 198 Printing and paper machinery - safety (chair: standardization committee, D / secretariat: 
D)
CEN TC 200 Tannery machinery - safety (chair: manufacturer, I / secretariat: I)
CEN TC 201 Leather and imitation leather goods and footwear manufacturing machinery - safety (chair: 
manufacturer, I / secretariat: I)
CEN TC 202 Foundry machinery (chair: manufacturer, D / secretariat: D)
CEN TC 211 Acoustics (chair: institute, D / secretariat: DK)
CEN TC 213 Cartridge operated hand-held tools (chair: manufacturer, D / secretariat: CH)
CEN TC 214 Textile machinery and allied machinery (chair: manufacturer, CH / secretariat: CH)
CEN TC 218 Rubber and plastic hose assemblies (chair: UK / secretariat: UK)
CEN TC 228 Heating systems in buildings (chair: institute, DK / secretariat: DK)
CEN TC 231 Mechanical Vibration and shock (chair: occupational health insurance, D / secretariat: D) 
CEN TC 232 Compressors - safety (chair: manufacturer, S / secretariat: S)
CEN TC 233 Biotechnology (chair: B / secretariat: F)
CEN TC 240 Thermal spraying and thermally sprayed coatings (chair: manufacturer, D / secretariat: D) 
CEN TC 242 Safety Requirements for passenger transportation by rope (chair: manufacturer, F / 
secretariat: F)
CEN TC 247 Controls for mechanical building services (chair: manufacturer, CH / secretariat: CH)
CEN TC 255 Hand-held, non-electric power tools - safety (chair: manufacturer, S / secretariat: S)
CEN TC 270 Internal combustion engines - safety requirements (chair: N.N. / secretariat: D)
CEN TC 271 Surface treatment equipment - safety (chair: N.N. / secretariat: D)
CENELEC TC 44X Safety of machinery, electrotechnics
(source: CEN 1990, 1991)
The following table shows the national and functional structure of the key functions, the chair 
and the secretariat37:
37 The chairman (it is  usually a man) and the manager have the opportunity to control the discussions 
within the committees to a wide extent. As a standardization manager explains: “The sessions must be 
well-prepared. Everything must be pre-arranged so that chairman and manager can play into each other's 






























































































Germany 19 = 42 % 19 =  39 %
United Kingdom 10 = 22 % 10 = 20 %
France 5 = 1 1 % 7 = 14 %
-Italy 3 = 7 % 4 = 8 %
Denmark 2 = 4 % 3 = 6 %
Switzerland 2 = 4 % 3 = 6 %
Sweden 2 = 4 % 2 = 4 %
'Belgium 2 = 4 % 1 = 2 %
group:
industry 27 =  60 %
safety institutions 7 = 16 %
other 11 =  24 %
total 45 =  1 00% 49 = 100 %
Regarding the nationality of the holders of the key functions, it appears again that almost only 
the highly-industrialized, "northern" States are present. With regard to the functional 
composition, the figures depict are more typical picture of standardization committees than the 
composition of TC 114. While safety institutions have quite a good stand in the TCs which deal 
with principal matters and do not directly affect specific manufacturers (e.g. 114 safety of 
machinery, 122 ergonomics, 211 acoustics, 231 vibration), the industry, almost exclusively 
manufacturers, dominates the technical committes which are responsible for specific 
technologies, while the interests in health, safety and humanization of work are 
underrepresented. In light of the fact that no less than 49 TCs are dealing with standardization of 
safety of machinery (and a couple more with other aspects of health and safety at work, e.g. 
equipment for protection, which are not listed here), the Trade Union Technical Bureau is in 
liaison with only 4 TCs (114, 122, 211, 231). Two conclusions can be drawn from these 
analyses:
.First, the somewhat dominant role of experts from the countries with a high level of protection 
in the process of directive preparation is reflected by the composition of the standardization 
committees and especially their key functions. The high-level countries control technical 
-standardization too.
Secondly, health and safety at work institutions are well represented in the TCs which deal with 
general aspects, but the manufacturing industry dominates in the TCs which draw up standards 
for specific technologies. However, there is only a marginal direct participation of the trade 
unions and if so, then only in the committees dealing with general questions (the same is true for 
consumers and environmentalists). Obviously, there are severe barriers against a more adequate 
participation of the representatives of the people who have the strongest interest in occupational 




























































































4.3 Factors of Success: Requirements for Successful Participation :u
Standardization Committees
Considering the working and decision making methods, there are certain requirements for 
successful participation (Eichener/Voelzkow 1991). If any interest group wants to influence the 
standard-setting process, it should fulfill the following requirements:
Physical Presence
To exert influence on standard-setting, it is necessary to send representatives to the committees 
and, in particular, into the working groups. And it is necessary that these representatives are 
present at most o f the meetings (especially when important decisions are made) and participate 
in the technical discussions.
Submitting written proposals for amendment of published drafts is usually not very successful, 
because there is hardly an argument which has not been anticipated by the committee. And 
another social factor is important: After a committee has fought for years to achieve a consensus 
on a draft, the committee members will identify themselves with the draft and defend it against 
criticism from the outside. Written comments are often rejected by a form letter if the protesters 
do not personally join the meeting where the comments are discussed. Even then, there is 
empirical evidence that only marginal corrections can be achieved (unless the commentator is 
very powerful, e.g. a government).
There are some preconditions to the ability to participate physically in the standardizatior 
process:
First, an interested party has to know about the standardization process and about the 
organization and committee which is working on the standards. This sounds trivial, but it is not 
Standardization has everywhere been extremely complex and opaque. This opacity has increasec 
greatly on the European level. Especially in the field of information and communicatior 
technologies, besides the official standardization bodies CENELEC and recently ETSI, then 
exist quite a bunch of other organizations which work on standards (EWOS, AMICE, EBU 
ECMA, etc.). Many of these organizations, like EWOS and AMICE in information technology 
have a semi-official status and do the actual work of standard-setting, while CENELEC "jus 
puts its stamp on the paper" (Interview, standardization manager).
All work items of standardization processes are published when they begin. Many interes 
groups, however, do not have the capacities to scan the long lists, which are published bi 
weekly, and to filter out the important committees.
The second precondition for participation is sufficient financial resources. Travelinj 
expenditures for TC and WG meetings all over Europe (or, on international level, all over th< 




























































































The third precondition is the availability of people with sufficient capacity to join the 
committees and to work there effectively. The crucial factor for the people who are sent into the 
committees is expertise.
Technical Expertise
Technical expertise is absolutely necessary in order to assert oneself in the discussions. Every 
question is discussed on the level of technical details. If you object to draft formulations, you 
.must present a technically correct alternative formulation. If you demand higher safety 
requirements, you must prove that the existing technology is dangerous, that means, you must 
present reports of accidents, and you must present solutions which are technically and 
economically practicable. General demands are useless: "The one who comes with a political 
statement has lost." (Interview, standardization manager)
Members of standardization committees not only have to be experts - they have to be highly 
specialized experts in the very field that is being standardized, who must know the state of the 
art and must have construction knowledge.
Expertise, of course, implies that the representatives must have the time and the opportunities 
for well-prepared participation in the meetings.
Command of Foreign Language and Technical Terminology
Expertise is one critical factor of success, another is a sufficient command of working 
languages, especially English and often French. To be able to communicate, you must know the 
languages, including the legal and technical terminology. The materials and discussions are 
usually in English, and interpreters do not help much, because they cannot translate the 
important details. Translations of written materials come too late.
The language requirements are significant barriers for many interest groups. It is usually no 
problem for the industry to find experts with foreign language knowledge or even foreign 
country experience or, if not, to send their representatives to language courses. Representatives 
"of unions and of state governments complain that they do not have such opportunities. This can 
lead to the situation that in national shadow committees those people are elected as national 
delegates to European committes who are able to speak English. And if these persons 
systematically belong to one interest group, there will be a bias in the representation of the 
national interest.
Social and Cultural Integration
The social character of the standard-setting process has already been discussed. To be accepted 
as a peer in discussions, the representatives should be integrated in the dominating social and 
cultural networks. If you know colleagues and experts in other states, if you have friends in 
other states, you have more access to information and connections. You can prepare discussions 





























































































Another factor is the power of bargaining in the discussions. The industry can threaten that they 
will obstruct the implementation of standards whose safety requirements go too far. On the 
national level, governments often have strong positions, because they can threaten that there will 
be legal regulation if a standard does not satisfy the public interest. Disperse (non-monopsonist) 
users (if there are users, which might not be the case if there is an anticipative standardization of 
new technologies), consumers and workers have much less, if any, bargaining power.
On the European level, on the one hand, the national governments have lost their regulative 
power. On the other hand, the possibility of declaring that standards do not conform to the 
essential requirements by directives creates a new bargaining power for those interests which 
have the chance to exert influence on their government to bring the matter before the Standing 
Committee.
4.4 The Participation Chances of Different Interests
Corresponding to the uneven ability to meet the requirements for successful participation in the 
standardization committees, the different interest groups have different chances of exerting 
effective influence.
Large firm s undoubtedly have the best chances, especially when they operate in various Member 
States. Of all interested parties, large firms have the most resources - staff, expertise, 
development facilities - to participate effectively. Large companies have special standardization 
departments, where strategies are made, and can recruit technical experts from their research 
and development facilities. And large companies can invest considerable resources into 
standardization, because they can internalize a direct, and positive return on investment. Their 
chances on the market depend on standards, so that influencing standard-setting is directly 
related to success or failure on the market.
Furthermore, large companies have structural advantages. Especially in the field of information 
technologies, the large manufacturers are not only familiar with the complex and opaque 
organizational network, they even create and control standard-setting or preparatory 
organizations. In some fields, European Standards are de facto  made by manufacturers' 
associations and are just published by the official body. The multinational activities are reflectec 
in multinational presence in the standardization committees, too. In some international 01 
European committees, especially in information technology, you can find several representative! 
of one multinational corporation as national delegates of several states. The multinationa 
activities enable such firms to perform different strategies: regarding the three levels o: 
standardization (national, European, and international), a large company can be active on al 
three levels, e.g. if a firm considers its chances on the European level as rather weak, it car 
concentrate its activities on the international level, find there other coalition partners, and pusl 




























































































Small and medium-sized firms have many more problems in participating in European 
standardization. Their resources are too scarce, especially in the case o f expert staff, to be 
invested in standard-making. And the smaller firms are confronted with the dilemma of 
collective goods. Standards are collective goods - if everybody, including one's own 
competitors, profit from standards, why should just one little firm bear the considerable costs of 
standardization?
The same dilemma applies for large and heterogenous groups of users, which are in general 
economically much less affected by standards than manufacturers. Another problem arises in 
anticipative standardization of new technologies: for these technologies, there are no actual users 
when standards are developed.
Both the collective good dilemma (or, in other terms, the cost-benefit-relation of standardization 
work) and the resource problem are critical for the groups which represent public rather than 
private interests: consumers, workers and environmentalists. The trouble begins with the 
problem of organizing collective interests: many consumers and environmental organizations 
exist only because they are subsidized with state money. It is obvious that they have too few 
resources even to perform their main functions, and quite certainly to engage in technical 
standardization. It is remarkable that in spite of these problems, consumers associations are quite 
engaged in standardization - although it is clear that their influence is limited, should there be 
some committees where one consumers' representative faces a phalanx of a dozen or more 
manufacturers' representatives.
Although much stronger in organization, the unions also have limited resources for effective 
participation in standardization. There are only few European countries where the unions are 
active in national standardization. A higher level of standardization activities can only be found 
in Denmark, United Kingdom and perhaps Sweden, while there are indirect standardization 
activities in France and Germany (TGB 1992, country reports). The unions, however, are quite 
reluctant to invest their resources in technical standardization. First, there is competition 
between their traditional field of activities, wage regulation, and the new field of participation in 
designing technology. Secondly, the unions do not have the expert staff at their disposition, 
which would be required for effective standardization work. The Trade Unions Technical 
Bureau lists the following difficulties of effective standardization work (TGB 1991, pp. 77-78):
* Insufficient resources in relation to the workload.
■* The union representatives' comparatively low level of expert knowledge, compared to 
industrial representatives.
* The difficulty in developing a single union opinion, since there is territorial rather than 
functional representation within the Technical Committees.
* The difficulty in securing representation of the union opinion in the national delegations, 
because they are dominated by manufacturers and, to a less extent, by industrial users 
(filtering of minority interests).
Besides the TUTB observers, almost only Danish unionists and one German unionists participate 





























































































Fig. 4: Impacts of European Standardization on 
Participation Chances
increasing importance of standardization (New Approach)
additional standardization level (national, international, European)
new standardization bodies on the European level (CEN, 
CENELEC, ETSI, EWOS...)
"comitologie''
increasing complexity and opacity 
multiplication of the number of actors 
multiplication of materials which have to be processed 
increasing travelling and participation costs 
language barriers
less plurality of national standardization (access monopoles) 





























































































Governments, although they delegate regulation authority to private standardization bodies, 
participate in standard-setting committees too. Limited resources - personnel, knowledge and 
expertise -, however, have been one of the reasons for the delegation of technical regulation, so 
that participation of goverment representatives must often be of limited intensity. In spite o f the 
limited capacities, in national standardization, goverments can exercise considerable influence 
on standard-setting, because government representatives can threaten with legal regulation, if the 
-standards do not sufficiently reflect the public interest. The other side - the industry - will of 
course argue that government proposals are technically impracticable and economically harmful, 
so the government officials still have to have good technical arguments. If, however, it comes to 
'a  fundamental interest conflict, the threat with legal regulation is a very good bargaining lever 
that makes the other committee members anxious to give at least enough regard to the public 
interest to prevent government intervention.
On the European level, the national governments lose this weapon. The only formal instrument 
of national governments in European standard-setting is the Standing Committee. Otherwise, 
governments, like any other interested party, can send their representatives into national shadow 
committees and eventually into the national delegations to European committees.
Shifting standardization from national to European level increases the participation barriers for 
those interest groups which have been weak anyway. Because a another level (the European 
level) was created, the amounts of materials which have to processed multiply. Distances 
become greater, travelling expenses increase too. Complexity and opacity - a cardinal problem 
of the EC anyway - also increase greatly. Finally, language barriers emerge (see fig . 4).
These problems, which basically reflect resource deficits, are reinforced by structural problems. 
European standardization follows the principle of territorial representation. The different 
interests that are gathered in the national standardization bodies are concentrated to a uniform 
national opinion, which is then represented by a small national delegation in the European 
committee. This is also a process of filtering. In this manner, the national minority opinions 
have no chance at all to reach the European level, because a national consensus has to be 
achieved before a European consensus can be reached on the basis of the national opinions.
In sum, the relative chances of participation and influence for the manufacturers, the large 
firms, and especially the multinational firms increase, whereas the chances of the users, the 
small and medium-sized enterprises, the consumers, the workers and the national governments 
.grow weaker when standard-setting shifts to the European level (see fig . 5). This means, the 
consideration of non-industrial and public interests - and the interest in safety at work is a public 
interest - becomes weaker. Particularly the national governments, which are obliged to represent 
the public interest, lose their power.
This situation leads to a problem of democratic legitimation: If regulatory powers are delegated 
to private-law standardization bodies, then standard-setting must be organized as a pluralist 
decision-making process with equal de facto chances for all relevant interests to participate in 
this process. The state cannot withdraw completely from standardization. Different interests 
have different capabilities of organization and conflict (Offe 1969). If some interests lack the 




























































































Fig. 5: Changing Participation Chances for Different 
Interest Groups by European Standardization
- complexity/ opacity
- technical expertise requirements
- procedural com petence requirements
- language com petence requirements
- expert staff requirements
- resource requirements






























































































weak interests also have adequate chances to receive consideration. Principally, there are several 
ways for governments to become active (see Eichener/Voelzkow 1991).
First, governments may regulate the self-regulatory processes by providing institutional and 
procedural regulations to guarantee that there is a pluralist representation of interests within the 
regulatory bodies (e.g. formal opportunities of participation for all interested parties, publication 
~ of drafts and public enquiries, the obligation to take public interests into account, etc.).
Governments can enforce such regulations by framework legislation for standardization, by 
_ treaties with the standardization organizations, by sending representatives into the supervising 
boards, by financial subsidies bound to conditions or by other measures (see Schuppert 1981).
Secondly, governments themselves can participate in decentralized regulatory processes by 
sending representatives to the committees who advocate the public interests. Government is not 
a homogenous actor, but rather a network of ressorts, and hence "the" public interest is in 
practice not clearly defined, but rather there is a heterogenity of conflicting reworr-specific 
public interests (e.g. the ressorts of economic affairs have usually other interests in occupational 
health and have obligations to other clientele groups than the ressorts of labour). Given these 
facts, there may even be democratic concepts which give up the assumption that governments 
have a monopoly in defming "the" public interests and which instead consider the different 
ressorts' public representatives just as equal actors in the same sense as the private interest 
groups' representatives. Regulation in consensus-based standardization bodies may take the 
character of "mutual partisan adjustment” (Lindblom 1965).
Thirdly, governments may force the private-law regulatory bodies to take account of the public 
interests by threatening with intervention. Governments must keep the proviso of legislative 
regulation for the case that private regulation does not produce democratically acceptable results. 
The proviso of intervention then serves as the "sword of Damocles" hanging over the 
standardization committees. Governments, however, have to take care that this "sword" stays 
"sharp", e.g. that they themselves have the resources to regulate if need be. Special agencies 
staffed with scientific experts may serve as "grinding stones"38. Facing the restrictions of 
legislative regulation, the threat with the proviso of intervention stays effective only when rarely 
used, because if it turns out that the government is not able to use it, the threat would no longer 
.be taken seriously.
Fourthly, governments can threat with the proviso of altering the institutional arrangement of 
-self-regulation. Governments can withdraw self-regulatory authorities also without returning to 
state regulation but by transfering it to other, competetive institutions. An impressive example 
was the Commission's initiative to found the European Telecommunications Standards Institute 
ETSI and to recognize it as a third official European standardization body - which was clearly an 
affront to CEN and especially to CENELEC (Reihlen 1989, Falke 1991, p. 123), particularly 
considering that ETSI is organized according to the principle of direct functional representation 
on the European level and not to the principle of territorial representation as CEN and 
CENELEC.
38 An example is the fact that the quality of environmental standardization in Germany in 





























































































Fifthly, governments can produce equal opportunities for the participation in self-regulatory 
arenas by exercising influence on the system of organized interests itself, especially by 
promoting the organization of diffuse interests which lack the ability to organize themselves. In 
many countries, for example, consumer associations exist only on the basis o f government 
subsidies. Within a concept o f "public pluralism" (Kelso 1978) or of an "associative democracy" 
(Cohen/Rogers 1990), government not only delegates regulatory powers to arenas of functional 
representation, but actively tries to balance the powers of the different interest groups by . 
supporting the weak interest groups, in order to create the pluralist equality of chances required 
for the democratic legitimation of self-regulatory processes.
In some Member States, at least some of these measures have already been taken by the 
governments. With the shift of technical standardization to the European level, these measures 
may not be sufficient anymore, because barriers arise and national governments as gatekeepers 
o f the weak interests lose their influence on the European level. This creates a vacuum which 
should be filled by the European "government", which must develop "functional equivalents for 
the mechanisms established within the national frameworks for the regulation of self-regulation" 
(Joerges 1991, p. 36, my translation): the Commission.
4.5 Again the Commission: its Role in Standardization
The Commission's role as an active and independent actor in the process of European integration 
is not exhausted when a directive is proposed to the Council. The Commission also remains an 
important actor in the standardization phase of the regulatory process, although, within the New 
Approach, most o f the regulatory workload is transferred to the standardization bodies. The 
Commission uses all four above mentioned measures - though to a varying extent - to exert 
influence on the standardization process.
First, the measures to provide an institutional and procedural framework have already been 
discussed - from the Information Directive and the General Guidelines, over the Machinery 
Directive's provision that the Member States are to take measures to ensure the participation of 
the social partners, to Commission negotiations with the European standardization bodies. 
Furthermore, the Commission exercises considerable control over the standardization processes _ 
via its mandates, which contribute to the budgets of CEN and CENELEC to a large extent.
Secondly, the Commission is increasingly active in monitoring the standardization process. The . 
Commission has begun to place consultants and observers with a liaison status in the CEN 
Technical Committees (including CEN TC 114, which is responsible for safety of machinery 
standards) to make sure that standards are set according to the Directives' original intentions 
(Kommission 1990). The TCs themselves are interested in these liaisons, because they can thus 
be sure to set standards which will not be brought before the Standing Committee and eventually 
rejected by the Commission. Together with the chairman and the secretary, the Commission's 
consultant to the TC (usually the person who contributed to the drafting of the directive) appears 
to be very influential. It is remarkable that the Commission's consultant to the CEN TC on 




























































































Machinery Directive - a fact which emphasizes the role of individual partisans in all stages of 
the European regulatory process.
In this manner, the preparation of legislation and standardization are closely linked by network 
structures: on the one hand, with their work in advisory committees, standardization experts are 
engaged in directive preparation; and on the other hand, with consultants, the Commission 
'supervises standardization work. Frequently, very few persons play the role of key agents in 
these informal networks. Therefore, it is important for interest groups not only to count on the 
formal channels of influence, but to particpate in the personal networks:
"Because of the central role which the Commission of the EC will continue to play in European 
standardization for a longer time, the building-up and the maintenance of the relations to the concerned 
offices (network) are of great relevance." (Wengel 1992, p. 34, my translation)
Thirdly, the proviso of rejection - after having considered the Standing Committee’s opinion - is 
the Commission's main instrument for disciplining the standardization bodies (and legitimating 
the delegation of technical regulation to private-law organizations). In practice, however, the 
Commission does not want the Standing Committee to really become active (Kommission 19?0). 
In fact, none of the main actors, neither the Commission nor CEN/CENELEC, has an interest in 
frequently using this procedure. Rejections of European Standards would damage 
CEN/CENELEC's image as politically neutral and effective organizations, while they would 
also affect the Commission's intentions:
If the Standing Committee were frequently appealed to, it could be expected that the parties 
outvoted in the standardization committees would bring the same interest conflicts (with 
probably the same arguments) before the Standing Committee and thus turn it - like a court of 
appeal - into a second arena of bargaining. Since the Standing Committee and the finally 
deciding Commission require technical expertise to judge the conflicts, an apparatus of technical 
subcommittees would be required, which would duplicate the structure of the CEN/CENELEC 
technical committees, and a staff of technical experts representing the different interest groups' 
points of view, who would probably be the same people as in the CEN/CENELEC committees. 
The results would be that the consensual base of standardization work would gradually erode 
and the standardization processes would be extremely delayed - jeopardizing the Commission's 
- goal of creating the internal market as soon as possible.
Apparently, the Commission has no intention of allowing the Standing Committee to become 
■effective. Hence, national governments’ proposals to establish technical subcommittees, in order 
to enable the Standing Committee to judge technically about standards, have been rejected by 
the Commission (until now, not more than one technical subcommittee - for cardial pacemakers 
- has been established). The Standing Committee procedure should be restricted to cases of 
violations of essential procedural requirements (e.g. if one of the social partners was refused 
access to national shadow committees) or to exceptional cases of apparent disregard of a 
directive's requirements, when an "emergency brake" has to be pulled (Kommission 1990).
Since both the Commission and CEN/CENELEC are interested in the Standing Committee's 
inactivity, it makes a lot of sense to assume that the main function of the Standing Committee is 




























































































will be interested in making "good", directive-conform standards in order to avoid intervention. 
The proviso of rejection of a standard is like the sword of Damocles hanging over the 
standardization bodies, and only remains sharp because it is rarely used.
Fourthly, the Commission has begun to support the weaker interests, especially the unions, by 
funding a technical bureau for the observation of European standardization. This strategy will be 
discussed in detail in section 4.5.2.
However, the Commission is still not satisfied with the performance of European 
standardization, including accountability of public interests. Recently, the Commission has 
begun exercising increased control over the institutional organization of standardization. With 
the Green Paper on the Development of European Standardization and its follow-up, the 
Commission demonstrated that it is determined to alter the institutional arrangement of European 
standardization if the standardization bodies do not satisfy its expectations.
4.5.1 The Problems with the New Approach and the Commission's Proposals for a 
Cure: the Green Paper on European Standardization
The Commission has not been entirely satisfied with the actual performance of the European 
standardization bodies in two respects:
First, the Commission recognized that non-industrial interests, particularly the employee's 
interests, have fewer chances to participate effectively in standard-setting.
Secondly - and this was the more important motivation to publish the Green Paper -, the 
Commission recognized that the harmonization of European Standards was advancing too slowly 
to provide the badly required standards on time.
Both problems were critical for the New Approach. The entire strategy of delegating de facto  
regulation to private associations would be compromised, if the democratic legitimation of the 
standards were poor, due to a lack of pluralist interest representation, or if the private bodies 
failed to provide the standards on time, so that the technically unspecified essential requirements .  
would cause a considerable judicial uncertainty (as feared by the vetoing German government).
Therefore, the Commission published quite a few proposals for remedy in the Green Paper on- 
the Development of European Standardization: Means for Faster Technological Integration in 
Europe, published on 8.10.1990 (COM(90)456 final).
The main intention of the Green Paper's many proposals is the acceleration of the 
standardization process. Our analysis focusses on the organizational changes which would affect 
the participation chances of different interests.





























































































First, the Commission proposed an active encouragement of more sectoral "Associated 
Standardization Bodies" by CEN/CENELEC. In fact, the Commission had already started to 
establish new, sectoral standardization bodies besides CEN and CENELEC. The European 
Telecommunications Standards Institute ETSI (a successor of the European confederation of the 
national Post administrations CEPT) has already achieved official status, and other institutions 
may follow, perhaps starting with the European Workshop for Open Systems EWOS (for 
.information technology standardization). The promotion of sectoral standardization bodies 
undoubtedly weakens the position of CEN/CENELEC and the official national standardization 
institutes which support CEN/CENELEC, and strengthens the Commission's position as a 
■process manager, because the Commission has the power to decide which organization gets 
standardization mandates and financial support. Since the Commission support is the main 
financial source for the European standardization organizations, they are quite dependent on the 
Commission's subsidies.
Secondly, it was proposed that European Standards should exist in their own right. Currently, 
European Standards only become effective when they are published as national standards by the 
respective national standardization organisation. It seems quite natural that European Standards 
exist in their own right, but in fact this proposal contained hidden dynamite. Since the largest 
national standardization institute, the German DIN, gets 60 % of its finances from the sale of 
standard sheets and related commercial activities, this proposal threatened the foundations of 
existence of at least some of the national standardization bodies.
Thirdly, the Commission proposed the creation of European Standardization Bodies, which 
possess exclusive authority in their areas, i.e. a (partial) shift to the principle of direct functional 
represention on the European level. ETSI used to be a European organization with direct 
membership of the interested parties from all over Europe, regardless of their home country. 
However, to be recognized officially, ETSI had to introduce a formal decision-making 
procedure with weighted national votes. Especially CEN and CENELEC (the CENELEC 
Director demanded a "democratic procedure") exerted pressure for this reform.
Fourthly, a greater share of the practical standardization work shall be transferred into "project 
teams’ or "drafting secretariats", which shall be located directly within the industry. Two 
already practised examples for this strategy are (1) the Computer Manufacturers Association 
'EWOS, which actually draws up standards which have just been formally ratified by 
CENELEC, and (2) the industrial consortium AMICE, which already drafted a European pre- 
Standard for the future key technology of computer integrated manufacturing (CIM).
The effects of the transfer of standardization work to the industry would be reinforced by the 
Commission's proposal to heighten industry involvement - meaning higher financial 
contributions from the industry.
A second group o f proposals focussed on reforms of the standardization process in order to 
accelerate its speed.
Fifthly, the Commission proposed that the principle of majority voting should be applied more 




























































































Sixthly, the public enquiry periods should be shortened and the period for public comments 
should be shortened from four to two months.
An unintended side effect both of the institutional and procedural means for the acceleration of 
standardization, however, would be a further deterioration of the participation chances of the 
already underrepresented interests. The delegation of standardization activities to a greater 
number o f sector organizations and industrial drafting-secretariats and project teams would ’ 
increase the already existing opacity and would diminish the access of the non-industrial 
interests to the actual standardization committees, especially because the de facto  drafting groups 
outside CEN/CENELEC are usually not bound to the procedural regulations of the official '  
organizations. The means for process acceleration would add to these negative effects, because 
the shortening of the public enquiry periods reduces participation chances for the interested 
parties, who are not represented by delegates in the European standardization committees. This 
is of particular importance for European standardization, because minority interests are usually 
not represented within the national delegations on the European level. With stricter majority 
voting, minority interests will certainly be given less consideration than with the attempt to 
achieve consensus.
To compensate these negative side-effects for a pluralist interest representation, the Commission 
proposed a third group of measures:
Seventhly, the Commission proposed the installation of a European Standardization Board and a 
European Standardization Council for coordination (more coordination is also required to 
compensate the increasing institutional complexity) and supervision. With the European 
Standardization Council, the influence of consumers, employees and administration is to be 
guaranteed, since the Council is to be composed of 2 representatives of the consumers, 2 union 
representatives, 2 representatives of EC and EFT A, 3 representatives of the three European 
standardization bodies and no less than 9 representatives of the industry.
Whether the proposed composition of the Standardization Council would strengthen the 
influence of the non-industrial interests or stabilize their weakness, is doubtful. There can be no 
doubt, however, that the Commission's influence on standardization would be increased by the 
establishment of these coordinating institutions.
Eighthly and finally, with the Green Paper, the Commission encouraged the unions (and users 
and consumers) to participate in European standardization and requested the standardization _ 
bodies to become more open for these groups. The (controversial) main point of this proposal is 
that participation at European level - not at national level - should be opened up to interested 
parties (all interested parties, not only non-industrial interests).
The assessment of the Green Paper's eight proposals, which have been discussed in this paper 
from the view of participation chances, must remain at best ambiguous. Probably, the 
participation chances for the workers' interests and the public interests would decrease rather 
than increase, because the measures would raise the barriers for the participation of the non­
industrial interests greatly. In particular, the transfer of actual standardization work to industrial 




























































































To compensate this problem somewhat, the Green Paper also pointed to the Commission's 
already existing support of the workers' interests.
4.5.2 The Commission's Support of the Less Represented Interests
As already mentioned, a crucial condition for the democratic legitimation of the New 
Approach's de facto  delegation of regulatory powers to private-law standardization bodies is a 
pluralist interest representation within the standardization bodies. Consequently, the Machinery 
Directive obliges the Member States to "ensure that appropriate measures are taken to enable the 
social partners to have an influence at national level on the process of preparing and monitoring 
the harmonized standards" (89/392/EEC, Art. 5 (3)). What "appropriate measures" are, 
however, is vague. Usually this provision is considered merely as the obligation that the national 
governments are to ensure that the national standardization bodies are just formally open to the 
participation of the social partners. If, for example, in one EC country, a trade union asks for 
participation in the national shadow committee to a CEN TC and if access to this shadow group 
is formally refused, then this union can ask its national government to bring this matter before 
the Standing Committee.
Formal access, however, is only a necessary, not a sufficient condition for actual participation. 
The delegation of regulatory powers to private-law arenas of functional representation requires 
that all societal interests have approximately equal de facto chances of participation. Concepts of 
"public pluralism" or "associative democracy" therefore provide that the interests which are less 
able to organize and to participate are supported by the government. When the Community 
shifted to the "New Approach" to technical harmonization and standardization, the problem of 
deficient abilities of participation was early recognized and the Community indeed began to 
support the weaker interests, especially the trade unions - not only in the sector of 
standardization. E.g. the Maastricht 11-member agreement on social policy (Art. 3 (1)) 
officially approves the support of the social partners for participation in the social dialogue.
The Commission also recognized early on that the trade unions lack the resources and thus the 
material ability to participate effectively in European Standardization. In its message on the 
Action Programme for Safety, Work Hygienics and Health Protection in the Working 
Environment (OJ No 88/C 28/02), which was approved by the Council Decision o f 21.12.1987 
(OJ No 88/C 28/01), the Commission announced that it intended to provide the European Trade 
Union Confederation with the financial means to establish a Technical Bureau for the 
observation of European standardization.
Models for this Technical Bureau might have been the 1975-established Consumers Council in 
the German DIN, which is a government-funded bureau with the task of supporting the 
participation of consumer interests in standardization, and government support for union 
participation in standardization in Denmark, France and Sweden (see country reports in TGB 
1992).
The Trade Union Technical Bureau (TUTB) was installed in Brussels in 1988 and is currently 




























































































activities include the observation of European standardization processes in the area of health and 
safety at work, the definition of priorities for union participation, the establishment of a network 
of union-oriented experts, the organization of the participation of union representatives in 
European standardization, the delegation of TUTB officers to standardization committees (e.g. 
CEN TC 114) and the communication of the relevance and the results of standardization. The 
TUTB also coordinates the work of the trade unions' experts working in the ad hoc groups of 
the Advisory Committee on Safety, Hygiene and Health at Work (TGB 1991, p. 40).
Though quite successful, the TUTB has its limits, of course. Its director complains that the 
TUTB officers have no formal authority as mere observers, that the flow of information both 
from CEN/CENELEC and from the Commission is frequently obstructed, that it is often 
difficult to find experts, that union representatives are usually in a minority position and not in 
bipartite comittees and that, of course, the resources are not sufficient (Sapir 1992a, b).
Although the TUTB has too few resources to cover all fields of employee-relevant European 
standardization satisfactorily, the subsidies are probably already approaching the upper limit of 
what can be expected from the Commission. The TUTB approach is limited in another respect, 
too.
As a European institution, it is a foreign element within the institutional system of European 
standardization, which provides no room for a European representation of interests but only 
room for national interest representation. Within the present system, the main arenas for the 
improvement of the material participation opportunities for the social partners have to be the 
national standardization bodies. In all twelve Member States, national equivalents to the 
European TUTB should be installed, and in all twelve Member States, the unions themselves 
should develop the organizational capacities to use their formal participation chances (see 
Eichener/Voelzkow 1992a, b).
The Commission, however, has decided to install the TUTB as a European institution. This, 
along with the fact that the Commission enables European (not national) union and consumer 
representatives to attend CEN/CENELEC Technical Committee meetings as observers, adds a 
facet o f direct functional representation to the still territorially organized standardization 
process.
4.5.3 From Territorial to Direct Functional Representation on the European Level?
On the other hand, the support or facilitation of improved participation on the part of the unions 
is very interesting, because it may indicate an important shift in standardization strategy. At 
present, European standardization is organized according to the principle of territorial 
representation: the national bodies send their delegates to CEN and CEN EL EC. There is 
evidence that the Commission indeed aims at a future reorganization of standardization 
according to functional representation on a single European level (which is certainly not yet 
practicable). Of course, the national institutes oppose these tendencies. So the Commission's 
complaint that the existing system (of territorial representation) does not allow full participation 




























































































European level may be an argument to eventually reorganize the total system of standardization. 
The Green Paper already contained the proposal to open up participation to the interested parties 
directly at the European level.
The present system of territorial representation remains within the logics o f the traditional 
approach, viewing the European Community as a Federation of independent states. Different 
■ functional - private and public, industrial and non-industrial - interests are, in a first step, 
aggregated to single national interests, which are then, in a second step, transposed to the 
European standardization bodies, where a harmonized European standard will be passed. The 
’ territorial organisation of European standardization is appropriate, if it is assumed that the 
heterogenity of interests of the same functional group between the Member States is greater than 
the heterogenity of the interests between different functional groups within each Member State. 
Only then is it useful to aggregate the different functional interests first and then the different 
national interests; otherwise, the different national interests should be aggregated within each 
interest group in a first step, and then directly represented within the European standardization 
bodies.
The obvious difficulties of the interested European parties in finding common positions were 
indeed taken as arguments against harmonized European Standards (and thus against the New 
Approach alltogether):
'There are voices which talk of a European representation of the interested parties in European 
standardization. These voices are far ahead of time. There is, thus far, no European industrial opinion on 
a concrete standardization project. There is no opinion of the European science, o f the European 
consumers, of the European trade unions.' (Geisendflrfer 1989, p. 9, my translation)
However, the present system can raise considerable problems for the representation o f the 
minority interests: Given the fact that, for example, the employees' interests have different 
chances of influence in different Member States, what happens in fact, is that, on the European 
level, the chances of influence of the employees' interests are weighted with the number of the 
Member States whose delegations at least partially transpose the employees' interests to CEN, 
CENELEC or ETSI. When, for example, the unions are represented in the shadow committees 
of only one Member State (e.g. Denmark or Germany), then there is only one national 
delegation within the European technical committee which regards the employees' interests at all 
- and this delegation may be stigmatized as 'the union group" by the others.
-T he Commission, by establishing the observership or liaison status for European union 
representatives, and by funding the TUTB, thinks more in terms of a functional represention of 
integrated European employees' interests. The range of these measures is still limited, because 
they only cover the observation and, at the most, the coordination of representation and 
influence, but not the right to vote, which is still reserved for the national representatives in the 
Technical Bureaus.
The Green Paper, however, contains several measures for an evolution o f the European 
standardization system towards more integration, e.g. that European Standards should exist in 
their own right or that a European Standardization Board and Council should be established, 
which add weight to the European organizations. The current arrangement could eventually be 




























































































system, the interested parties would directly participate in European standardization committees. 
Two alternative options are thinkable: Either the different interests are represented in the 
standardization committees by their European organizations (e.g. European industrial 
associations of the different branches, European consumer associations, the European Trade 
Union Federation), which, in a first step, formulate a common position. Then there would be no 
inter-State bargaining in the European committees at all. Or individual firms, associations and 
trade unions have direct access to the European standardization bodies (perhaps with quotas for * 
parties from the different Member States). Then the situation could arise in which a trade union 
representative from one country would come into conflict with his colleague from another 
country within the committee. In both cases, the national standardization bodies would lose their 
functions as national coordinators. (They would probably take over sectoral administrative tasks 
of the European standardization work, since CEN/CENELEC would have too few resources for 
that).
What would such a shift from the principle of territorial to functional representation imply for 
the chances of participation? Instead of a quick answer, we should differentiate between a short­
term (up to 5-10 years from the present) and a long-term perspective (see fig . 6).
In the short run, the present sytem favours the participation of the weak interest groups. The 
access to the national standardization bodies, both for committee membership and for comments 
on European Standard drafts, which are still published by the national institutes, is easier than 
the access to a European institution with longer distances (and higher travel expenses), language 
barriers and more opacity. Furthermore, the unions and the other organized interests would have 
to settle their problems with different opinions on levels and philosophies of protection.
In the long run, however, the shift to functional representation would be connected with more 
chances than restrictions for the non-industrial interests. One reason is that any interest group 
which already organizes on the European level and which is represented in many Member States 
has a structural advantage over the merely national groups. The large-scale industry, which 
already has a common European point of view, must be counterbalanced by an integrated 
European view o f the consumers and the unions. Multinational firms can send their 
representatives via many national delegations to the CEN/CENELEC/ETSI committees and are 
thus able to multiply their influence. The unions (and the other non-industrial interest groups) 
would also have to send representatives in the respective shadow committees and national '  
delegations in many European countries to form a counterbalance against the industry. But it is 
very unlikely that the unions would get the chance to participate in their national standardization _ 
bodies in more than a few Member States. For a CEN committee dealing with sensoric devices 
for automatic safety stops, for example, the unions would need experts for this technology in 
many countries - which would be quite a task, since it is already difficult for the unions to find 
at least one expert for such a field. Thus, also from the organizational viewpoint, the shift to 
functional representation might be better for the participation chances of the unions, assuming 
that they have some time to manage the problems of European organization. For this task, they 
have already been supported by the EC Commission. And it seems to be easier for the unions to 
get support from the EC than from all national governments.
The TUTB could serve as a nucleus for building a European structure to organize the 




























































































Fig. 6: Comparison of Territorial vs. Functional
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standardization in many countries, the European trade unions would need just one unit in 
Brussels, which could draw upon a large reservoir of technical experts all over Europe. To 
resume our example, for the European Trade Union Federation it would be sufficient to find just 
one expert for sensors in any State and to send him or her to the European standardization 
committee. The precondition is that the ETUC would have managed to build up a working 
network of technical experts. To overcome the difficulties of reaching a common European 
position, the ETUC would need an institutional arrangement of process management and _ 
decision-making equivalent to the configuration on the level of EC decision-making. A strong 
European organizational unit with an institutional self-interest in effective European 
standardization work, which could be built up around the TUTB, could serve as an equivalent to - 
the Commission and could manage the interest conflicts on the less problematic working level of 
technical experts.
4.5.4 Comments on the Green Paper and the Commission's Follow-up
The Green Paper was intended as a provocation by the Commission and was perceived by the 
addressees as such. The Commission received no less than 252 comments which were directly 
submitted to the Commission, while many more comments were addressed to national 
governments and standardization bodies, and later submitted to the Commission as coordinated 
national responses. The Commission made a synopsis of the comments (Commission 1991) and 
published on 16.12.1991 a Follow-up to the Green Paper: Standardization in the European 
Economy (COM(91) 521 final). The following analysis is an interpretation of these Commission 
papers.
Especially the national standardization bodies regarded the Green Paper's proposals as a threat to 
their existence. The Commission's tendency towards functional representation was clearly 
recognized by the national bodies, which already tried to stop the early steps in this direction.
1. Promotion of Sectoral Standardization Bodies
There was no support for the creation of new European standardization bodies on sectoral lines, 
which would complicate the standardization process (p. 5). There was some support for. 
Associated Sectoral Bodies (like EWOS), if participation of all interested parties is ensured (UK, 
EFTA, UNICE, BEUC, pp. 11-12).
2. European Standards to Exist in their Own Right
This proposal naturally provoked firm protest from the national standardization bodies. The 
reactions of governments and industrial associations were mixed (especially problems of legal 
compatibility were foreseen for cases where national law refers to standards). The BEUC 




























































































3. European Standardization Bodies which hold Exclusive Authority in their Area
For similar reasons, this proposal also raised serious objections. Besides the self-interest- 
motivated comments of the national standardization organizations, some governments, the EFT A 
secretariat, the Economic and Social Committee, some industrial associations, the ETUC and the 
CCC argued that this would put small and medium-sized enterprises, the employees and the 
-consumers at a serious disadvantage (pp. 28-29).
4 . The Use of "Drafting Secretariats" and "Project Teams" and Higher Industry 
Involvement
The proposal of more industrial funding received much support, but some comments expressed 
concern that this would favour large companies. Especially the social partners feared that higher 
industrial contributions might jeopardize the influence of parties with modest financial means 
(pp. 7-8).
The proposal of drafting secretariats and project teams received much support from many sides, 
too. However, the Economic and Social Committee and a few other commentators expressed 
their fear that this might imply that only the industry would be involved in preparing drafts 
which might lead to a neglect of the safety aspects. Therefore, also some of the supporters - 
including the European consumers association BEUC and the German DIN (where industrial 
teams are already in practice) - demanded rules which ensure that all interests are taken into 
account and that the results reflect a consensus and not the views of individuals (pp. 10-11).
5. More Systematic Use of Majority Voting
This proposal was generally rejected. Consensus is widely regarded as an essential condition for 
the acceptability of standards. ETUC feared that majority voting would strengthen the role of 
the industry and EBUC asked “How would this operate other than to the disadvantage of 
minority interests? Consumer input should be safeguarded by the creation of an appeal 
procedure where majority voting disregards consumer interest" (pp. 14-13). But also the main 
industrial associations generally rejected majority voting.
6. Shorter Public Enquiry Periods
This proposal was also rejected by almost all commentators (governments, standardization 
bodies, industry, BEUC, ETUC) with the common argument that this would jeopardize the 
consultation with all interested parties, and the acceptance, without having a substantial 
accelerating effect (pp. 16-17).
7. European Standardization Board and Council
Although it was agreed that better coordination between the existing official (CEN, CENELEC, 
ETSI) and associated standardization organizations (e.g. EWOS) is needed, "an evolutionary 




























































































and consumers, however, supported the proposed institutions under the condition that they are 
adequately represented in these coordination bodies (p. 26).
8. Participation at European Level to be Opened up to Interested Parties
This proposal seemed to provoke the most comments. Most of the comments were negative, 
because the weak interests would be unable to participate on the Eurpopean level, especially the 
small and medium-sized enterprises. The national standardization bodies naturally claimed that 
’national representation is the only way to ensure adequate participation in the work and 
voluntary implementation of its results on the part of all affected" (here: DIN). Also CEN and 
CENELEC, which already released a memorandum on union participation in European 
standardization in 1989 (CEN/CENELEC Memorandum No. 5), insisted that unionists 
participate primarily by membership in the national delegations (Huigen 1992). On the other 
hand, ETSI favoured the proposal and expressed its willingness to find appropriate mechanisms 
for membership of trade unions.
The responses regarding non-industrial interests were mixed. The BSI argued that at present 
consumers are full voting members of its technical committees and national delegations. The 
observership on the European level (without the right to vote) represents a lesser capacity; 
hence, if national delegations disappear, consumers must be more than observers. The industrial 
associations UNICE and ORGALIME were opposed to further integration of consumers and 
trade unions in European standardization, because the only way of ensuring balanced 
representation of different interests are the national delegations. The ETUC (which is already 
favoured by the Commission policy) naturally supported the proposal, but added that the social 
partners' influence is important on the national level, too. BEUC and CCC claimed that 
observership is not sufficient and demanded full voting rights. Some comments (including that 
o f the Danish government) proposed that trade unions and consumer organizations should be 
funded by the Commission to build up specific organizations for observing standardization, 
defining priorities and designating experts to participate in the committees (as practised with the 
TUTB; pp. 36-38).
The Commission reacted to the comments by presenting a follow-up paper (COM(91) 521 final) 
with modified proposals:
* The public enquiry periods can be shortened only if national standards are simply 
adopted as European Standards (No 27).
* Branch associations shall be encouraged to build up associated standardization bodies, 
which shall be rather autonomous to limit the collisions with other standardization works 
(No 27). *
* The proposal that European Standards should exist in their own right is dropped, but the 
obligation to publish European Standards as national standards is tightened up. And the 
Commission intends to refer to European Standards instead of national standards in the 
directives (No 53).
* Small, full-time working project teams are proposed for certain situations (No 27).
* The national standardization bodies' interests in conserving the principle of territorial 




























































































become a monopoly. The Commission points to other interests in standardization directly 
on the European level requiring direct functional representation in certain areas of 
standardization (No 33).
* European trade unions, consumer organizations and associations of artisans and small and 
medium-sized industries are to express common interests on the European level in 
addition to the national level. Therefore, the Commission, the EP and the ESC are 
convinced that the European Standardization Bodies must permit direct participation of 
European organizations on the European level in the form of non-voting observerships on 
all organizational levels from the working group to the general assembly (No 33-34). 
CEN, CENELEC and ETSI have already reacted to this proposal (No 35).
* The Commission approves its policy of giving financial support to the interest groups 
with insufficient means for participation, and announces that it will continue to support 
the unions and consumer associations and that it will begin to moderately support small 
and medium-sized enterprises (No 37).
* The Member States are requested to support the interest groups in addition to the 
manufacturers, in order to ease these groups' participation in the standardization (No 19).
* The idea of the European Standardization Board and Council is dropped, but the 
Commission announces the installation of a common presidents group for better 
coordination between the bodies, and of a European Forum for Standardization for a 
dialogue with the social partners and consumers. The Forum shall be able to deal with 
every question that might arise regarding European standardization, particularly matters 
of representation and participation. The membership of the Forum is to be larger than the 
proposed Council and the representation of the industry is to be balanced by national 
governments' representatives. The number of consumers and union representatives is to 
be increased from 2 to 339 (No 39-43).
* The Commission increases its involvement in the standardization process by giving 
orders to plan sectoral standardization programmes (No 23-25).
The essentials of the Commission's Follow-up have been formally approved by Council
Resolution from 18.6.1992 (OJ No 92/C 173/01).40
When the Green Paper and its Follow-up are compared, it appears that, although some proposals 
have been weakened or even dropped, the original intentions are generally confirmed. There is, 
however, a remarkable shift in the motives. While in the Green Paper the motive of acceleration 
clearly dominated, the problem of accountability has now gained importance. The Commission 
even speaks of a "process of democratization of standardization, which now gets more 
competences" (Farnell 1992, p. 104). The previously pursued strategy of supporting the weak 
interest groups is confirmed and extended and, with the Standardization Forum, somewhat more 
"regulation of self-regulation" (Joerges 1991, p. 36) is introduced in order to aid the less 
represented interests in articulating their wishes. Despite the heavy protests, the Commission
39 The following composition is proposed: 1 representative of each national Government (EC and EFTA 
states), 5 representatives of the common presidents group, 12 representatives of the industry (including 
small and medium-sized enterprises), 3 representatives of professional users, 3 representatives of the 
consumers, 3 representatives of the unions, 1 representative of the European Organisation for Testing 
and Certification, 1 representative of the EC Commission, 1 representative of the EFTA Secretariat (No 
42c).
40 This Council Resolution is another proof of the thesis of the Commission's leadership in European 





























































































insists that the national way must not be the only way for the representation of the intereste» 
parties and that there must be both effective national and direct European representation (Famel 
1992, p. 104).
The story of the Commission's attempt to reform the institutional arrangement and the proceduri 
of European standardization is an example for the relevance of the peculiar configurations o 
actors. If we consider the institutional self-interests of the main actors, we get a configuration o 
interests as follows:
* The Commission is interested in a shift from territorial to functional representation.
* The national standardization bodies and the national governments want to keep th 
present system of national delegations.
* CEN and CENELEC, as territorially organized bodies, which depend on the nations 
institutes, support the national bodies.
* ETSI, as a functionally organized institute, which has been promoted greatly by th 
Commission to be recognized as the third official European standardization body 
supports the Commission.
* The weak interest groups - the trade unions, the consumer associations and th 
associations of the small and medium-sized enterprises - are primarily concerned aboi 
their chances of influence. Unions and consumers have been supported by th 
Commission and already favour the Commission's ideas of further integration, while th 
small and medium-sized firms expect risks from a shift to functional representation 
Therefore, the Commission intends to support the participation of the small and mediuir 
sized enterprises, too.
* The large corporations seem to be indifferent, because they have good chances c 
participation anyway; they probably tend more to functional representation to sav 
capacities by eliminating one of the three levels of standardization.
* The Commission can argue that, under the present arrangement, the national standarc 
bodies and the national governments fail to ensure that the unions and consumers hav 
sufficient de facto  participation chances.
In this configuration, both for the Commission and for the national governments, supporting t! 
trade unions' de facto  opportunities to participate in standardization can be an instrument ft 
improving one's political position: the German government already plans to finance a Germ's 
equivalent to the TUTB (whether such an institution would help the workers, however, 
doubtful, since the Berufsgenossenschaften, who are fighting for their regulatory powers, ai 
bent on capturing this institution before it exists).
As in directive-making, also in standardization, the determinants of the regulatory outcomes a: 
to be sought in the configuration of actors who are not only motivated by their clientele 
interests but also by their institutional self-interests in maximizing powers and resources. Ar 
like in health and safety at work legislation, it is most unlikely that standards will be passed c 
the level of the least common denominator. But whether the European occupational health ar 
safety standards will really be on the highest level of protection, according to the latest state i 
the science of technology in favour of humane working conditions, now depends on the abili 




























































































Government support of the weak interests is just half the story, the second half is the 
organizations' willingness to build up organizational structures to take advantage of the chances 
of participation (Eichener/Voelzkow 1992a, b, see also TGB 1991, p. 9). Trade unions usually 
demand extended participation chances; in European standardization, there is a configuration of 
actors which is clearly in favour of the unions' chances to participate in this very important 
regulatory process. The future will show whether the European unions use their opportunities.
5. Conclusion and Perspectives
According to the New Approach to Technical Harmonization and Standardization, the process of 
European health and safety at work regulation is divided into two phases: legislation and 
standardization. From the point of view of the interest in a high level of protection, there are 
political risks in both phases. In the phase of legislation, there is the risk of legislation on the 
level of the least common denominator, or social dumping, because of the logics of 
intergovernmental bargaining and the opportunity of a couple of low-standard countries to form 
a blocking minority against high-level directives. In the phase of standardization, there is the 
risk that the interests in occupational health and safety are not given adequate consideration 
because of insufficient de facto  chances of participation of the groups who represent these 
interests, mainly the European trade unions.
In actual European health and safety at work regulation, however, both risks could be avoided to 
a considerable extent, because there is a specific configuration of actors in favour of high-level 
and innovative regulation. Mainly the European institutions, primarily the EC Commission, 
which turned out to occupy a dominant and driving position in the process o f directive 
preparation and whose innovative ideas were supported and somewhat enhanced by the 
European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee, pursued a strategy of innovative 
regulation. Neither within the Council, which made the final decision, nor within the 
consultative committees was the Commission's intention of high-standard legislation blocked by 
the national interests of the Member States with lower levels of protection.
However, although the results of European health and safety at work regulation are quite good - 
/o r  many observers surprisingly good -, the democratic legitimation of the European decision­
making process is doubtful, at least in this sector of regulatory policy. The Commission's role 
goes far beyond mere process management in the preparatory stage of European legislation, but 
the Commission is a key actor with good de facto  opportunities to impose her concepts during 
all stages of the complex regulatory process. Empirical evidence and theoretical reasoning 
indicate that the Commission's leading role is basically unaffected by the advisory committees of 
the Member States' representatives. Of course, the Commission adopts many proposals from 
partisans within the committees, from the Economic and Social Committee and from the 
European Parliament, but the Commission adopts them only, i f  they fit into her strategy. The 
extremely complex and opaque regulatory process offers many chances for lobbying and the 
Commission is open to and explicitly invites any articulation of interests and any help from 
outside experts. Opportunities to express interests and to offer expertise, however, must not be 
mistaken for opportunities for effective participation in decision-making. The Commission 




























































































The deficit of democratic legitimation remains, even if the Commission, which is institutionally 
interested in an innovative regulation, opts for a high level of health and safety work and even 
acts as an advocate of the workers' interests (not without strengthening its own position when 
supporting Union participation in European standardization).
The opportunity to escape from political responsibility has been mentioned as one facto; 
contributing to the Member States' willingness to give up the veto-power by signing the Single 
European Act. The price of diffusing responsibilites by shifting major parts of the de facto 
decision-making process to complex, opaque and anonymous network-like structures is the 
erosion of "traditional democratic and parliamentary norms":
"Governments become less responsible for the decisions affecting the citizens by whom they are elected. 
For the normal citizens the 'state' becomes less and less a clear object of identification. .. In such ar 
interlocked system politicians cannot be responsive to nor responsible for their electorate." (Wessek 
1990, p. 238)
The politicians' growing habit of blaming the European Community for home-made problems 
(from financial deficits and rising taxes to economic problems of worn-out industries - see 
Hansch 1990, p. 245) does not help to change the negative attitudes toward Europear 
harmonization in many Member States. The example of the German debate on the health anc 
safety at work directives points to a even more important source of discomfort with Brussels: Ir 
particular, many of the interest organizations which have important mediating functions betweer 
governments and citizens contribute to the conservation and reinforcement of prejudices or 
European decision-making - including the myth of social dumping - because they are afraid o: 
losing their own regulatory authority in the process of institutional re-arrangement (e.g. th< 
German Berufsgenossenschaften).
Indeed European integration requires that national institutions with a high level of legitimation 
governments and powerful interest groups - must lose much of their influence in Brussels t< 
overcome the mutual blockade situation of inter-national bargaining. If national govemmen 
representatives in the consultative committees complain that the Commission rejects 90 % o 
their proposals, this comes close to the mathematical number of rejections which are required t< 
prepare a directive proposal which is evenly influenced by all of the 12 Member States (with i 
mathematical share of 1/12 for each State) and free of national biases. Furthermore, thi 
Commission has also to seek a balance between the official national interest as articulated b 
government officials and national minority interests, which may be expressed by various societa 
partisan groups. Facing the multitude of national governmental and non-governmental interest 
on the European level, a "success quota" of "only" 10 % appears to indicate even a quite stron] 
influence - compared to the influence of others. Reality is, of course, much more complex ani 
cannot be appropriately modelled by such simple arithmetical games. I merely wanted t 
demonstrate that no single actor can reasonably expect more than a marginal identifiabl 
influence on European decision-making.
European health and safety at work regulation indeed appears to be a blend of influences fror 
many (advanced) Member States - e.g. the New Approach from Germany, the occupation, 
health concept from Denmark and the Netherlands (and non-EC-Member Sweden), the ris 




























































































personal protection approach from France etc. The high level of protection is partly the result of 
the fact that the most innovative elements from various countries have been combined.
Exactly the fact that the Commission is concerned with avoiding situations of national 
dominances - of "relative deprivation" for the other States - creates the feeling of disregard of 
one's own interests. In the current political system of the European Community there is no 
.adequate compensation for this loss of democratic legitimation. The European Parliament and 
the (in public widely unknown) Economic and Social Committee are the least influential 
European institutions, and most of their effective influence on European decision-making comes 
-from acting within the hidden networks of preconsultations in the preparatory stages of the 
decision-making process.
Although between 1985 and 1992 the Commission's strong position has been an important 
reason for the new and "unexpected" drive towards integration, the democratic deficit in 
European decision-making may become critical for Europe's future. The Danish population's 
rejection of the Maastricht Accord (which paradoxically introduces and enhances democratic 
procedures to some extent), the small majority for the Union Treaty in the French referendum, 
the British Government desertion from the European Currency System and partial dissociation 
from the European Community demonstrate that people and governments in the Member States 
are increasingly concerned about losing national sovereignty.
When both the British Prime Minister and the German Chancellor blamed the Commission for 
being too dominant and practising some over-regulation and over-harmonization during the 
currency crisis in late September 199241, these comments reflected widespread negative attitudes 
against the "Eurocrats" in Brussels. Commission Vice President and Commissioner o f DG III, 
Martin Bangemann, reacted to these criticisms on the one hand by playing down the 
Commission's role and pointing to its concern for subsidiarity but on the other hand by 
emphasizing the necessity of harmonization in technical standardization, indicating that the 
Commission's course in technical regulation won't change (on 23.9.1992, as quoted by the 
European press, e.g. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung from 24.9.1992).
After the long period of stagnation from the late 60ies to the early 80ies, the period between 
1985 and 1992 - from the Commission's White Paper and the Single European Act over a 
- comprehensive harmonization of law up to the Maastricht Accord on the European Union - has 
certainly been marked by a fresh drive towards integration. Facing the European crisis in 
autumn 1992, the suspicion arises that the speed of the drive towards integration may have been 
accelerated a little too much, provoking a roll-back in some Member States, most evidently in 
Denmark, the United Kingdom and France. What are the prospects for European integration in 
the future?
41 Probably the most important statement was an official statement addressed to the Bundestag, when 
Chancellor Kohl spoke of "centralist misdevelopments", a "tendency to regulate all and everything on 
the European level" and a "frequently observable regulatory mania (Regelungswut)' and demanded that a 
reasonable equilibrium between local community, region, nation-state and European Community be 





























































































Returning to a policy of minimum harmonization on the level of the least common denominator 
would certainly not be acceptable for the highly-industrialized Member States, and doesn't 
appear to be a realistic option, since, at least in the area of health and safety at work, most of 
the harmonized European regulation has already been enacted. On the other hand, it seems to be 
unlikely that the Community will be able to continue on its path of tough regulatory 
harmonization with the same speed as maintained during the last years, especially if the total 
effects o f European regulation become increasingly visible after the time-lag between directive 
passing and de /aero-implementation.
One reaction to the legitimation crisis could be a more consequent application of the principle of 
subsidiarity to something called "Europe k la carte" or "two-speed Europe": a loosei 
international regime with special membership conditions for single countries which are nol 
willing or not able or not permitted (in the case of the monetary system) to participate fully ir 
the European Union. In such a perspective, there would be a core group around the large and 
economically strong Member States Germany and France, probably including the Benelux 
countries and perhaps Denmark, and a more or less peripheral group of States which are 
politically reluctant to join this core group (such as United Kingdom) or are economically toe 
weak to participate fully in economic integration. However, as Bangemann made clear, such "i 
la carte" memberships are only practicable in some new and additional sectors of integratior 
policy, but not in the sectors where harmonization is essential for the completion of the interna 
market, because there, as in legal harmonization, the principle "all or nothing” is in effeci 
(Weiler 1982a). In health and safety at work regulation, it is hard to see how the wheel could lx 
turned back and how a "two-speed Europe" could be realized without a new segmentation of tht 
internal market. To protect their industries against social dumping from low-level states, the 
countries with high levels of protection would have to erect new trade barriers. Accordingly, the 
ministers of finances confirmed during their meeting on 28 September 1992 that there won't tx 
a Europe of two speeds.
"All or nothing" characterizes the future of the Community too. If there is only a choici 
between the erosion of the Community or ongoing harmonization (perhaps with a somwha 
reduced speed), the legitimation crisis can only be overcome by reforming the Community 
decision-making process itself. Because there is no return, the Community has to take the nex 
step on the ladder towards a mature political system on a supranational level.
This is not the place for intricate discussion of options for the democratization of the Europeai 
Union. Only some thoughts shall be presented which arose from the analysis of the decision 
making processes in health and safety at work regulation. The deficit of democratic legitimation 
which is the cause of the increasing discomfort, results from the considerable transfer o 
regulatory powers to the EC. This transfer of powers to the European institutions, of which thi 
most important ones - Council, Commission and Court of Justice - lack democratic legitimation 
requires compensation. However, it is evident that any strengthening of national bodies - eithe 
governments, parliaments or interest groups - will raise the level of conflict in Europeai 
decision-making and increase the dissatisfaction with its outcomes. One approach to settling th 
legitimation problem is to enhance the powers of the European Parliament - which is generall 
demanded as a necessary prerequisite of a democratic political system on the European level 
Another, additional approach, is to balance the transfer of powers to European decision-makin 




























































































time ("Europe of regions"; see Hull/Rhodes 1977 or, more recently, the articles in von 
Alemann/Heinze/Hombach 1990). In federal Member States (like Germany), the transfer of 
regulatory powers in fields where the regions (in Germany the LAnder) are legally competent (in 
Germany inter alia safety) even leads to serious judicial problems, if the regions do not formally 
participate in European decision-making (Falke/Joerges 1987). The establishment of an 
(advisory) committee of the regions by the Maastricht Accord is one reaction to such demands.
Facing such reforms, Schmitter (1992, pp. 40-76) is concerned about the Community’s future. 
He expects that the Community's stability will be threatened by a further diversification of 
decision-making institutions and processes (e.g. the creation of a new advisory committee of the 
regions, the new powers of the European Parliament up to an exceedingly complex co-decision 
procedure [Art. 189b], the Conference of the Parliaments [/es Assises], the dialogue of the social 
partners according to the 11-Member agreement on social policy, and a couple of other 
measures which are less important for our topic but highly important for others, e.g. the 
European Central Bank).
On the other side, regarding the improved opportunities for divide et impera-strategies, this 
diversification of decision-making structures would probably strengthen the Commission's 
position and "weaken further what is left of sovereignty at the national level" (Streeck/Schmitter 
1991, p. 154). As Elias (1969) worked out in his study on the formation of the modem nation­
state, regional particularism generally tends to strengthen the centre, because then the central 
power is able to play off the regional actors against one another. If a multitude of regions tries 
to participate in European decision-making, single tunes will merge into a diffuse choir and 
national positions will be weakened, because regions - forming transnational coalitions - will 
fight against their national governments on Brussels's stage (von Senger und Etterlin 1992, p. 
24, Morass 1992, p. 303).
However, such institutional diversity is characteristic for mature political systems with a 
multitude of regionally and functionally differentiated interests and actors. All modem nation­
states have de facto  network-like decision-making structures with a diversity of channels of 
influence for various territorial and functional actors.
Even in the absolutist states there was a tendency towards de /acro-decentralization of powers 
(which eventually led to their transformation), because with increasing functional differentiation 
there is increasing functional interdependency; and when the level of interdependency increases, 
-systems become more and more self-dynamic and less controllable (Elias 1969, vol. 2, pp. 147- 
148). Or, as Deutsch analyses this phase in the process of state formation:
"The over-all size of the decision-making group became much larger. An increasing number of decisions 
was no longer made by identifiable individuals or small identifiable groups. Rather, decisions emerged 
as the outcome of the partly impersonal interplay of a large number of semi-independent pressure 
groups, each of which concentrated its energy mainly upon the pursuit of a very few limited objectives, 
often with scant regard for the effects of its action in the larger national and international context." 




























































































The decision-making structures within the European Community are already network-like. In the 
process of maturing, the political system of the Community will become even more complex42. 
The complexity and opacity of European decision-making has been in favour of the Commissior 
and of a few partisans whose ideas were adopted and supported by the Commission. Unies! 
there are Member States which will retreat from Community - which becomes increasing!) 
difficult with further integration and dependency -, the further development, including the 
effects of the Maastricht Accord, will probably weaken the national actors and strengthen thj 
European actors. If this happens, the only chance to counterbalance the Commission's centra 
position and to introduce more democratic participation and legitimation can be on the 
supranational level.
Usually, democratization of European decision-making is seen as enhancing the powers of the 
European Parliament. There are, however, serious barriers to and side-effects of enhancee 
decision-making powers of the European Parliament. A grave barrier is that there is still ne 
European political public - an indispensable precondition for a working parliamentarisn 
(Schneider 1992, p. 28). A paradoxical side-effect of enhanced decision-making powers coule 
be a weakening of the European Parliament's political role, because then the national partie: 
would certainly tighten up their control over their Members of the EP, which would probabl; 
lead to a re-nationalization of the debates and decision-making patterns within the EP. It woult 
be fatal for European integration, if the logics of inter-national bargaining would be transfère* 
into the European Parliament. Currently, the political influence of the EP - which appears to b< 
de facto  higher than formally - stems from two phenomena: First, that de facto decision-makini 
in the EC happens within informal networks spanning around the Commission. And secondly 
that there is little national attention and control of EP activities. The Members of the EP are to : 
considerable extent both independent and isolated from the national political arenas and the El 
has become a path for political careers which is quite distinct from the career paths in thi 
national parties. The Members of the EP react to this situation by focusing their activitie 
towards European integration - similarly as the actors of the other supranational institutions, th 
Commission and the Court of Justice. It is doubtful, whether the Parliament would be able ti 
keep its potential for integrative and innovative policies, if its activities became high politics.
For these reasons, it seems to be wise to bet not only on the European Parliament to achieve 
democratization of European decision-making. More democratic or, more soberly, at least mor 
participative decision-making also requires a stronger functional representation of societs 
interests on the European level. An additional system of functional representation to balance th 
different functions (economy, technology, social welfare, ecology etc.) or, in other terms, th 
interest groups (firms, workers, consumers etc.) is especially required in the Europeâ 
Community, which has historically been biased towards the economy (besides agriculture) an 
where the system of territorial representation, primarily the Council, is unlikely to safeguar 
appropriate regard of a balanced public interest. The current tendencies towards improve
42 In his three scenarios for Europe's future, Wessels (1992, pp. 55-6) links the dynamics of integratio 
with the structure of decision-making processes. Whereas reduced complexity of decision-makin 
procedures will occur both in the “backlash'1 scenario (re-nationalization) and in the ‘federal quantui 
leap' scenario (constitutional federalism with diminishing powers of national actors), in the “tren 
extrapolation' scenario, continuing integration is associated with increasing complexity of procedures i 
order to create more channels for participation - probably the most appropriate mechanism to cope wit 
the peculiar combination of the continuance of basic national sovereignty with increasing regulator 




























































































participation of the workers, the consumers, the regions etc. can indeed be viewed as attempts to 
come to holistic rather than particularistic definitions of the public interest on the EC level 
(Zellentin 1992, p. 72).
Especially for the regulation of occupational health, the role of intermediary organizations in the 
European decision-making process appears to be central. Organized interests have important 
.mediating functions in mature, network-like democracies (Cohen/Rogers 1990). On the one 
hand, they articulate the interests of their clienteles to parliaments and governments (pluralism). 
On the other hand, organized interests are engaged in implementing state policy, and partly 
-"incorporated" into governmental regulatory processes (corporatism*3). In European health and 
safety at work regulation, associations perform both functions. Participation of organized 
interests is provided both in the process of directive preparation and in standardization. 
Particularly the delegation of technical regulation to the private-law standardization bodies is an 
outstanding example of corporatist governance.
That pluralist participation in decision-making and corporatist participation in governance do not 
currently work entirely satisfactorily, however, results from the fact that most interest groups - 
including the standardization bodies - are organized on the national level. Most of the European 
peak organizations which already exist are weak federations of the national associations without 
direct membership (like CEN and CENELEC, while ETSI permits direct membership), with 
few resources of their own (compared to the resources of the respective national organizations) 
and, usually, very little authority to act on behalf of their members (see Kohler-Koch 1992). 
Within the European organizations, national thinking is still rife and conflicts between the 
national member organizations limit their ranges of action, whereas the national organizations 
still continue to operate on the European scene independently and not seldom against one 
another. The activities of most European peak organizations is limited to, important enough, the 
observation of European regulatory processes, while they would be overcharged with the task of 
interest aggregation and representation (ibid., p. 96). Only the industrial associations - 94 % of 
the S2S registered European organizations - are fairly strong because of better personal and 
financial resources, accumulated experiences, built-up communication networks and channels of 
influence (ibid., pp. 95-6).
Streeck and Schmitter (1991) go so far as to speak of "the failure of Euro-Corporatism" - at 
-least on the premise that fully-developed corporatism requires centralized collective bargaining 
between monopolist organizations of capital and labour (according to Schmitter’s definition of 
corporatism; see Schmitter 1974, pp. 93-98). Their analysis, however, is based on two 
consequences of the intergovemmentalist supposition that the primary mechanism of European 43
43 "Corporatism" is understood here as the integration of organized interests into the processes of policy­
making and policy-implementation (Voelzkow 1991). Whereas many scholars define corporatism this 
way by function, (e.g. Anderson 1977, p. 191; Lehmbruch 1979, p. 55; see also the definitions quoted 
by von Alemann/Heinze 1979), Schmitter (1974, pp. 93-98) defines corporatism by structure, i.e. as a 
system of government-acknowledged interest organizations with a monopoly of representation within 
their domain (while pluralist systems are characterized by less government regulation and competing 
interest groups). It is usually assumed that (regulatory) function and (monopolist) structure correspond 
(with a cautious formulation: Schmitter 1981, p. 67; critically: von Beyme 1981). The difference 
between both definition approaches becomes significant, if this is not the case, especially if groups 





























































































decison-making is negative integration. One consequence is that the pressure groups which are 
interested in deregulation ("business" or "capital") have to do nothing more than just to refuse tc 
empower their European peak organizations to participate in European arenas of corporatisi 
negotiations and to enter into binding obligations on behalf of their national membei 
organizations (ibid., p. 141). The strategy to "prevent centralization of [corporatist, V.E.] 
regulatory capacity simply by refusing to build the organizations necessary for them to be able 
to make binding commitments at the central level" (ibid., p. 142) is successful because of th< 
second consequence, the mutual blockade of the veto-powered national governments within the 
Council, whose institutional self-interest in avoiding any loss of sovereignty is reinforced by the 
"capital's" pressure on them to prevent social regulation on the European level. The result il 
that the nation-state remains the primary scene of social regulation and hence the main target o) 
interest group activities.
"In the history of the Community up to the present, intergovernmental ism and the veto powers o 
individual nations were always strong enough to preempt or modify centrally made decisions. Organizer 
interests thus had no other choice even if they were otherwise inclined, than to maintain a strong nationa 
base and to cultivate established channels of influence. This .. holds in particular for groups and it 
policy arenas where the interest is more in nondecisions than it is in decisions. As long as thi 
Community - that is, its nonintergovemmental institutions such as the Parliament and the Commission 
cannot autonomously determine the range of policy that come under its jurisdiction, its ability t< 
influence the structure of organized group interests will remain low indeed." (Streeclc/Schmitter 1991, p 
143)
At least in the specific sector of social regulation which has been analyzed in this paper, thing: 
have changed in the meanwhile. First, the Commission has acquired quite a bit of proces: 
control in all phases of the regulatory process and become a key actor in the process o 
European decision-making. Hence, the Commission has become a target of associative pressure 
and the Commission itself eagerly promotes a constituency of European interest groups (alsc 
providing it with expertise and working capacities). Secondly, the mechanism of negativi 
integration was turned into a  mechanism of positive integration, when the main negotiation: 
were shifted away from the Council to the consultative committees. Within these committees 
the logics of decision-making are reversed: while unanimous decision-making is in favour o 
obstructionism, the working style of a consultative committee is in favour of high-leve 
regulation, because it creates a vacuum to be filled with positive proposals, adding to a growinj 
list o f items which are taken into consideration by the directive-preparing Commission.
It is the logics of positive integration within network-like decision-preparing structures that i 
responsible for "babies growing fat", as Commission President Delors put it on the Birminghan 
summit of 16.10.1992 (quoted after Der Spiegel of 22.10.1992). The more actors - nationa 
government representatives, European Parliament, Economic and Social Committee, sing! 
interest groups, standardization bodies etc. - express their demands the more likely is it that nev 
regulations are added to the original Commission proposal. The depicted genesis of the Displa; 
Screen Equipment Directive is a good example of such a "baby", which gained considerabl 
regulatory weight by adopting additional proposals of the ESC and the EP. These procedure 
logics also contribute to the observed tendency of a high-level regulation.
Since any actor applying to the Commission has a chance of positive influence, single interei 
groups can no longer prevent the development of a corporatist system of interest representatio 




























































































greater if it is not balanced out. The Commission's readiness to engage partisans for the work of 
drafting the technical annexes (and consequent tasks) has been mentioned. The interested parties 
have a burden of initiative: only the one who participates in the decision-making process has a 
chance of influencing it - the one who refuses cannot prevent decision-making any more.
Streeck and Schmitter are right that the emerging "postindustrial" Euro-Corporatism will be 
_ quite different from the kind of corporatism which is typical for mature capitalism, i.e. a 
corporatism characterized by established arenas of autonomous regulation by monopoly 
organizations of capital and labor. To the degree that the class conflict is be replaced by a 
- multitude of other, interfering conflict lines - between higher and lower industrialized countries, 
wage maximization and humanization of work, polluters and environmentalists, workers and 
consumers, manufacturers and users, small and big business, region and nation-state etc. - the 
system of organized interests - "disjointed pluralism" as called by the authors -
"would be characterized by a profound absence o f  hierarchy and monopoly among a wide variety o f  
players o f  different but uncertain status. Interest associations, and quite a few of them, will certainly 
be among those players. But they will have to compete for attention with national states, subnational 
regions, large firms, and specialized lobbyists, leaving their constituents with a wide range of choices 
among different paths of access to the Community's political center and enabling them to use threats of 
exits to coerce their representatives into pluralist responsiveness." (Streeck/Schmitter 1991, p. 159)
This is an excellent description of the incorporation of organized interests (both non­
governmental and governmental actors) into the network of European decision-making in health 
and safety at work regulation since the introduction of the New Approach. The fact that the 
Commission or the standardization bodies are open to any group applying to them, or, in other 
terms, that there are no monopolies of interest representation gives rise to a theoretical problem: 
classical corporatist theory assumed that functional integration in governmental policy-making 
requires monopolist representation of interests, because otherwise the interest groups have no 
opportunities to enter into obligations which are binding for their constituents, because their 
constituency can withdraw support and change to other, competing organizations.
Fortunately, this problem does not occur in European regulatory policy, because the outcomes 
of corporatist regulation are generally binding, either directly legally binding - like the directives 
- or, within the framework of directive reference, de facto binding - like the standards which are 
.  set to specify New Approach directives. Since standardization bodies are not interest 
organizations but meta-organizations to which the interested parties express their demands, the 
delegation of regulatory functions to associative bodies can be called a pluralist corporatism (as 
-against Schmitter's "monopolist" corporatism), because the democratic legitimation of this 
associative regulation requires the participation of a plurality of organized interests rather than 
monopolist structures of interest representation, which would necessarily fail to cope with the 
extreme heterogenity of interests within the European Community, both in terms of territorial 
and functional diversity. The heterogenity of interests, which cannot be reduced to simple 
dichotomies (like that between labor and capital), has always been the reason why technical 
regulation cannot be organized by bipartite or tripartite bodies but only by committees consisting 





























































































The pluralist way may even be the only way that corporatism can work on the European level44. 
When the outcomes of health and safety at work regulation and of the "social dialogue", which 
started in January 1985 in Val Duchesse (Kommission 1991), are compared, the former appear: 
to be far more successful than the latter, the long and cumbersome negotiations of which 
resulted in not much more than a few noncommittal resolutions (although a slow progress musi 
be conceded since 1985). The story of the social dialogue also reveals that monopolist interesi 
representation on the European level suffers from the overwhelming, obstructionist influence ol 
the national member organizations.
The developing, pluralist Euro-corporatism, however, is connected with another, more sevetf 
problem. For a working political system on the European level, the interest groups must tx 
responsive to the opportunities of the European decision-making structure and must become able 
to participate effectively in the complex networks. This requires a different strategy toward: 
European regulation: Instead of defending national positions against European regulation, whicl 
is still primarily regarded as a threat (especially for monopolist regulatory authority withir 
corporatist frameworks on the national level), European regulation has to be viewed as ai 
opportunity for social innovation.
European integration has become a matter of fact. The arena for interest group activities ha 
been shifting from the national capitals to Brussels. This shift was regretted by most interes 
groups, because it was connected with the loss of well-known lobbies, procedures and contac 
persons, of channels of communication, of vested rights and - frequently - of monopolist acces 
to relevant actors within the national political system. However, fighting against the transfer o 
regulatory powers to Brussels does not seem promising, because the EC will regulate anyway 
even without participation of the groups who fail to direct their attention to Brussels. For mos 
interest groups, the time has come to adjust to the new situation and to direct the focus of thei 
attention to the lobbies in Brussels.
I f  you can't beat them, join them. Interest groups - and other actors - have improved chances o 
influence, if they organize directly on the European level and join the existing coalition o 
European actors -of the Commission, the Court of Justice, the European Parliament and th 
lobbyists who are already present (see von Senger und Etterlin 1992, p. 21). Th 
standardization-related political and financial support of the Trade Union Technical Bureau an 
o f the consumer organizations are examples that the Commission is willing to support Europea: 
interest groups, because it fits into its strategy towards Europeanization of decision-making 
Interest groups - or innovators within such groups, who do not succeed on the national level an 
who may try to realize their ideas on the European level - may take advantage of the institution: 
self-interest of the European actors in creating a European system of corporatist governance 
There have already been examples of a filtering of the rather innovative individuals and faction
44 Another discussion would be to compare both kinds of corporatism (or, in Schmitter's term: 
"pluralism" and "corporatism") in the light of the theory of democracy. Whereas it is an importai 
condition for the legitimacy of monopolies of functional interest representation that the individual: 
interests are primarily defìned by their roles and occupations and thus clearly identifiable an 
unambiguous, a pluralist corporatism offers choices according to individual preferences. Hence, 
pluralist corporatism may be more appropriate for post-industrial societies (e.g. as pictured by Bee 
1986), when socio-economic classes dissolve into individualization and new problems of survival aril 




























































































who got oriented towards Brussels from the rather conservative ones who remained focused on 
the national arenas.
A positive influence on European decision-making requires a positive, offensive attitude. Still 
the behaviour o f many actors seems to be determined by expectations, which have been rendered 
misdirected ever since the Single European Act and the Commission's fresh regulatory drive . If 
.  European regulation is not taken seriously, if deregulation is still falsely expected, chances of 
influence are squandered. As mentioned above, expecting social dumping from European 





























European Committee for Standardization
European Committee for electrotechnical Standardization
Computer Integrated Manufacturing
German Institute for Standardization
European Community (-ties)
European Free Trade Association 
European Parliament
Economic and Social Committee of the European Communities 
European Telecommunications Standards Institute 
European Trade Union Confederation 
European Workshop for Open Systems 
International Organization for Standardization
Liaison Group of the European Mechanical, Electrotechnical, Electronic and
Metalworking Industries
Technical Committee
Trade Unions Technical Bureau
Trade Unions Technical Bureau
Union of Industrial and Employers Confederations of Europe 
Working Group
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